This gap in General Johnston’s line had suddenly become the most important part in the line, and all available forces were hurried there to repel the danger that seriously threatened: but I do not think any further firing took place. This was the last firing from the Army of Tennessee in its last battle during the war. General Johnston, in his report of the battle of Bentonville, says: “In the Eighth Texas Regiment, Lieutenant General Hardee’s only son, a noble youth of sixteen, charging bravely in the foremost rank, fell mortally wounded. He had enlisted but a few days before.” General Hardee reported his loss at Averyboro at 500. Prisoners taken said that the Federal loss was about 3,000. General Johnston, in his report on the three days’ fighting at Bentonville, says that his loss was 223 killed, 1,467 wounded, and 653 missing. Of the missing, many of them reported to him afterwards at Smithfield, having charged through the Federal lines where gaps were made by the thick timber, and, passing into the country beyond, rejoined their commands in a few days thereafter. Maj. Buck Joyner, of the Eighteenth Tennessee Infantry, was one of this lot, who reported with about one hundred of his men. General Johnston, speaking further in his report on Bentonville, says: “We captured 903 prisoners.” The Federals reported their loss to have exceeded 4,000, which is about correct, I suppose, when we remember that the Confederates fought for the most of the time in intrenchments. The appearance of the field of battle certainly justified such a conclusion.
My comment on the battle of Bentonville is that the Confederates fought with as much bravery and patriotic zeal as they had shown at Murfreesboro or at Chickamauga. It is true that they had everything to discourage them, had they stopped to think; but an instinct of honor suggested that they would stick it out to the end, let consequences be what they may, and the idea of a surrender had not then entered their heads.
CHAPTER X.
Further Movements in North Carolina, and the Beginning of the End.
After the battle of Bentonville General Johnston retreated to Smithfield, N. C., a distance of seventeen miles. Gen. Frank Cheatham, with two thousand of the Army of Tennessee, joined him there, and small squads of that army continued from time to time to come up, marching on foot from Corinth, Miss. A lull took place in the movements of the Federal army at this time. Generals Sherman and Schofield had united their large armies, and were deliberating on their next movement to encompass General Johnston and his army. The Confederate recruits that had joined since the battle of Bentonville about supplied the losses Johnston had sustained during his North Carolina campaign.
During this lull in military movements General Johnston availed himself of the opportunity to reorganize his much depleted army. Five or six companies were consolidated into one, three or four regiments into one, and so on through the list to that of divisions. This, of course, retired many commissioned officers from the lowest rank to that of major generals of divisions. I do not remember that any lieutenant generals were interfered with, as I am of the opinion that we did not have an oversupply of this grade on hand. But to the honor of these retired officers, I did not hear of one who sulked in his tent for this reason; but they patriotically became members of the army again in some capacity, even down to enlisting, as many of them had done at the beginning of the war, as privates in their company. The infantry say to this day that most of them joined the cavalry. I know that some twenty of them, the highest rank among them being that of colonel, joined the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry and were paroled with that regiment. I remember after the reorganization to have met a soldier in the old Second Tennessee Infantry, and I asked him what was the number of his regiment since the reorganization. He replied that he did not know, as it was one of the questions that was past finding out; that he knew of a company of a lieutenant and five men that had been built up to the regulation limit of seventy-two men by the consolidation of five other companies and the enlistment of commissioned officers from the lowest rank to that of major general to reach the required limit. Of course the soldier was romancing, but really he was drawing a truthful picture of what the Confederate army was then, after four years of campaigning and fighting the battles that they had passed through.
Before General Johnston had left Smithfield he was officially notified of the fact that General Lee had been forced to leave Petersburg, Va., with his army on the 2d day of April, 1865. Richmond, the Confederate capital, had been evacuated, and the President and his Cabinet were then at some point in North Carolina, of which Johnston was notified by telegram, summoning him to meet them in conference. I do not suppose that any other officer of the Army of Tennessee knew of this fact at the time, even the highest ranking officers. While this conference was in session General Lee notified President Davis of the surrender of his army at Appomattox. I will be pardoned here for quoting liberally from Johnston’s narrative for the purpose of showing what transpired at the interview between General Johnston and Mr. Davis and his Cabinet. The army was totally ignorant of all this, and the thought of a surrender had not entered their minds:
The three corps of the Confederate army reached Raleigh, N. C., on the evening of the 10th of April, 1865. In a telegram dated Greensboro, N. C., 4:30 P.M., the President directed me to leave the troops under Lieutenant General Hardee’s command and report to him there. Taking the first train, about midnight, I reached Greensboro about eight o’clock on the 12th, and was General Beauregard’s guest. His headquarters was a freight car near by and in sight of those of the President. The General and myself were summoned to the President’s office in an hour or two, and found Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan with him. We had supposed that we were to be questioned concerning the military resources of our department in connection with the question of continuing or terminating the war. But the President’s object seemed to be to give, not to obtain, information. He said that in two or three weeks he would have a large army in the field by bringing into the ranks those that had abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by calling out the enrolled men whom the conscript bureau with its forces had been unable to bring into the army. It was remarked by the military officers that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under the same circumstances could not be forced into it, would scarcely in the present desperate condition of our affairs enter the service upon mere invitation. Neither opinions nor information was asked, and the conference ended.
General Breckenridge, as was expected, arrived that afternoon and confirmed the report of the surrender of the Army of Virginia. General Beauregard and myself, conversing together after the intelligence of the great disaster, reviewed the condition of our affairs, carefully compared the resources of the belligerents, and agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown. In conversation with General Breckenridge afterwards I repeated this and said that the only power of government left in the President’s hands was that of terminating the war, and that this power should be exercised without more delay. I also expressed my readiness to suggest to the President the absolute necessity of such action, should an opportunity to do so be given me. General Breckenridge promised to make this opportunity. Mr. Mallory came to converse with me on the subject. He showed great anxiety that negotiations to end the war should be commenced, and urged that I was the person who should suggest the measure to the President.
General Breckenridge and myself were summoned to the President’s office an hour or two after the meeting of his Cabinet the next morning. Being desired by the President to do so, we compared the military forces of the two parties to the war. Our force was an army of about 20,000 infantry and artillery and 5,000 mounted troops. That of the United States was three armies that could be combined against ours, which was insignificant when compared with either: Grant’s army of 180,000 men, Sherman’s army of at least 110,000, and Canby’s army of 60,000—odds of seventeen or eighteen to one, which in a few weeks could be more than doubled. I represented that under such circumstances it would be the greatest of human crimes for us to attempt to continue the war, for, having neither credit, money, nor arms but those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition but that in their cartridge boxes, nor shops for repairing arms or making ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would be, not to harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation of our country and the ruin of its people. I therefore urged that the President should exercise at once the only function of government still in his possession and open negotiations of peace.
The President then desired the members of his Cabinet to express their opinions on the important subject. General Breckenridge, Mr. Mallory, and Mr. Reagan thought that the war was decided against us, and that it was absolutely necessary to make peace. Mr. Benjamin expressed the contrary opinion, making a speech for war, much like that of Sempronius in “Soldier’s Play.” The President said that it was idle to suggest that he should attempt to negotiate when it was certain from the attempt previously made that his authority to treat would not be recognized, nor any terms that he might offer would be considered by the government of the United States. I reminded him that it had not been unusual in such cases for military commanders to initiate negotiations upon which treaties of peace were founded, and proposed that he should allow me to address General Sherman on the subject. After a few words in opposition to that idea, Mr. Davis reverted to the first suggestion, that he should offer terms to the government of the United States, which he had put aside, and sketched a letter appropriate to be sent by me to General Sherman, proposing a meeting to arrange the terms of an armistice to enable the civil authorities to agree upon terms of peace. The letter prepared in that way was sent by me to Lieutenant General Hampton, near Hillsboro, to be forwarded to General Sherman. It was delivered to the latter the next day, April 14, and was as follows: