Mo.
Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man[164]. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.
I.
Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.
I.
By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing[165].
M. S.
To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive[166] (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether [pg 048] passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.
What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name[167].