PHIL. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?
HYL. By no means.
PHIL. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.
HYL. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?
PHIL. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.
HYL. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?
PHIL. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?
HYL. They are in a continual change.
PHIL. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.
HYL. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.