Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer

by G. Moxley Sorrel

A fine opportunity of crushing Burnside was lost at Campbell's Station. Burnside's retreat was in time to cover the roads leading into it, and there he had to make a stand. We should have beaten him badly, but he escaped and was soon safe in Knoxville. The roads were deep in mud and caused hard travel and labor, but they were no better for the Union force.

Campbell's Station cannot be termed a serious battle. It was principally an artillery fight, in which the gallant Alexander was tormented by defective ammunition. It should have been a strong and decisive battle, but things went wrong with the infantry divisions and an effective co-operation was not secured. Ah! would that we could have had Hood again at the head of his division.

As it was, the five brigades of this fine command were practically paralyzed by the differences between the senior brigadier in command, Jenkins, and his competitor, General E. M. Law. It was a most unhappy condition of things, but by no fault of Longstreet. When Mr. Davis visited us at Chickamauga the Lieutenant-General laid the situation before him and urged the promotion and appointment of Jenkins, to which Mr. Davis would not listen. He was asked then to appoint Law, but this also met the Executive's "No," that officer being junior; and then Longstreet begged the assignment of any good major-general to be found elsewhere. But none came then; months after one was sent when irretrievable mischief had been done by the unfortunate condition of the division. It lasted during all the subsequent operations in East Tennessee throughout the winter.

Thus it came about that the enemy eluded us at Campbell's Station, and the next day was behind his works at Knoxville, except his cavalry, which lingered to retard our march. Our army followed closely, at once put the enemy's works under fire, and so began what is called the "Siege of Knoxville."

By many it is thought to have been a serious error on the part of the Confederate commander, the resorting to so slow a process. "He should have attacked immediately"; and I am disposed to consider intelligent statements of Union officers and citizens of Knoxville, long after, as indicating that an energetic movement, without the slightest delay, would have carried us into the town and brought Burnside to terms.

On the 18th of November McLaws advanced against some defenses of skirmishers, but part of his line halted before reaching the crest of the hill. Captain Winthrop, an Englishman serving with Alexander, dashed forward, and encouraging the men got through the hill in handsome style. It was well done by "Bull" Winthrop, as we called him, and he picked up a nasty wound in the doing of it.

Burnside's strongest defense was Fort Loudon, later called Fort Saunders, for the gallant officer of that name who fell in its defense. It was a strong earthwork, closely under McLaws's eye, who was expected to capture it. Of course he had done much work toward it—ditches, parallels, and many devices for success. A night attack was proposed and at one time favored.

On the 22d General McLaws thought the time had come and he was ordered to prepare his assaulting column, supported by the division. Longstreet also ordered up other troops for support and following up a success. Later on McLaws reported that his officers preferred daylight for the work before them and the movement was for the time deferred. On the 23d we heard that Bragg had been attacked at Chattanooga. Bushrod Johnson's division of two brigades was at Loudon moving to us, and our strength then would be eleven brigades of infantry, Wheeler's cavalry of four brigades (Wheeler himself had been ordered back by Bragg, leaving the horse under command of Maj.-Gen. Will T. Martin), Alexander's artillery, and Leyden's battalion.

On the 25th, Bragg's chief engineer, General Leadbetter, brought orders from the former to attack immediately. Longstreet was reluctant. Troops from Virginia were on the march, due with us in eight or ten days, and with them the investment could be made complete. The enemy was also said to be on half rations, and an attack now with chances of our repulse would be all in his favor. But Leadbetter felt that Bragg's orders were imperative and the assault must be attempted. Minute orders were then sent to McLaws for the effort. The details are rather lengthy for the scope of these recollections. It was intended for the 28th, but because of bad weather put off until the 29th. At the appointed time the vigorous assault was made in fine form by the brigades of Wofford, Humphreys, and Bryan in the early gray of the morning. At first we seemed to be going right ahead, shoving everything aside, but some stops were made and the wounded men began coming back.

General Longstreet says that when Major Goggin, an old Army man on McLaws's staff, reported to him that it would be useless to persevere, that the fort was so surrounded with net-works of wire that no progress could be made without axes and not an axe was to be found—"Without a second thought, I ordered the recall." He says later that the accounts of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the works, convinced him that the few wires met with were far from being the serious obstacle reported and that we could have gone in without axes. It also seemed sure that the fort was nearly ours by the retirement of part of its garrison, only some two hundred men being kept with the guns.