P. [167], § 88. Aristotle, Phys, i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers who first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a false track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the way, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear, because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into being either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both of these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and nothing would become from what is not.'
(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. Werke, xvii. 181.
P. [168], § 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the interpretation given by Plato (in the Theaetetus,152; Cratylus, 401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian—which however is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving fire. The other phrase (Ar. Met. i. 4) is used by Aristotle to describe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and Democritus. Cf. Plutarch, adv. Colotem, 4. 2 Δημόκριτος διορίζεται μὴ μᾱλλον τὸ δὲν ἥ τὸ μηδν εἶναι; cf. Simplic. in Ar. Phys. fol. 7.
P. [169], § 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209. 'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a conditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort by a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system of the world has actuality; the world of phenomena in general has Daseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, is. I am is all the Ego can say of itself.'
P. [171], § 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn.
Spinoza, Epist. 50, figura non aliud quam determinatio et determinatio negatio est.
P. [172], § 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or check) are distinguished in Werke, iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's Secret of Hegel, i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, Krit. d. r. Vernunft, p. 795, that Hume only erschränkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu begrenzen.
P. [173], § 92. Plato, Timaeus, c. 35 (formation of the world-soul): 'From the individual and ever-identical essence (ὀυσία) and the divisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate species of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded them all into one form (ἰδέα), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature of the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and making of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many portions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and the other and the essence.'
P. [175], § 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, Werke, ii. 377. 'A various experience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the understanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible opinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance. The consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is present (das Gegenwärtige), every effort of their mind is called out to get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole inquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the actuality,—in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the vital existence (Daseyn)—of a God in the whole of things and in each one.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural thing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we ourselves also belong, and in which we are.'
P. [177], § 95. Plato's Philebus, ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf. Werke, xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity is finite and infinite.'