326. Émile learns a Trade.—At the age of fifteen, Émile will know nothing of history, nothing of humanity, nothing of art and literature, nothing of God; but he will know a trade, a manual trade. By this means, he will be sheltered from need in advance, in case a revolution should strip him of his fortune.

“We are approaching,” says Rousseau, with an astonishing perspicacity, “a century of revolutions. Who can give you assurance of what will then become of you? I hold it to be impossible for the great monarchies of Europe to last much longer. They have all had their day of glory, and every State that dazzles is in its decline.”

We have previously noticed, in studying analogous ideas in the case of Locke, for what other reasons Rousseau made of Émile an apprentice to a cabinet-maker or a carpenter.

327. Émile at the Age of Fifteen.—Rousseau takes comfort in the contemplation of his work, and he pauses from time to time in his analyses and deductions, to trace the portrait of his pupil. This is how he represents him at the age of fifteen:—

“Émile has but little knowledge, but that which he has is really his own; he knows nothing by halves. In the small number of things that he knows, and knows well, the most important is that there are many things which he does not know, but which he can some day learn; that there are many more things which other men know, but which he will never know; and that there is an infinity of other things which no man will ever know. He has a universal mind, not through actual knowledge, but through the ability to acquire it. He has a mind that is open, intelligent, prepared for everything, and, as Montaigne says, if not instructed, at least capable of being instructed. It is sufficient for me that he knows how to find the of what good is it? with reference to all that he does, and the why? of all that he believes. Once more, my object is not at all to give him knowledge, but to teach him how to acquire it as he may need it, to make him estimate it at its exact worth, and to make him love truth above everything else. With this method, progress is slow; but there are no false steps, and no danger of being obliged to retrace one’s course.”

All this is well; but it is necessary to add that even Émile has faults, great faults. To mention but one of them, but one which dominates all the others, he sees things only from the point of view of utility, and he would not hesitate, for example, “to give the Academy of Sciences for the smallest bit of pastry.”

328. Education of the Sensibilities.—It is true that Rousseau finally decides to make of Émile an affectionate and reasonable being. “We have formed,” he says, “his body, his senses, his judgment; it remains to give him a heart.” Rousseau, who proceeds like a magician, by wave of wand and clever tricks, flatters himself that within a day’s time Émile is going to become the most affectionate, the most moral, and the most religious of men.

329. The Fourth Book of the Émile.—The development of the affectionate sentiments, the culture of the moral sentiment, and that of the religious sentiment, such is the triple subject of the fourth book,—vast and exalted questions that lend themselves to eloquence in such a way that the fourth book of the Émile is perhaps the most brilliant of the whole work.

330. Genesis of the Affectionate Sentiments.—Here Rousseau is wholly in the land of chimeras. Émile, who lives in isolation, who has neither family, friends, nor companions, is necessarily condemned to selfishness, and everything Rousseau can do to warm his heart will be useless. Do we wish to develop the feelings of tenderness and affection? Let us begin by placing the child under family or social influences which alone can furnish his affections the occasion for development. For fifteen years Rousseau leaves the heart of Émile unoccupied. What an illusion to think he will be able to fill it all at once! When we suppress the mother in the education of a child, all the means that we can invent to excite in his soul emotions of gentleness and affection are but palliatives. Rousseau made the mistake of thinking that a child can be taught to love as he is taught to read and write, and that lessons could be given to Émile in feeling just as lessons are given to him in geometry.