The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 3 (of 4) / Hegel's Aesthetik

by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

2. THE BEAUTIFUL FORM OF SCULPTURE

We must now inquire into the nature of the bodily forms which are adapted to give an impression of a content of this kind.

Just as in classical architecture the dwelling-house is the anatomical skeleton framework which art has to inform with its accretions, in like manner sculpture, on its part, discovers the human form as the fundamental type for its figures. Whereas, however, the house is already a piece of human workmanship, though not as yet elaborated artistically, the structure of the human form, on the contrary, appears as a product of Nature unaffected by man. The fundamental type of sculpture is consequently given to it, that is, does not hail from human inventiveness. The expression, however, that the human form is a part of Nature is a very indefinite one, which we must submit to closer analysis.

In Nature it is the Idea, which is given there, as we have already found when discussing natural beauty, its primary and immediate mode of existence, receiving in animal life and its complete organic structure the natural existence adequate to its notion. The organization of the animal frame is therefore a birth of the notion in its essential totality, which exists in this corporeal mode of being as soul, yet, as the principle of merely animal life, modifies the animal frame in the most varied classifications, albeit too every specific type continues to be subject to the general notion[139]. The fact that notion and bodily form, or more accurately, soul and body, correspond to one another—to fully understand this is the problem of natural philosophy. We should have to demonstrate that the different systems of the animal frame in their ideal[140] structure and conformation no less than their association, and the more definite organs in which the bodily existence is differentiated are in general accord with the phasal steps of the notion's movement, so that it becomes clear, to what extent we have here presented to us as real only the particular aspects of the soul-life which are necessary. To develop this exposition, however, does not lie within the scope of the present inquiry.

The human form is not, however, as the animal form, merely the corporeal framework of the soul, but of Spirit. In other words, spirit and soul are essentially to be distinguished. For the soul is merely this ideal and simple unity of self-subsistence attaching to the body in its corporeal aspect[141], whereas Spirit is the independent selfness of conscious and self-conscious life together with all the emotions, ideas, and aims of such a conscious existence. In contemplating the immense difference which separates merely animal life from spiritual consciousness, it may appear strange that the bodily frame attaching to the latter, the human body, is nevertheless so clearly homogeneous with that of animal life. It will tend, however, to decrease such an astonishment if we recall to mind the definition, which Spirit itself has authorized us to make in accordance with its own notion, that it is a mode of life and essentially therefore itself also a living soul and natural existence. As such living soul the life of conscious spirit, by virtue of the same notion that is inherent in the animal soul, is entitled to accept a body, which fundamentally in its general lines runs parallel to the organic structure of animal life. However superior to mere animal life Spirit may be it is evolved through[142] a corporeal frame whose visible appearance receives an identical articulation and principle of life with that which the notion of animal life in general underlies. Inasmuch as, however, and furthermore Spirit is not merely the Idea as determinate existence, that is, the Idea as Nature and animal life, but the Idea which secures independence in its own free medium of ideality as Idea, the spiritual principle elaborates for itself its own specific mode of objectivity over and beyond that of animal life, simply, in other words, science, the reality of which is exclusively that of thought itself. Apart from thought, however, and its philosophical and systematized activity, Spirit is involved within an abounding life of feeling, inclination, idea, imagination, and so forth, which is fixed in a more direct or less immediate association with its vital being[143] and bodily frame, and consequently possesses a reality in the human body. In this reality, which is part of its own substance, Spirit asserts itself also as a principle of life, shines into it, transpierces it, and is made manifest to others by means of it. Consequently, in so far as the human body remains no purely natural existence, but has asserted itself also in its configuration and structure as the natural and sensuous existence of Spirit, it is, nevertheless, regarded as the expression of an ideality more exalted than that compatible with the purely animal body to be distinguished from it, despite the fact that the human body in its broad lines is in harmony with it. For this reason, however, that Spirit is itself soul and life, that is, an animal body, it is and can only be modifications, which the indwelling Spirit of one living body attaches to this corporeal form. As a manifestation of Spirit consequently the human shape is distinct from the animal by virtue of these modifications, albeit the distinctions of the human organism from the animal are as much the result of the unconscious creation of spiritual activities, as the soul of the animal kingdom is the informing though unconscious activity of the body that belongs to it.

We have thus reached the precise point of our present departure. In other words, the human body is present to the artist as Spirit's expression. What is more, he discovers it as such not merely in a general way, but also in particular characteristics it is pre-supposed to be the type which, in its form, its specific traits, its position and general habit, reflects the ideality of Spirit.

We shall find it a difficult matter to fix in clear terms of thought the precise nature of the association between spirit and body in their relation respectively to feeling, passion, and other spiritual conditions. It has, no doubt, been attempted to develop the same scientifically both from the pathognomical[144] point of view and the physiognomical. Such attempts have hitherto not met with much success. For ourselves the science of physiognomy can only be of importance in so far as that of pathognomy is exclusively concerned with the mode under which definite feelings and passions are physically located in particular organs. It has been stated, for example, that the seat of anger is in the gall, of courage in the blood. Such statements, we may remark incidentally, are erroneous in their manner of expression. For even assuming the activity of particular organs corresponds to specific passions, we cannot say that anger, for instance, has its local position in the gall bladder, but, in so far as anger is corporeally related, the gall is pre-eminently that in which its active appearance asserts itself. In our present inquiry this pathognomical aspect does not, as already stated, concern us, because sculpture has merely to deal with that which passes over from the ideal side of Spirit into the external aspect of form permitting Spirit thus to be visible in the physical environment. The sympathetic interaction between the internal organism and the feeling soul is no object of sculpture; indeed, we may add, it is unable to accept much which appears on the external surface itself, such as the tremble of the hand and the entire body in an outburst of anger, the movement of the lips, and others of like nature.

With regard to physiognomical science I will limit myself to this observation. If the work of sculpture, which has as its fundamental basis the human form, has to exhibit the way in which the bodily presence as such manifests not only the divine and human aspect of Spirit in its broadest and most substantive features, but also the particular character of a definite individuality in this divine presence, we are no doubt compelled to discuss what parts, traits, and conformations of the body are fully accordant with any specific mode of ideality. We are indeed forced upon such an inquiry by the sculpture of antiquity, which we must as a matter of fact admit includes the expression of individual god-like characters with that of divinity generally. Such an admission does not, however, amount to an assertion that the association of spiritual expression with bodily form is merely a matter of accident and caprice rather than the creation of a figure of self-subsistent actuality. In this connection every organ must, in a general way, be looked at from two points of view, as a mode of expression that possesses its physical side no less than its spiritual. We need hardly caution our readers that the method of Gall in conducting such an inquiry is inadmissible. This writer reduces Spirit to what is little better than a Calvary.

(a) The advance of sculpture, in respect to the content which its function is to declare, is limited to the investigation how far the substantive and at the same time individual condition of spiritual life is made vital in bodily form, receiving therein determinate existence and form. In other words, through the content adequate to genuine sculpture the contingent individualization of the external appearance is from one point of view excluded, and this applies both to the spiritual and physical aspects of the presentment. Only that which persists, and is universal and according to rule in the human form is the object of a work of sculpture. And this is so albeit we have the additional necessity to individualize the universal in such a way that not only the abstract law but an individual form, which is brought into the closest fusion with it, is placed before our eyes.

(b) From another point of view it is necessary that sculpture, as we have seen, be kept unaffected by purely contingent personal life[145], and all expression of such in the independent ideal mode under which it asserts itself. For this reason an artist, in dealing with physiognomical characteristics, is not entitled to move in the direction of individual manner[146]. For a facial manner is simply just this appearance on the surface of an individual idiosyncrasy and some particular aspect of emotion, idea, and volition. A man by his chance expressions of countenance expresses the feelings he has as some particular person, whether it be in his exclusive relation to his own life, or in his self-relation to exterior objects, or other persons. One sees, for example, on the street, more particularly in little towns, in many, or rather the majority of men, that they are exclusively preoccupied, in their demeanour and expression of face, with themselves, their dress and attire, in general terms, that is, their purely personal particularity, or, at least, matters of momentary importance, and any unforeseen or accidental features thus presented. Countenances which express pride, envy, self-satisfaction, depreciation, and so forth, are of this nature. Moreover, the feeling and contrast of substantive being with my personal idiosyncrasy may be responsible for such alterations of expression. Humility, defiance, threats, fear, are expressed in this way. In a felt contrast of this kind we find already a separation between the individual in the subjective sense and the universal asserted. Reflection on what is truly substantive continually leans in the direction of merely personal considerations, so that it is the individual rather than the substantive character which is predominant in the content. The form, however, which remains severely true to the principle of sculpture ought neither to express this severation nor the predominance of the personal aspect above adverted to.