In the Third Dialogue plausible objections to this conception of what the reality of the material world means are discussed.
Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, and Berkeley another Protagoras, on account of it? His answer is, that the reality of sensible things, as far as man can in any way be concerned with them, does not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested, demonstrated, or even conceived, but in phenomena actually seen and touched, and in the working faith that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the analogies of present sense-experience.
But is not this negation of the Matter that is assumed to be real and independent of Spirit, an unproved conjecture? It is answered, that the affirmation of this abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, and one self-convicted [pg 360] by its implied contradictions, while its negation is only a simple falling back on the facts of experience, without any attempt to explain them.
Again, is it objected that the reality of sensible things involves their continued reality during intervals of our perception of them? It is answered, that sensible things are indeed permanently dependent on Mind, but not on this, that, or the other finite embodied spirit.
Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or Mind is open to all the objections against independent Matter; and that, if we deny this Matter, we must in consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession of isolated feelings? The answer is, that there is no parity between self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of all relation to any Spirit. We find, in memory, our own personality and identity; that we are not our ideas, “but somewhat else”—a thinking, active principle, that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas, and that is revealed as continuously real. Each person is conscious of himself; and may reasonably infer the existence of other self-conscious persons, more or less like what he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-conscious persons, with their common sensuous experiences all under cosmical order, is not open to the contradictions involved in a pretended universe of Matter, independent of percipient realising Spirit.
Is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguishing between the real existence of a thing and its being perceived? It is answered, that all they are entitled to mean is, to distinguish between being perceived exclusively by me, and being independent of the perception of all sentient or conscious beings.
Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves the distinction between facts and fancies? He is reminded of the meaning of the word idea. That term [pg 361] is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras of fancy: it is applied also to the objective phenomena of our sense-experience.
Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause of all changes in nature declaimed against as baseless? It is answered, that the supposition of unthinking Power at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is absurd.
Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the common belief of mankind? It is argued in reply, that this unrealised Matter is foreign to common belief, which is incapable of even entertaining the conception; and which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for sensible things.