[129] I am in doubt whether M. Compayré intends to sanction this doctrine or not. This is an anticipation of one of Jacotot’s paradoxes: “All human beings are equally capable of learning.” The verdict of actual teachers is undoubtedly to the effect that there are manifold differences in the ability of pupils to know, comprehend, and judge. (P.)
[130] Is not the antagonism pointed out by Malebranche more serious than M. Compayré seems to think? If the current of mental activity sets strongly towards the feelings, emotions, or senses, it is thereby diverted from the purely intellectual processes, such as reflection and judgment. The mind of the savage is an example of what comes from “following the order of nature” in an extreme training of the senses. On the nature and extent of this antagonism, the following authorities may be consulted: Hamilton, Metaphysics, p. 336; Mansel, Metaphysics, pp. 68, 70, 77; Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 392-394; Bain, Education as a Science, pp. 17, 29, 37; Spencer, Principles of Psychology, pp. 98-99. (P.)
[131] John Locke. His Life and his Work. Paris, 1878.
[132] Thoughts, translation by G. Compayré, p. 57.
[133] Demogeot et Montucci, de l’Enseignement secondaire en Angleterre, p. 41.
[134] On the question of corporal punishment in school, is not M. Compayré too absolute in his assumptions? On what principle does he base his absolute condemnation of the rod? What is to be done in those cases of revolt against order and decency that occur from time to time in most schools? There is no doubt that the very best teachers can govern without resorting to this hateful expedient; but what shall be done in extreme cases by the multitude who are not, and never can be, teachers of this ideal type? Nor does this question stand alone. Below, it is related to family discipline; and above, to civil administration. If corporal punishment is interdicted in the school, should it not be interdicted in the State? (P.)
[135] It is usually said that a pupil’s distaste for a study indicates one of two things, either the mode of presenting the subject is bad, or it is presented at an unseasonable period of mental development; but this distaste is quite as likely to be due to the fact that a certain mode of mental activity has not yet been established; for until fairly established, its exercise cannot be pleasurable. The assumption that intellectual appetites already exist and are waiting to be gratified, or that they will invariably appear at certain periods of mental development, is by no means a general law of the mental life. In many cases, these appetites must be created, and it may often be that the studies employed for this purpose may not at first be relished. And there are cases where, under the best of skill, this relish may never come; and still, the knowledge or the discipline is so necessary that the studies may be enforced contrary to the pupil’s pleasure. (P.)
[136] Thoughts, edited by R. H. Quick (Cambridge, 1880), pp. 153-4.
[137] Thoughts, p. 177.