The Turks and Europe

by Gaston Gaillard

Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new hostilities in Syria. He said that first—

“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and commission committed by the British Government, and more particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council of the League of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established there should be no disturbance of the status quo without the willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of British diplomacy.”

Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France and the Arabs:

“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the Government was to make representations at once to both the French and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”

Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal, and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria and the neighbouring regions.

Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the situation of France in Syria. He expressly said:

“The real question before the House was whether the British Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the interests of her ally France.’ ...

“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the status quo. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of occupation of territories in which later we should have no interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that territory.

“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It was said that this action of the French Government was contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, ‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, ‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?

“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any other independent body....