3. Exertions were made to establish communication between Cawnpore and Meerut via Futtehgurh, Bareilly and Moradabad. Mails were forwarded towards Bareilly, but none issued from or through that station. This excited much uneasiness for some time, but was explained by the mutiny of the troops there and at Shajehanpore on the 30th June. Bareilly was, like Delhi, the scene of the political intrigue, and the suppression of postal communication was there, as elsewhere, an object of the first importance with the insurgents.
4. The post offices and mail lines in Oude, generally, became disorganized about the same time as in Rohilcund, as the troops mutinied almost simultaneously in both provinces.
5. While the Grand Trunk Road between Cawnpore and Agra was open, arrangements were made to maintain communication between the Punjab and Cis-Sutledge States with Agra via Kurnaul Hansie and Jeypore, but the mutiny of the Hurrianah Battalion and a portion of the 4th Irregular Cavalry at Hansie and Hissar in the end of May entirely stopped that line.
6. An attempt was made to open communication with Agra and Meerut via Muttra and by a line midway between Khoorjah and Secunderabad, but it had to be abandoned owing to the rebel Wulleedad Khan and his followers having obtained undisputed possessions of the district of Bulundshahur.
7. But, although Bulundshahur and a large portion of Allyghur were occupied by the rebel Wulleedad Khan, a line of runners was established between Meerut and Agra via Gurhmooktesur Ghat, the left bank of the Ganges, Anoopshahur and Allyghur. Letters of light weight were managed to be conveyed with tolerable safety by that route, notwithstanding that large sums were offered for the murder of those caught in the act of conveying English correspondence.
8. On or about the 5th June the troops at Allahabad, Cawnpore, Futtehgurh, Hameerpore, Banda Jansie, Lullutpore and Saugor mutinied; and, in consequence, all the post offices and mail lines in the Doab and Bundlekund as low down as Mirzapore became disorganized. Communication between Agra, the Cis-Sutledge States and Calcutta was then fairly cut off and could not be re-established by the Grand Trunk Road so long as Delhi remained in the possession of the mutineers. The route via Multan to Bombay was, however, open and instructions were given for the mails to and from the N.-W.P., Cis-Sutledge and Punjab being forwarded via Lahore.
9. Between Agra and Bombay the mail was not interrupted till the mutiny of the Gwalior Contingent on the 17th June, and since then up to 1st February, 1858, or a period of seven months and thirteen days, the road via Gwalior and Indore to Bombay was closed or not practicable and safe for the mail.
10. So soon as it was apparent that the mail between Bombay and Agra could not be re-established via Gwalior and Indore, the establishment of runners between Agra, Jeypore, Naseerabad, Deesa and Ahmedabad was strengthened, and the mails to and from Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, etc., were very regularly conveyed by that route.
11. In the course of the month of August, Dr. Clark managed at Agra to organize an establishment of kossids, thence via Etawah to Cawnpore, and for very light letters not exceeding a ¼ tola in weight the arrangements, although occasionally interrupted, were generally successful excepting for a period of nearly eighteen days in the end of November and beginning of December, when the troops of the Gwalior Contingent crossed the Jumna and invested Cawnpore. On the defeat of the Gwalior Contingent at Cawnpore on the 7th December the kossid dak was again useful in keeping up communication between Agra and Cawnspore until the 5th January, 1858, when the mail carts were re-established after having ceased to run from the 5th June, or a period of seven months.