The History of Pedagogy

by Gabriel Compayré

In other terms, Descartes ascertained that his studies, though pursued with ardor for eight years in one of the most celebrated schools of Europe, had not permitted him to acquire “a clear and sure knowledge of all that is useful for living.” This was to condemn the barren teaching and the formal instruction of the Jesuits. Passing in review the different parts of the instruction, Descartes first remarks that it was wrong to make an abuse of the reading of ancient books; for, to hold converse with the men of other centuries “is about the same as travelling; and when we spend too much time in travelling, we become strangers in our own country.” Then he complains that he was not made to know “the true use of mathematics,” since he had been shown their application only to the mechanic arts. He nearly condemns rhetoric and poetics, since eloquence and poetry are “intellectual gifts rather than the fruits of study.” The ancient languages—and in this he gravely deceives himself—seem to him useful only for the understanding of authors. He does not admit that the study of Latin or Greek can contribute to intellectual development.

From these reflections there seems to issue the notion of an instruction more solid, more positive, more directly useful for the purposes of life, than that which had been brought into fashion by the Jesuits. However, Descartes does not eliminate the ordinary studies, as eloquence, “which has incomparable power and beauty”; poetry, “which has an enchanting tenderness and melody”; the reading of the classics, which is “a studied conversation with the most estimable men of past centuries”; history, “which forms the judgment”; fables, whose “charm arouses the spirit.” But he would give to all these exercises a more practical turn, a more utilitarian character, a more positive application.

203. Great Principles of Modern Pedagogy.—Without intending it, without any other thought than that of modifying the false direction of the mind in the search for scientific truth, Descartes has stated some of the great principles of modern pedagogy.

The first is the equal aptitude of minds to know and comprehend. “Good sense,” says Descartes, “is the thing of all else in this world that is most equally distributed.[129] ... The latent ability to judge well, to distinguish the true from the false, is naturally equal among all men.” What is this but saying that all men are entitled to instruction? In a certain sense, what are the innumerable primary schools scattered over the surface of the civilized globe, but the application and the living commentary of Descartes’ ideas on the equal distribution of good sense and reason among men?

But, adds Descartes, “it is not enough to have a sound mind; the principal thing is to make a good use of it.” In other words, nature is not sufficient in herself; she needs to be guided and directed. Method is the essential thing; it has a sovereign importance. Success will depend less on natural qualities, such as imagination, memory, quickness of thought, than upon the rules of intellectual direction imposed on the mind. Education has a far greater part than nature in the formation and development of accurate and upright intelligences.

Another Cartesian principle is the substitution of free inquiry and reflective conviction for blind beliefs founded upon authority. Descartes promulgated this famous rule of his method: “The first precept is, never to receive anything for true that I do not know, upon evidence, to be such; ... and to comprise no more within my judgments than what is presented so clearly and distinctly to my mind that I have no occasion to call it in question.” In this declaration he has not only reformed science and revolutionized philosophy, but has banished from the school the old routine, the mechanical processes and exercises of pure memory, and has made a demand for rational methods that excite the intelligence, awaken clear and distinct ideas, and provoke judgment and reflection. Of course, it is not proposed to make a little Descartes out of every child, despoiling him of received beliefs in order to construct personal opinions de novo; but the rule of evidence, applied with moderation and discretion, is none the less an excellent pedagogical precept, which will never be disallowed by those who wish to make of the child something more than a mere machine.

204. Objective and Subjective Pedagogy.—We have now reached a place where we may call into notice two different tendencies, equally legitimate, which we shall find, with exaggerations that compromise their utility, in the practice of modern teachers. There are those who wish above all to develop the intelligence; and there are others who are preoccupied with furnishing the mind with a stock of positive knowledge. The first conceive instruction as taking place, as it were, through what is within, through the development of the internal qualities of precision and measure; the others are preoccupied only with the instruction that takes place through what is without, through an extended erudition, through an accumulation of knowledges. In a word, if I may be allowed the expression, some affect a subjective pedagogy, and others an objective pedagogy. Bacon is of the latter number. That which preoccupies the great English logician above everything else is the extension of observations and experiments. “To reason without knowing anything of that which we reason upon,” he says, “is as if we were to weigh or measure the wind.” Descartes, however, who has never neglected the study of facts, esteems them less as material to be accumulated in the mind, than as instruments for training the mind itself. He would have repudiated those teachers of our day who seem to think the whole thing is done when there has been made to pass before the mental vision of the child an interminable series of object-lessons, without the thought of developing that intelligence itself.

205. Malebranche (1638-1715).—We must not expect great pedagogical wisdom from a mystical dreamer and resolute idealist, who has imagined the vision of all things in God. Besides, Malebranche has given only a passing attention to things relating to education. The member of a teaching congregation, the Oratory, he has not taught; and the whole effort of his mind was spent in the search for metaphysical truth. Nevertheless, it is interesting to stop for a moment this visionary who traverses the earth with eyes fixed on the heavens, and inquire of him what he thinks of the very practical question, education.