While, however, the Convention was divided on the question of the secession of the State, and, during its earlier sessions, how evenly divided none could tell, nearly all, if not all, of its members were professed Unionists. The people had elected them as Unionists. It was loudly proclaimed that Unionism had triumphed at the polls by from forty to sixty thousand majority. Nearly every man that spoke during the deliberations of the Convention with great vigor asserted that he was in favor of maintaining the Union. The Hon. Hamilton R. Gamble, chairman of the Committee on Federal Relations, in explaining to the Convention the report of that committee, said: “As far as my acquaintance with the gentlemen of this Convention extends, I know of no gentlemen who avow, or insinuate, or in any manner admit, that they entertain any unfriendly feeling to the Union. You may speak to any member of the Convention you please in reference to his position about the Union, and he will proclaim that he is in favor of the Union. How, then, in the introduction of this question before this body, shall I undertake to speak in favor of the Union, when there is a unanimity, an entire unanimity, among all the members upon the very view which I would endeavor to take and enforce?”
Any one unacquainted with the hair-splitting political doctrines of that day might have been deceived by this emphatic and universal profession of Unionism by the members of this sovereign Convention. Calhoun also frequently made the strongest declarations of his warm attachment to the Union. But neither he nor they had in mind the actual government formed by the people of the States under the Constitution, in contradistinction to the confederation that preceded it, but simply a compact of sovereign States, which having been voluntarily entered into could by any State be lawfully terminated at will. Many in this Convention were conscious or unconscious disciples of Calhoun, and in their speeches advocated his political heresies. Their effusive professions of devotion to the Union deceived no one who was at all conversant with our political history. The Hon. Mr. Gamble, whose words I have quoted in reference to their “entire unanimity” for the Union, understood them perfectly, and he expatiated on their professions of devotion to the Union in order to induce them, if possible, to act in accordance with them, and to vote to keep Missouri in that Union for which they expressed such fervent love. On the surface there was unity; beneath the surface, contrariety. Some of the Convention meant by the Union a centralized, sovereign government under the Constitution, while others meant a loose compact of sovereign States.
And if both parties when they spoke of the Union had meant the same thing, which manifestly they did not, the phrase, “Union man,” would still have been ambiguous. In the debates of the delegates it came out clearly that there were two kinds of Union men in the Convention, conditional and unconditional. Mr. Sheeley of Independence said: “I admire this Union, and while perhaps I will stick in it as long as any man in the Convention, who is not an unconditional Union man,” thus openly announcing himself a conditional Union man. Mr. Vanbuskirk of Holt County, in an able speech, declared that on the part of some of the Convention, “the whole matter is brought to this point, that it is Union upon condition; that is, Union with the ‘buts’ and ‘ifs,’ or ‘under existing circumstances.’” Of course that kind of Unionism was a mockery. Only about six months before, the rabid secessionist, Yancey of Alabama, had proclaimed himself to be a pre-eminent Union man, but declared that if Abraham Lincoln should be elected to the Presidency, he would favor immediate secession. That was being a Calhoun Unionist, a Unionist according to a construction of the Constitution that was utterly at variance with John Marshall’s interpretation of it. In 1861, in Missouri, whenever a man said, “I am a Union man in the Constitution,” we knew for a certainty that his Unionism was conditional, and that he should probably be classed with the secessionists.
Let us notice the conditions on which the loyalty of these “but” and “if” Unionists was based. First, they felt themselves to be under no obligation to sustain the Union unless the Federal government should guarantee to them their rights. They meant by this, their rights in slave property. The people of the Northern States must not obstruct by legislation, or in any other way, the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; in fact must aid the Southern slaveholder in recapturing his fleeing property.
In the second place, they demanded a compromise by which slavery south of 36° 30′ should be protected in the territories. In demanding no more than this, many of them thought that they were making very generous concessions to the North, since they believed that, under the Constitution, the Southern slaveholder had the undoubted right to go into any territory of the United States with his human chattels, and there be protected in both person and slave property.
In the third place, they announced that they would not sustain the Union, if the general government should attempt to coerce the seceded States. They declared that they would neither aid their seven erring sisters in making an attack on the Federal government, nor the Federal government in coercing the States that had left the Union. This view was urged by Mr. Howell on the floor of the Convention in a resolution, a part of which was, “We earnestly remonstrate and protest against any and all coercive measures, or attempts at coercion of said States into submission to the general government, whether clothed with the name or pretext of executing the laws of the Union, or otherwise. And we declare that in such contingency Missouri will not view the same with indifference.” This resolution intimated, and it came out clearly in the ensuing debate, that if the United States should attempt to compel by force the collection of the national customs in the South, such an act on the part of the general government would be regarded as coercion. This is sufficient to reveal the true character of the conditional Unionists. They affirmed emphatically, “we are in favor of keeping Missouri in the Union, if the Northern States will guarantee the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, protect slavery in the territories south of 36° 30′, and the general government will not even in the execution of the Federal laws south of Mason and Dixon’s line use any force whatever; but if these conditions are not fulfilled, we are in favor of going out of the Union, and uniting our fortunes with the Southern Confederacy;” and when the Convention adjourned to St. Louis, the Unionism of a decided majority of its members was unquestionably of that conditional type.
Since we have so fully set forth the composition and views of the Convention, it will be unnecessary to reproduce in detail its organization and proceedings. The Hon. Sterling Price, afterwards a Confederate general, was chosen president, and presided over the deliberations of the Convention with ability and impartiality. The delegates to the Convention took an oath to sustain the Constitution of the United States and that of the State of Missouri. A strong Committee on Federal Relations was appointed, of which Hon. Hamilton R. Gamble, an unconditional Union man of whom we have already spoken, was chairman. During the first sittings of the Convention, numerous resolutions in reference to the attitude that Missouri ought to maintain toward the Union were introduced and referred to the Committee on Federal Relations; and while that committee was deliberating, the members of the Convention occupied the time in making speeches on the general subject of secession. As each one seemed anxious to declare himself, there was much speaking. Both extreme and conservative views were freely aired, and each day evidently added new strength to the position that it would be unwise for Missouri to sever her relations with the Union.
There was one unique incident that profoundly stirred the whole Convention. The Convention of the State of Georgia, that passed an ordinance of secession, sent the Hon. Luther J. Glenn as a commissioner to present it to the Convention of Missouri and to urge its delegates to enact a similar ordinance and to join the Southern Confederacy. He appeared at Jefferson City, during the proceedings of the second day of the Convention, and his communication from Georgia to the Convention was read by the Chair.[[8]] This communication was promptly laid on the table, but the incident greatly disturbed all genuine Union men, especially since the commissioner with his secession message had been received with open arms by the Governor, and in the evening both houses of the disloyal legislature in joint session had listened to an address from him with the most manifest marks of sympathy.[[9]]
At the first day’s session in St. Louis this communication of the Georgia commissioner was called up, and a motion was made that he be invited to address the Convention. Thereupon there was hot debate. Hon. Sample Orr, referring to Mr. Glenn, said: “He is here to-day and called an ambassador by some, by others a commissioner. If he is an ambassador, he has missed the right city. He should have gone to Washington. If he is here as a commissioner from a sister State, then the oath we have taken forbids that we should have an alliance with any other State in the Confederacy.” He meant by Confederacy, the United States. Mr. Smith, a delegate from St. Louis, said: “We did not come here to receive ambassadors from foreign States.” But finally the Convention deemed it best on the whole to listen to the gentleman from Georgia, who then proceeded to tell the very old story of the atrocious conduct of the Northern abolitionists, and of the equally reprehensible acts of the Chicago Convention, that nominated Abraham Lincoln for the Presidency; of the deplorable condition of his State, on account of the protective tariff, that built up the North and pulled down the South, and that, on account of these things, which a long-suffering people could no longer endure, his State had peaceably seceded, and he was commissioned by Georgia to urge Missouri to follow her example.[[10]]
Georgia’s Ordinance of Secession and the address of her commissioner were referred to a special committee, of which the Hon. John B. Henderson, the author of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States,[[11]] was chairman. On the eighteenth day of the sittings of the Convention, Mr. Henderson, slaveholder though he was, presented a comprehensive report recommending the rejection of the prayer from Georgia to secede, presented by Mr. Glenn, and urging the weightiest and most conclusive reasons against the disruption of the Union. This report was stronger meat than the Convention was then able to digest, so after a short, sharp debate it was laid on the table[[12]] and was never afterwards taken up. It did not need to be. It had done its work. The author of it had seized his opportunity to deal a staggering blow against the secession of Missouri, and the effect of it could not be neutralized. So what at first was a menace was transmuted into a blessing.