[114] Ibid. 75, 76.
[115] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 77-80.
[116] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 83, 84.
[117] The distinction between these two words is a very important one. Schwegler, in explaining Hegel’s position in his “History of Philosophy,” states that Hegel asserts that Socrates set Moralität, the subjective morality of individual conscience, in the place of Sittlichkeit, “the spontaneous, natural, half-unconscious (almost instinctive) virtue that rests in obedience to established custom (use and wont, natural objective law, that is at bottom, according to Hegel, rational, though not yet subjectively cleared, perhaps, into its rational principles).” As Dr. Stirling says in his Annotations to the same work (p. 394), “There is a period in the history of the State when people live in tradition; that is a period of unreflected Sittlichkeit, or natural observance. Then there comes a time when the observances are questioned, and when the right or truth they involve is reflected into the subject. This is a period of Aufklärung, and for Sittlichkeit there is substituted Moralität, subjective morality: the subject will approve nought but what he finds inwardly true to himself, to his conscience.”—[Translator’s Note.]
[118] Diog. Laert. II, 44 (cf. Menag. ad h. 1); 18-20, 22.
[119] Diog. Laert. II. 22, 23; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 28 (p. 113).
[120] Diog. Laert. II. 24; Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 18; Plat. Apol. Socrat. p. 32 (pp. 120-122); Epist. VII. pp. 324, 325 (p. 429).
[121] Plat. Convivium, pp. 212, 176, 213, 214, 223 (pp. 447, 376-378, 449, 450, 468, 469).
[122] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 10.
[123] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, § 11-16; Aristot. Metaph. I. 6.