Now, however, a strange phenomenon arrested our attention. Many of those who were bent on forcing Missouri out of the Union, for the time being relaxed all effort. They seemed to have given up the contest. What led them thus to lay aside their open belligerency? We were able soon to solve this mystery. It had been often and confidently asserted that the Federal government was to send, from the adjoining free States, several thousand men to defend the Arsenal and other property of the United States. A little later some regiments from Illinois came. This wrought up the secessionists to fever heat. To their minds the introduction of troops from other States was an outrageous invasion of State sovereignty.

Moreover there had been for several weeks a persistent effort to misrepresent the attitude of the general government. While it was simply endeavoring to defend its property and domain, it had been dinned into the ears of the secessionists, in the most emphatic terms, that the object of the United States was invasion and subjugation; and as true men they must arise and defend their hearths and homes, wives and children against Lincoln’s minions. So our fellow-citizens, who had been devising every possible scheme to secure the secession of Missouri, thought it quite unnecessary for them to put forth any further effort to attain their object, since the incoming of soldiers from other States would produce such a revulsion of feeling against the Federal government, that the people without any further incentive would speedily determine to secede. They began to talk confidently of setting aside the decree of the Convention. But without proposing any further effort, they were quietly awaiting the natural drift of events. They believed that by the force of circumstances the State would be carried out of the Union and into the Southern Confederacy.

Their confident expectation was not altogether baseless. Clear-headed Union men saw the danger of introducing troops at that time from other States into our city. The authorities at Washington were induced to take this view of the case into serious consideration. The result was that for the time being they wisely changed their policy. Some regiments that had been ordered from Illinois to St. Louis were sent elsewhere.

Moreover, the President, carefully humoring the prejudices of those who tenaciously held the doctrine of State sovereignty, on April 30th, ordered Captain Lyon “to enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States, and for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants of Missouri.” So the State rights men were beaten at their own game and on their own ground. In his order the President seemed carefully to respect the doctrine of State sovereignty. Only Missourians, and they from “St. Louis and vicinity,” were to defend the Arsenal and city. Could anything have been more fitting and beautiful? But the secessionists were altogether unwilling to take their own medicine. The order of the President was not to their liking. It took the wind out of their sails; it upset their calculations. If ten thousand volunteers were to be gathered from their own city and vicinity, and no troops were to come from adjoining States, State sovereignty would not apparently be infringed, and there would be no revulsion of feeling against the Federal government; and, most of all, if the secessionists should attempt to rise in force, these ten thousand local volunteers would in all probability quickly and sternly suppress them. The very care that the President had taken to humor their prejudices aroused them to intense and bitter activity against the Federal government. With warmth they asked if these ten thousand Missourians were not to be used in defending the property of the United States, the very property that they had vainly tried to get into their own hands? Was it not as unjust to use Missourians to guard Federal property within the boundaries of their own State as it was to use them to guard like property in Maryland or Virginia? Did not the President’s plausible policy ruthlessly override State sovereignty? Had not our Governor peremptorily refused to furnish the Federal government with Missouri soldiers to put down rebellion in the seceded States? Had he not already replied to Mr. Cameron, President Lincoln’s Secretary of War, that the requisition for troops from Missouri by the United States “is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with?”[[17]] They did not propose to submit quietly to such indignities. They were once more on fire for action, but their activity now showed itself not in any attempt to take the Arsenal, but in sharp denunciation of the Federal authorities, and in aiding in every possible way those already in open revolt.

On May 6th, an event transpired which excites laughter now, but to a large number of our fellow-citizens was natural and very serious then. The disloyal police commissioners of St. Louis, appointed by our secession Governor, in a solemn and weighty document, formally demanded of Captain Lyon the removal of all United States troops from all places and buildings occupied by them outside the Arsenal grounds. The commissioners declared that such occupancy was “in derogation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.”[[18]] Captain Lyon in his reply to them asked: “What provisions of the Constitution and laws were thus violated?” The commissioners replied that originally “Missouri had sovereign and exclusive jurisdiction over her whole territory,” that she had delegated a portion of her sovereignty to the United States over certain tracts of land for military purposes, such as arsenals and parks, and asserted that outside of such places the United States had no right to occupy her soil. The whole thing was so ludicrous that thousands in St. Louis were merry over it. Police commissioners dictating as to where the United States should house the officers of its army and quarter its troops! But it was an object lesson that vividly revealed the absurdity of State sovereignty, in which so many at that time implicitly believed. Captain Lyon of course positively refused to comply with a demand so preposterous, and the commissioners with great gravity referred it to the Governor and legislature. Nothing more was ever heard of it.

During all this time the work at the Arsenal went right on. The number of volunteer soldiers daily increased. By the middle of June there were more than ten thousand of them, three fourths of whom were Germans. This latter fact should be specially noted since it alone can explain some events with which we yet shall have to deal. And under the command of Captain Lyon, the Arsenal ceased to be a bone of contention. It was no longer regarded with solicitude by the loyal of the city. It had become a bulwark of Unionism. Whatever came we felt measurably safe, since all the force of the Arsenal was now wielded to prevent the secession of Missouri, and to maintain the integrity of the Union.

CHAPTER VI
CAMP JACKSON

The story of Camp Jackson roots itself in that of the Arsenal. A few facts will show this. During the first days of April our disloyal Governor became unusually patriotic. He thought, or appeared to think, that our State was about to be pounced upon by some lurking foe, and must be made ready to defend itself. To ensure its safety against an enemy that no loyal eyes could anywhere discern, he determined to plant a battery of artillery on Duncan’s Island in the river immediately opposite the Arsenal. From this he was dissuaded, but he did plant one farther down the river at Powder Point, and another, to which we have already referred, on the levee, some distance above the Arsenal. All intelligent men of both parties understood at once that these batteries were hostile to the defenders of the Union, and if occasion offered were to be used in securing the Arsenal and its munitions of war for the secessionists. The Governor’s patriotic professions really deceived but very few. Still, to their honor, some charitable Union men strove to put the best construction on his words; but they were often in great perplexity when they tried to harmonize his words with his acts. While plotting for the secession of the State he constantly harped upon his devotion to it. To his mind evidently its secession from the Union would be its highest good.

Still, under existing circumstances, just what he intended to do, many could not even guess. Captain Lyon declared that he was in correspondence with the Confederate authorities at Montgomery. We then thought that this might be true, and now know from war documents that Lyon as usual was right. In reply to a letter written by the Governor on the 17th of April, and sent to Montgomery by private messengers, Jefferson Davis wrote: “After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the Arsenal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two 12–pounder howitzers and two 32–pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These, from the commanding hills, will be effective, both against the garrison and to breach the enclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the Arsenal and securing its supplies.”

On that same 17th of April, Governor Jackson visited St. Louis and had a conference with the leading secessionists who resided there. Prominent among them was Brigadier-General Daniel M. Frost. He was born and bred in the State of New York. He graduated from West Point in 1844, and served both in the Mexican War and on the western frontier. He subsequently married in St. Louis, resigned his commission in the army, and went into business in his adopted city. He dipped into politics, became a State Senator, and was finally assigned to the command of the First Brigade of Missouri Volunteer Militia. Snead, who was aide-de-camp of our secession Governor and a soldier in the Confederate army, says that “The Governor trusted Frost fully.”[[19]] And two days before the conference of April 17th, Frost presented to him a carefully prepared memorial,[[20]] praying that he would authorize him to form an encampment of militia near our city, and order Colonel Bowen, then defending the western counties of the State against Kansas, to report to him for duty. General Frost also disclosed his plan for placing this encampment on the bluffs just below the Arsenal. This however was too bold a move for the politic Governor. It would too clearly reveal to all thoughtful observers his real purpose. He preferred so far as possible to veil his intention. He chose clandestine action. So while on that memorable 17th of April he refused the requisition of the Secretary of War for troops from Missouri in the vehement and absurd language already quoted, and secretly appealed by private messengers to Jefferson Davis for cannon with which to bombard and take the Arsenal, and in hot haste summoned the legislature to meet in extra session, at Jefferson City, on May 2d, in order “to place the State in a proper attitude of defence;” that all might be legally done, he fell back on the militia law of 1858, and ordered the commanding officers of the several militia districts of the State to call together, on May 6th, for six days, those legally required to do military duty for the purpose of drill in the art of war. This order gave General Frost liberty to form a military camp in any place he might choose within the limits of our city or county.