My life on the plains

by George A. Custer

Colonel Fetterman sallied forth promptly with his command to the rescue of the train. He moved out rapidly, keeping to the right of the wood road, for the purpose, as is supposed, of getting in rear of the attacking party. As he advanced across the Piney a few Indians appeared on his front and flanks, and kept showing themselves just beyond rifle range until they finally disappeared beyond Lodge Trail ridge. When Colonel Fetterman reached Lodge Trail ridge the picket signalled the fort that the Indians had retreated, and that the train had moved toward the timber. About noon Colonel Fetterman’s command, having thrown out skirmishers, disappeared over the crest of Lodge Trail ridge; firing at once commenced and was heard distinctly at the fort. From a few scattering shots it increased in rapidity until it became a continuous and rapid fire of musketry. A medical officer was sent from the post to join the detachment, but was unable to do so, Indians being encountered on the way. After the firing had become quite heavy, showing that a severe engagement was taking place, Colonel Carrington, the commander of the post, sent an officer and about seventy-five men to reinforce Colonel Fetterman’s party. These reinforcements moved rapidly toward the point from which the sound of firing proceeded. The firing continued to be heard during their advance, diminishing in rapidity and number of shots until they had reached a high summit overlooking the battle-field, when one or two shots closed all sound of conflict. From this summit a full view could be obtained of the Peno valley beyond, in which Fetterman’s command was known to be, but not a single individual of this ill-fated band could be seen. Instead, however, the valley was seen to be overrun by Indians, estimated to number fully three thousand warriors. Discovering the approach of the reinforcements, the Indians beckoned them to come on, but without awaiting their arrival commenced retreating. The troops then advanced to a point where the savages had been seen collected in a circle, and there found the dead naked bodies of Colonel Fetterman, Captain Brown, and about sixty-five of their men. All the bodies lay in a space not exceeding thirty-five feet in diameter. A few American horses lay dead near by, all with their heads toward the fort. This spot was by the roadside and beyond the summit of a hill rising to the east of Peno creek. The road after ascending this hill follows the ridge for nearly three-quarters of a mile, and then descends abruptly to Peno valley. About midway between the point where these bodies lay and that where the road begins to descend was the dead body of Lieutenant Grummond; and at the point where the road leaves the ridge to descend to the Peno valley were the dead bodies of three citizens and a few of the old, long-tried, and experienced soldiers. Around this little group were found a great number of empty cartridge shells; more than fifty were found near the body of a citizen who had used a Henry rifle; all going to show how stubbornly these men had fought, and that they had fought with telling effect on their enemies was evidenced by the fact that within a few hundred yards in front of their position ten Indian ponies lay dead, and near by them were sixty-five pools of dark and clotted blood. Among the records of the Indian Department in Washington there is on file a report of one of the Peace Commissioners sent to investigate the circumstances of this frightful slaughter. Among the conclusions given in this report, it is stated that the Indians were massed to resist Colonel Fetterman’s advance along Peno creek on both sides of the road; that Colonel Fetterman formed his advanced lines on the summit of the hill overlooking the creek and valley, with a reserve near where the large number of dead bodies lay; that the Indians in large force attacked him vigorously in this position, and were successfully resisted for half an hour or more; that the command then being short of ammunition and seized with a panic at this event and the great numerical superiority of the Indians, attempted to retreat toward the fort; that the mountaineers and old soldiers, who had learned that a movement from Indians in an engagement was equivalent to death, remained in their first position and were killed there; that immediately upon the commencement of the retreat the Indians charged upon and surrounded the party, who could not now be formed by their officers and were immediately killed. Only six men of the whole command were killed by balls, and two of these, Colonel Fetterman and Captain Brown, no doubt inflicted this death upon themselves, or each other, by their own hands, for both were shot through the left temple, and powder was burnt into the skin and flesh about the wound. These officers had often asserted that they would never be taken alive by Indians.

The difficulty, as further explained by this commissioner, was that the officer commanding the Phil Kearny district was furnished no more troops for a state of war than had been provided for a state of profound peace. “In regions where all was peace, as at Laramie in November, twelve companies were stationed; while in regions where all was war, as at Phil Kearny, there were only five companies allowed.” The same criticism regarding the distribution of troops would be just if applied to a much later date.

The Indians invariably endeavored to conceal their exact losses, but they acknowledged afterwards to have suffered a loss of twelve killed on the field, sixty severely wounded, several of whom afterwards died, and many others permanently maimed. They also lost twelve horses killed outright, and fifty-six so badly wounded that they died within twenty-four hours.

The intelligence of this massacre was received throughout the country with universal horror, and awakened a bitter feeling toward the savage perpetrators. The Government was implored to inaugurate measures looking to their prompt punishment. This feeling seemed to be shared by all classes. The following despatch, sent by General Sherman to General Grant, immediately upon receipt of the news of the massacre, briefly but characteristically expresses the views of the Lieutenant-General of the Army.

St. Louis, Dec. 28, 1866.

General: Just arrived in time to attend the funeral of my Adjutant-General, Sawyer. I have given general instructions to General Cooke about the Sioux. I do not yet understand how the massacre of Colonel Fetterman’s party could have been so complete. We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children. Nothing less will reach the root of the case.

(Signed) W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General.

The old trouble between the War and Interior Departments, as to which should retain control of the Indian question, was renewed with increased vigor. The Army accused the Indian Department, and justly too, of furnishing the Indians arms and ammunition. Prominent exponents of either side of the question were not slow in taking up their pens in advocacy of their respective views. In the succeeding chapter testimony will be offered from those high in authority, now the highest, showing that among those who had given the subject the most thoughtful attention the opinion was unanimous in favor of the “abolition of the civil Indian agents and licensed traders,” and of the transfer of the Indian Bureau from the Interior Department back to the War Department, where it originally belonged.

X.

The winter of 1867–’68 was a period of comparative idleness and quiet, so far as the troops guarding the military posts on the Plains and frontier were concerned. The Indians began their periodical depredations against the frontier settlers and overland emigrants and travellers early in the spring of 1868, and continued them with but little interruption or hindrance from any quarter until late in the summer and fall of that year.