P. [332], § 193. Anselm, Proslogium, c. 2. In the Monologium Anselm expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. Monol. c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument quod nullo ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret—i.e. from the conception of (God as) the highest and greatest that can be (aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest) he infers its being (sic ergo vere EST aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.) The absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not ipso facto imply existence.
Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the Liber pro insipiente made the objection that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and reality were prima facie different. And in fact the argument of Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, thought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but not essentially self-affirming—implicit (an:sich) only, as said in pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 Domine, non solum es, quo majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest (transcending our thought).
P. [333], line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.
P. [334], § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant, i. 86-95.
A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it 'represents,' i.e. concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, Mikrokosmus.) It is the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the universe. And yet there are monads—in the plural.
P. [334], § 194. Fichte, Werke, i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'
P. 338, § 195. Cf. Encyclop. § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed order.'
Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) his De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis (1822) and his Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden (1822).
P. [340], § 198. Civil society: distinguished as the social and economical organisation of the bourgeoisie, with their particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of citoyens in the state or ethico-political organism.
P. [345], § 204. Inner design: see Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft, § 62.