Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?
Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?
Wt I see is onely variety of colours & light. Wt I feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wt resemblance have these thoughts with those?
A picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wth the tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wth the tangible head[231]?
M.
All things by us conceivable are—
1st, thoughts;
2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;
3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wch can possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.