My life on the plains

by George A. Custer

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, General.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

In response to a request from General Grant to furnish the Department with a statement of his views on the question of a transfer of the Indian Bureau from the Interior to the War Department, General John Pope, whose great experience among and knowledge of the Indians of the plains eminently qualified him to judge of the real merits of the question, wrote an able letter, briefly stating the prominent reasons favoring the proposed change. As the question of the transfer of the Indian Bureau from the control of the Interior to that of the War Department is constantly being brought up, and after the failure of the present policy is most likely to be raised again, the arguments advanced by General Pope, being those generally maintained by the army, and still having full force, are here given:

Washington, D. C., January 25, 1867.

General: In compliance with your suggestions, I have the honor to submit the following leading reasons why the Indian Bureau should be retransferred to the War Department. The views which I shall submit are by no means original, but are well-settled opinions of every officer of the army who has had experience on the subject, and are and have been entertained for years by nearly every citizen of the territories not directly or indirectly connected with the present system of Indian management.

Under present circumstances there is a divided jurisdiction over Indian affairs. While the Indians are officially at peace, according to treaties negotiated with them by the civil officers of the Indian Bureau, the military forces stationed in the Indian country have no jurisdiction over the Indians, and of consequence no certain knowledge of their feelings or purposes, and no power to take any action, either of a precautionary or aggressive character. The first that is known of Indian hostilities is a sudden report that the Indians have commenced a war, and have devastated many miles of settlements or massacred parties of emigrants or travellers. By the time such information reaches the military commander, the worst has been accomplished, and the Indians have escaped from the scene of outrage. Nothing is left to the military except pursuit, and generally unavailing pursuit. The Indian agents are careful never to locate their agencies at the military posts, for reasons very well understood. It is not in human nature that two sets of officials, responsible to different heads, and not in accord either in opinion or purpose, should act together harmoniously; and instead of combined, there is very certain to be conflicting action. The results are what might be expected. It would be far better to devolve the whole management of Indian affairs upon one or the other department, so as to secure at least consistent and uniform policy. At war the Indians are under the control of the military, at peace under the control of the civil officers. Exactly what constitutes Indian hostilities is not agreed on; and, besides this, as soon as the military forces, after a hard campaign, conducted with great hardship and at large expense, have succeeded in forcing the Indians into such a position that punishment is possible, the Indian, seeing the result and the impossibility of avoiding it, immediately proclaims his wish to make peace. The Indian agent, anxious, for manifest reasons, to negotiate a treaty, at once interferes “to protect” (as he expresses it) the Indians from the troops, and arrests the further prosecution of the military expedition just at the moment when results are to be obtained by it, and the whole labor and cost of the campaign are lost. The Indian makes a treaty to avoid immediate danger by the troops, without the slightest purpose of keeping it, and the agent knows very well that the Indian does not intend to observe it. While the army is fighting the Indians at one end of the line, Indian agents are making treaties and furnishing supplies at the other end, which supplies are at once used to keep up the conflict. With this divided jurisdiction and responsibility it is impossible to avoid these unfortunate transactions. If the Indian department, as at present constituted, were given sole jurisdiction of the Indians, and the troops removed, it is certain that a better condition of things would be obtained than now exists, since the whole responsibility of Indian wars, and their results to unprotected citizens, would belong to the Indian Bureau alone, without the power of shifting the responsibility of consequences upon others. The military officer is the representative of force, a logic which the Indian understands, and with which he does not invest the Indian agent. It is a fact which can be easily authenticated, that the Indians, in mass, prefer to deal entirely with military commanders, and would unanimously vote for the transfer of the Indian department to the War Department. In this they are mainly influenced by the knowledge that they can rely upon what the military commander tells or promises them, as they see he has power to fulfil his promise.

The first and great interest of the army officer is to preserve peace with the Indians. His home during his life is to be at some military post in the Indian country, and aside from the obligations of duty, his own comfort and quiet, and the possibility of escaping arduous and harassing field service against Indians at all seasons of the year, accompanied by frequent changes of station, which render it impossible for him to have his family with him, render a state of peace with Indians the most desirable of all things to him. He therefore omits no proper precautions, and does not fail to use all proper means, by just treatment, honest distribution of annuities, and fair dealing, to secure quiet and friendly relations with the Indian tribes in his neighborhood. His honest distribution of the annuities appropriated to the Indians is further secured by his life commission in the army, and the odium which would blast his life and character by any dishonest act. If dismissed from the service for such malfeasance, he would be publicly branded by his own profession, and would be powerless to attribute his removal from office to any but the true cause. The Indian agent, on the other hand, accepts his office for a limited time and for a specific purpose, and he finds it easy when he has secured his ends (the rapid acquisition of money) to account for his removal from office on political grounds or the personal enmity of some other official of his department superior in rank to himself. The eagerness to secure an appointment as Indian agent, on a small salary, manifested by many persons of superior ability, ought of itself to be a warning to Congress as to the objects sought by it. It is a common saying in the West that next to, if not indeed before, the consulship to Liverpool, an Indian agency is the most desirable office in the gift of the Government. Of course the more treaties an Indian agent can negotiate, the larger the appropriation of money and goods which passes through his hands, and the more valuable his office. An Indian war on every other day, with treaty-making on intermediate days, would be therefore the condition of affairs most satisfactory to such Indian agents. I by no means say that all Indian agents are dishonest. In truth I know some who are very sincere and honorable men, who try to administer their offices with fidelity to the Government; but that the mass of Indian agents on the frontier are true only to their personal and pecuniary interests, I am very sure no one familiar with the subject will dispute. I repeat, then, that a condition of peace with the Indians is above all things desirable to the military officer stationed in their country: something very like the reverse to the Indian agent.

The transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department would at once eliminate from our Indian system the formidable army of Indian superintendents, agents, sub-agents, special agents, jobbers, contractors, and hangers-on, who now infest the frontier States and territories, and save to the Government annually a sum of money which I will not venture to estimate. The army officers detailed to perform duty in their places would receive no compensation in addition to their army pay. Previous to the creation of the Interior Department and the transfer of the Indian Bureau to that department, army officers performed well and honestly the duties of Indian agents, and it is only necessary to refer to our past history to demonstrate that our relations at that time with the Indians were far more friendly and satisfactory than they have been since.... The military are absolutely necessary in the Indian country to protect the lives and property of our citizens. Indian agents and superintendents are not necessary, since their duties have been and can still be faithfully and efficiently performed by the army officers stationed with the troops. Harmonious and concerted action can never be secured while both parties are retained. The military are necessary—the civil officers are not; and as it is essential that the one or the other be displaced, I cannot see what doubt exists as to which party must give way. These are only the general reasons for the retransfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department—reasons which are well understood by every one familiar with the subject.... In order that any policy whatever may be consistently and efficiently pursued, a change in our present administration of Indian affairs is absolutely essential. The retransfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department is believed to be the first step toward a reformation, and until that step is taken it is useless to expect any improvement in the present condition of our Indian relations.

I am, General, respectfully your obedient servant,
John Pope, Brevet Major-General U. S. Army.

General U. S. Grant, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.