Another newspaper, the Ileri, wrote:
“The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we read the treaty.”
The aforesaid Peyam Sabah, after a survey of the conditions, came to this conclusion:
“Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:
“To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of endless hostility between the various races.
“To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty?
“To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.”
Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be made.
Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to that effect had been given to the police. Then he is said to have declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber.
The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled.