39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?
40. Qu. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?
41. Qu. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power?
42. Qu. What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself?
43. Qu. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction?
44. Qu. Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?
45. Qu. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there could have been of late so many sufferers?
46. Qu. Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises?
47. Qu. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job?
48. Qu. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?