When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.
P.
Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.
M.
Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wch is not an ens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and exist in rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference between entia realia & entia rationis may be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.
N.
Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.
We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.
M.
Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world[86]. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.