The army thus moved forward, and A. P. Hill leading, struck the enemy near, and in, the town of Gettysburg sharply on the afternoon of July 1. We were following some little distance in the rear, and heard the lively fire of cannon and rifles, and soon after got the news of Hill's and Ewell's decided success in an important preliminary engagement. Many prisoners and much material remained with the Confederates. This stimulated every one forward, and Ewell taking position on our left, we were all snugly in bivouac at a good hour, with Longstreet's two divisions, McLaws and Hood, about four miles in rear, but ready for movement next day. Pickett had been doing guard duty at Chambersburg and was not yet up, but would be in the morning. The serious mishap of the day was Ewell's failure to seize the heights on the left. General Lee expected it of him, and we know of no impediment.
CHAPTER XXI
Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 2, 3, 1863
Expectation of revelations—Longstreet and Lee—Attacks not in good combination between the three corps—July 2, situation unfavorable—Our heavy attack on the right—Ground and guns taken—Round Top reinforced checks us—Longstreet leads—Hood and Longstreet—Am slightly wounded—Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle, Coldstream Guards—Captain Ross, Austrian Army—July 3, necessity of a stroke—Pickett's charge—His repulse—Lee's noble encouragements—July 4, not attacked—Holding ground—Withdrawal at night—The retreat, and passage of the river.
On the tremendous and decisive battle of Gettysburg, now about to engage the two armies, more has probably been written than on any battle since Waterloo. There seems to be a feeling abroad that great secrets explaining why we were beaten are yet to be told and that they are locked up in the breasts of a few men, one of them the present writer, Longstreet's chief of staff. There is absolutely nothing in that expectation; no living man knows more about the battle than has already been written.
Lee has made his report. Longstreet has written a book and said his say. The staff has little or nothing to add. Communications were in the main between Lee and Longstreet, verbally, or occasionally by note direct.
The story has been in part told by Longstreet. We can discover that he did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief. As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. His plans may have been better than Lee's, but it was too late to alter them with the troops ready to open fire on each other. Ewell on the left, A. P. Hill and Longstreet on the right, seemed never able to work together, and I can well imagine the great soul of our Commander deeply furrowed with the difficulties about him and what was going on to the disadvantage of the army. This is all I shall permit myself to express on this well-worn but ever interesting subject. One can build many theories, but theories only will they be; besides, my opinion is already given that the loss of the campaign was due to the absence of Stuart's cavalry.
I proceed to jot down idly some "choses vues" of the military events and incidents of the three great days of this remarkable historic battle and the days immediately about it.