“Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come! And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.”
The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly.
At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate Austria and to bring her to rely more and more on German friendship by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already prevailing between Austria and Russia.
Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon the meeting of the Conference.
Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister, which were published in the Daily Telegraph in January, 1921. In one of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of M. de Nelidov, at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey.
“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St. Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November 21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople, was a veritable idée fixe. The other Ministers refrained from expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor Alexander III left Russia.
“The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and also to the Minister of the Navy.”
M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.
“Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain from sharing my apprehensions with several persons very intimate with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich and Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know whether it was the influence of these men or the influence of that Power which rules the whole world and which we call God, but His Majesty changed his mind and instructed Nelidov, soon after the latter’s departure for Constantinople, to give up his designs.”