On the other hand, the avowed object of the Charcoals was to save the Union without slavery; and perhaps they were unduly impatient with those who would save the Union with slavery, or even with those who would save the Union with or without slavery. But they were always ready to give a reason for the faith that was in them. They said: “Slavery is unquestionably the cause of secession and of this bloody war. If we preserve the Union and with it the cause of its present disruption, then, at no distant day, the same cause will rend it again, and our soil will be drenched with the blood of our children. We believe the doctrine of our great President, that the nation cannot continue half slave and half free. We therefore give ourselves to the extermination of the fruitful cause of all our present distress. We fight and pray for the restoration of the Union, but of the Union purged of human bondage.”
These opposing factions also radically disagreed as to the method of dealing with the disloyal, or those suspected of disloyalty. The Claybanks contended that in dealing with rebels or rebel-sympathizers their previous surroundings and education should be taken into account, and large allowance should be made for their inevitable prejudices; that many slaveholders were Unionists and ought not to be driven into hostility to the general government by needlessly severe measures; that every day that they remained in our ranks their Unionism would grow stronger; and that since they were with us on the main question of Unionism, all other questions should be permitted to sink from sight.
But the shibboleth of the Charcoals was: “No quarter to slavery or secession.” They maintained that since the war had been begun by secessionists, in a mixed community like Missouri it was of the utmost importance to find out who were really for the Union and who were against it; and that the shortest road to such knowledge was through uncompromising and drastic measures; and that in the long run such a course of action, rigidly adhered to, would be productive of the least suffering, and consequently most humane. So they urged that all aiders and abetters of rebellion should be imprisoned or sent beyond the lines of the Federal army, and their property confiscated.
But all Charcoals were not alike; some were much more extreme in their views than others. At times they strenuously opposed one another, and the more moderate among them held the more radical in check. A like diversity of views was seen among Claybanks. But notwithstanding the variety of views held by each of these factional parties, each, as we have seen, unitedly and bitterly opposed the other, both in reference to the aim of the war and the manner of conducting it.
Maj.-Gen. John C. Fremont Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Halleck
Maj.-Gen. John McA. Schofield Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans
Hon. Frank P. Blair, Jr.
When our military commanders came to us one after another, they were beset, not to say besieged, by the Charcoals and Claybanks in reference to the conduct of the war in Missouri. Each faction tried to forestall the other by getting the ear of the new general first, and telling him just what he ought to do in order to achieve success. Each was absolutely sure that only its way was right. Any other course than the one suggested would lead to utter disaster. Each party was so dead in earnest that when its views were discarded it cursed the idiot that had not heeded them. To do his duty intelligently and fearlessly amid this din of clashing opinions, a commander of the Department of Missouri needed great clearness of thought, coolness of disposition, and firmness of purpose. He did not lie on a bed of roses, but on bumblebees’ nests.
General Fremont, whose career among us I have already briefly delineated, gave himself too much into the hands of the radicals. He did this partly because he himself was naturally radical, and partly from the influence of his environment. Our German fellow-citizens, whose views were extreme, at the start got the ear of the general and held it to the last. Mr. Blair, the leader of the Union men of St. Louis, although at first very radical, soon drew away from the extremists, and became a conservative. It was through his great personal influence that Fremont had been put over the Department of the West, and by that same influence he had been removed from his command. Among other reasons urged as making his removal necessary was his radicalism, that had offensively manifested itself when he exceeded his authority in manumitting slaves.
His successor in command was quite as radical as he; but Halleck courted information. He listened attentively to both Charcoals and Claybanks. Having gotten the views of both factions, he discreetly kept his own counsels. He was independent and fearless. His measures were often startlingly radical; but his blows, which fell hard and fast, were mainly directed against rebels, rebel-sympathizers, bushwhackers, bridge-burners and spies. He did, to be sure, as we have seen, deliver a batch of slaves from durance vile and put them on the road to freedom; but in doing it he was very careful to keep strictly within the limits of his authority. While he did not fully please any faction, his administration taken as a whole was far more satisfactory to the Charcoals than to the Claybanks.
General Samuel R. Curtis, Halleck’s successor, leaned decidedly to the Charcoals; in fact he was a Charcoal himself. He and they evidently were one in thought and sentiment. He carried out so far as he was able their extreme views. Without possessing Halleck’s discretion, he continued the policy of assessing wealthy secessionists. But this policy had gradually taken on new features. What began in assessments had unfolded into confiscation. During the last month of his administration, General Curtis sent to the South, beyond the lines of the Union army, not a few persons of means. Those having families were permitted to take with them a thousand dollars; those without families two hundred dollars each. The rest of their property was confiscated and used to meet the necessities of sick and wounded soldiers.