Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e. of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance.
P.
Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be prov'd on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and onely in the mind.
M. P.
The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality.
M.
Tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist, are not without the mind.
M.
The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is, that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite, immutable, eternal, &c.;—wch will be to make either God extended (wch I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God.
I.