[Drawn by Boudier, from one of the sarcophagi of Sidon, now
in the Museum of St. Irene. The vignette, which is by
Faucher-Gudin, represents the sitting cyno-cephalus of
Nectanebo I., now in the Egyptian Museum at the Vatican.]
Darius appears to have formed this project of conquest immediately after his first victories, when his initial attempts to institute satrapies had taught him not only the condition and needs of Asia Minor, but of the teaching the Scythians such a lesson as would prevent them from bearing down upon his right flank during his march, or upon his rear while engaged in a crucial struggle in the Hellenic peninsula. On the other hand, the geographical information possessed by the Persians with regard to the Danubian regions was of so vague a character, that Darius must have believed the Scythians to have been nearer to his line of operations, and their country less desolate than was really the case.* A flotilla, commanded by Ariaramnes, satrap of Cappadocia, ventured across the Black Sea in 515,** landed a few thousand men upon the opposite shore, and brought back prisoners who furnished those in command with the information they required.***
* The motives imputed to Darius by the ancients for making
this expedition are the desire of avenging the disasters of
the Scythian invasion, or of performing an exploit which
should render him as famous as his predecessors in the eyes
of posterity.
** The reconnaissance of Ariaramnes is intimately connected
with the expedition itself in Ctesias, and could have
preceded it by a few months only. If we take for the date of
the latter the year 514-513, the date given in the Table of
the Capitol, that of the former cannot be earlier than 515.
Ariaramnes was not satrap of Cappadocia, for Cappadocia
belonged then to the satrapy of Daskylion.
*** The supplementary paragraphs of the Inscription of
Behistun speak of an expedition of Darius against the Sako,
which is supposed to have had as its objective either the
sea of Aral or the Tigris. Would it not be possible to
suppose that the sea mentioned is the Pontus Euxinus, and to
take the mutilated text of Behistun to be a description
either of the campaign beyond the Danube, or rather of the
preliminary reconnaissance of Ariaramnes a year before the
expedition itself?
Darius, having learned what he could from these poor wretches, crossed the Bosphorus in 514, with a body of troops which tradition computed at 800,000, conquered the eastern coast of Thrace, and won his way in a series of conflicts as far as the Ister. The Ionian sailors built for him a bridge of boats, which he entrusted to their care, and he then started forward into the steppes in search of the enemy. The Scythians refused a pitched battle, but they burnt the pastures before him on every side, filled up the wells, carried off the cattle, and then slowly retreated into the interior, leaving Darius to face the vast extent of the steppes and the terrors of famine. Later tradition stated that he wandered for two months in these solitudes between the Ister and the Tanais; he had constructed on the banks of this latter river a series of earthworks, the remains of which were shown in the time of Herodotus, and had at length returned to his point of departure with merely the loss of a few sick men. The barbarians stole a march upon him, and advised the Greeks to destroy the bridge, retire within their cities, and abandon the Persians to their fate. The tyrant of the Ohersonnesus, Miltiades the Athenian, was inclined to follow their advice; but Histiasus, the governor of Miletus, opposed it, and eventually carried his point. Darius reached the southern bank without difficulty, and returned to Asia.*
* Ctesias limits the campaign beyond the Danube to a fifteen
days’ march; and Strabo places the crossing of the Danube
near the mouth of that river, at the island of Peukê, and
makes the expedition stop at the Dniester. Neither the line
of direction of the Persian advance nor their farthest point
reached is known. The eight forts which they were said to
have built, the ruins of which were shown on the banks of
the Oaros as late as the time of Herodotus, were probably
tumuli similar to those now met with on the Russian steppes,
the origin of which is ascribed by the people to persons
celebrated in their history or traditions.
The Greek towns of Thrace thought themselves rid of him, and rose in revolt; but he left 80,000 men in Europe who, at first under Megabyzos, and then under Otanes, reduced them to subjection one after another, and even obliged Amyntas I., the King of Macedonia, to become a tributary of the empire. The expedition had not only failed to secure the submission of the Scythians, but apparently provoked reprisals on their part, and several of their bands penetrated ere long into the Chersonnesus. It nevertheless was not without solid result, for it showed that Darius, even if he could not succeed in subjugating the savage Danubian tribes, had but little to fear from them; it also secured for him a fresh province, that of Thrace, and, by the possession of Macedonia, brought his frontier into contact with Northern Greece. The overland route, in any case the more satisfactory of the two, was now in the hands of the invader.
Revolutions at Athens prevented him from setting out on his expedition as soon as he had anticipated. Hippias had been overthrown in 510, and having taken refuge at Sigoum, was seeking on all sides for some one to avenge him against his fellow-citizens. The satrap of Sardes, Arta-phernes, declined at first to listen to him, for he hoped that the Athenians themselves would appeal to him, without his being obliged to have recourse to their former tyrant. As a matter of fact, they sent him an embassy, and begged his help against the Spartans. He promised it on condition that they would yield the traditional homage of earth and water, and their delegates complied with his demand, though on their return to Athens they were disowned by the citizens (508). Artaphernes, disappointed in this direction, now entered into communications with Hippias, and such close relations soon existed between the two that the Athenians showed signs of uneasiness. Two years later they again despatched fresh deputies to Sardes to beg the satrap not to espouse the cause of their former ruler. For a reply the satrap summoned them to recall the exiles, and, on their refusing (506),* their city became thenceforward the ostensible objective of the Persian army and fleet. The partisans of Hippias within the town were both numerous and active; it was expected that they would rise and hand over the city as soon as their chief should land on a point of territory with a force sufficient to intimidate the opposing faction. Athens in the hands of Hippias, would mean Athens in the hands of the Persians, and Greece accessible to the Persian hordes at all times by the shortest route. Darius therefore prepared to make the attempt, and in order to guard against any mishap, he caused all the countries that he was about to attack to be explored beforehand. Spies attached to his service were sent to scour the coasts of the Peloponnesus and take note of all its features, the state of its ports, the position of the islands and the fortresses; and they penetrated as far as Italy, if we may believe the story subsequently told to Herodotus.**
* Herodotus fixes the date at the time when the Athenians
first ostracised the principal partisans of the
Pisistratids, and amongst others Hipparchus, son of Charmes,
i.e. in 507-6.
** Herodotus said that Darius sent spies with the physician
Democedes of Crotona shortly before the Scythian expedition.
While he thus studied the territory from a distance, he did not neglect precautions nearer to hand, but ordered the Milesians to occupy in his name the principal stations of the Ægean between Ionia and Attica. Histiasus, whose loyalty had stood Darius in such good stead at the bridge over the Danube, did not, however, appear to him equal to so delicate a task: the king summoned him to Susa on some slight pretext, loaded him with honours, and replaced him by his nephew Aristagoras. Aristagoras at once attempted to justify the confidence placed in him by taking possession of Naxos; but the surprise that he had prepared ended in failure, discontent crept in among his men, and after a fruitless siege of four months he was obliged to withdraw (499).* His failure changed the tide of affairs. He was afraid that the Persians would regard it as a crime, and this fear prompted him to risk everything to save his fortune and his life. He retired from his office as tyrant, exhorted the Milesians, who were henceforth free to do so, to make war on the barbarians, and seduced from their allegiance the crews of the vessels just returned from Naxos, and still lying in the mouths of the Meander; the tyrants who commanded them were seized, some exiled, and some put to death. The Æolians soon made common cause with their neighbours the Ionians, and by the last days of autumn the whole of the Ægean littoral was under arms (499).**
* Herodotus attributes an unlikely act of treachery to
Megabates the Persian, who was commanding the Iranian
contingent attached to the Ionian troops.
** The Dorian cities took no part in the revolt—at least
Herodotus never mentions them among the confederates. The
three Ionian cities of Ephesus, Kolophon, and Lebedos also
seem to have remained aloof, and we know that the Ephesians
were not present at the battle of Ladê.