Finally, the note concluded with the following threat:
“If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.”
These lines plainly show that some Powers had not given up the idea of ejecting the Turks from Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity that might warrant another European intervention to carry out their plans and satisfy their ambition; and yet this policy, as will be seen later on, went against their own interests and those of Old Europe.
The idea that the British Premier entertained of the important strategic and commercial consequences that would ensue if the Near East were taken away from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory to the historical part played by Turkey; and by disregarding the influence of Turkey in European affairs in the past and the present, he made a grievous political mistake. If one day Germany, having become a strong nation again, should offer her support to Turkey, cut to pieces by England, all the Turks in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George’s policy, especially as M. Venizelos might then have been replaced by Constantine or the like.
Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring on July 27 at 12 midnight, to let the Allies definitely know whether she accepted the clauses of the treaty and intended to sign it.
This comminatory answer did not come as a surprise. Mr. Lloyd George openly said he was convinced the Greeks would be as successful in Thrace as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to foresee but did not mean much for the future; and he thought he was justified in declaring with some self-satisfaction before the Commons on July 21, 1920—
“The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared.
“The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have no reason to regret it.”
The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval group, including two British dreadnoughts, effected a landing in the ports of Erekli, Sultan Keui (where they met with no resistance), and Rodosto, which was occupied in the afternoon.
The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the Marmora reached the Chorlu-Muradli line on the railway, and their immediate objective was the occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway in order to cut off all communications between Jafer Tayar’s troops and the Nationalist elements of the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this position they would be able to threaten Jafer Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their flanks and rear in order to compel them to withdraw their troops from the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they did not cross the Bulgarian frontier.