FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER WILLIAM IV.
In 1830 the closing months of Wellington's administration were disturbed by the French and Belgian revolutions. The former of these was occasioned by the publication on July 25 of three ordinances, restricting the liberty of the press, dissolving the chambers, and amending the law of elections. The Parisian populace rose against this infringement of the constitution. In the course of a three days' street-fight (the 27th to the 29th) the troops were driven out of Paris. On the 30th a few members of the chambers, who had continued in session, invited Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans, to assume the office of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and he was proclaimed on the following day. On August 7 the chamber of deputies offered him the crown, which he accepted, and on the 9th he was proclaimed "King of the French". On the 2nd Charles X. and the dauphin had renounced their rights in favour of the young Duke of Bordeaux, and on the 16th they sailed from Cherbourg to England. The change of dynasty was accompanied by a transference to the bourgeoisie of such political influence as had hitherto belonged to the clergy and noblesse. It remained to be seen whether it would also be accompanied by a change of foreign policy.
RECOGNITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE.
The new French revolution occasioned no slight perturbation in the European courts. To say nothing of the fear of the precedent being followed in other lands, there was no longer any guarantee that France would respect the arrangements effected by the treaties of Vienna and Paris. Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed not to recognise Louis Philippe, and entered into a convention for mutual aid in the event of French aggression. Aberdeen, the British foreign secretary, declared that the time had come for applying the treaty of Chaumont, which, as extended at Paris, pledged Great Britain and the three eastern powers to act together in case fresh revolution and usurpation in France should endanger the repose of other states. Wellington, however, saw that the cause of the elder Bourbon line was hopeless, and held now, as in 1815, that if France was not to menace the peace of Europe, her political position must be one with which she could be contented. He considered that the arguments which justified the admission of France to the councils of the powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 applied with no less cogency to the government of Louis Philippe than to that of Louis XVIII. He therefore determined to acknowledge the new French government at an early date after the notification of its assumption of power. Nor were the other powers slow in taking the same course. It is true that Metternich suggested a closer bond between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, partly to restore amicable relations between Austria and Russia, partly to oppose any possible designs of France on Italy. Prussia, fearing war, resisted the proposal, and preferred to draw France into a guarantee of the status quo by recognising Louis Philippe. Russia was last of the great powers to acknowledge the new régime in France, and she only did so on condition that the powers should hold the French king responsible for the execution of the international engagements of the fallen dynasty. Louis Philippe was certainly not the man wilfully to embroil France in a war with her neighbours, and, had he been independent of French public opinion, there would have been no reason to fear French aggression.
The state which had most to fear from an aggressive France was the new kingdom of the Netherlands. Trusting for protection to the great powers rather than to its own forces, the Netherlands government had adopted a system which left it almost entirely without troops except during the military exercises of September and October. Wellington, who knew the pacific character of the new French government, advised the garrisoning of certain isolated points on the frontier, but thought no further preparation necessary. A few weeks were however to prove that the new French revolution had aroused a more implacable enemy, against whom the house of Orange would have needed all the troops it could summon to its aid. The union of Holland and Belgium had been resolved on by the powers at Paris in 1814, mainly for military reasons. Austria had been unwilling to resume the heavy burden of guarding the Belgian Netherlands and southern Germany against French aggression, and the powers had consequently resolved on strengthening those smaller states on whom the duty of resistance would fall. In these days, accustomed as we are to the distinction between the Teutonic and Latin races, it might seem reasonable that two countries in which the prevailing languages are low German should be subject to the same government. But it was not yet customary to turn the principles of comparative philology into arguments for the rearrangement of political boundaries. The French language and culture had moreover made considerable progress among the upper and middle classes of Belgium, while religious differences alienated the clergy from the house of Orange. In the states-general of the Netherlands the Dutch had half the votes, and, as the Orange party was strong in Antwerp and Ghent, commanded a majority. The fiscal system adopted by the government favoured the Dutch rather than the Belgian population. Dutchmen were generally preferred for state offices, and an attempt to control the education of the clergy was deeply resented as an attack on the Roman catholic religion. Belgium in consequence presented the curious spectacle of the liberal and clerical parties working on the same side, united against the Dutch government.
BELGIAN REVOLUTION.
The example afforded by France turned a discontent which might have led to local riots into a national conflagration. On August 25 there was a rising of the populace at Brussels, which the troops proved unable to quell. On the 27th it was suppressed by a body of burgher guards, a volunteer force drawn from the bourgeoisie of the town. The bourgeoisie finding themselves in possession of the Belgian capital, at first presented a series of minor demands to the king, but on September 3 they went the length of demanding a separate administration for Belgium. The king undertook to lay this proposal before the states, which assembled on the 13th. But before the states could come to any conclusion the question had assumed a new aspect. All the leading towns of Belgium had followed the example of Brussels by forming burgher guards and had thus joined in the revolution; and on the 20th a fresh rising of the populace of Brussels had overthrown the burgher guard and instituted a provisional government. This was followed by an attempt on the part of Prince Frederick of Orange, a younger son of the King of the Netherlands, to occupy Brussels with a military force. After five days' fighting he was compelled to retire, and when on the 30th the states-general gave their consent to the proposal for a separate administration, their decision fell upon deaf ears. All the Belgian provinces were in revolt.
It was now clear to everybody that the national party in Belgium would not consent even to a personal union with Holland. As the union of the two countries formed a part of the treaty of Vienna, every European power had a legal right to employ force to prevent its disruption, and Russia and Prussia both desired active intervention. In France, on the other hand, there was a loud popular demand for the reannexation of Belgium to France, of which it had formed a part from 1794 to 1814. Louis Philippe saw that he could not resist this demand if the Belgian insurgents were coerced on the side of Prussia, and therefore announced that Prussian aggression would be met by a French expedition to Belgium to keep the balance even, until the question should be settled by a congress of the powers. On September 25 Talleyrand had arrived in England. He quickly obtained the adhesion of Wellington to the principle of non-intervention. The duke had been among the first to grasp the fact that reconciliation of Dutch and Belgians was impossible, and that the intervention of the powers would necessitate a European war, to avoid which the union of the two countries had originally been designed. He agreed therefore to a separation of the countries on condition that France should bind herself to observe the arrangements of the congress of Vienna in 1815 and should take no separate action in Belgium.
On Talleyrand's suggestion it was decided to refer the question to the conference already sitting in London for the purpose of settling the Greek question, which would of course have to be reinforced by representatives of Austria and Prussia for the present purpose. Molé, the French foreign minister, would have preferred Paris as the seat of the congress, but the King of the Netherlands absolutely refused to entrust his cause to a conference meeting in a city where opinion ran so strongly against him. On October 5 he made a formal appeal to the powers for the aid guaranteed him by treaty, but the demand came too late to induce Wellington to swerve from the policy of non-intervention, and on November 4 the conference of London began its labours by proposing an armistice in Belgium, which was accepted by both parties. This left Maastricht and the citadel of Antwerp in the hands of Dutch garrisons, and Luxemburg in the hands of a garrison supplied by the German confederation. Every other place in Belgium was in the hands of the insurgents. But the further solution of the question was reserved for other hands. On the 3rd Louis Philippe was compelled to accept a revolutionary ministry, and on the 22nd Wellington and Aberdeen had to make way for a whig ministry with Grey as premier, and Palmerston as foreign secretary.
The new foreign secretary had served a long political apprenticeship as secretary at war in the successive administrations of Perceval, Liverpool, Canning, Goderich, and Wellington, and under the three last-mentioned premiers he had enjoyed a seat in the cabinet. It will be remembered that he had been a warm champion of Greece, and had resigned office along with Huskisson, Dudley, and Grant. He now returned in company with Grant as a member of a whig cabinet. Although this change of party involved the adoption of a domestic policy far removed from Canning's, Palmerston's foreign policy remained rather Canningite than whig. The interest and the honour of England ranked with Palmerston as with Canning before all questions which concerned the maintenance of European peace. But instead of Canning's versatile diplomacy he displayed too often a reckless disregard of the susceptibilities of foreign governments, and, if, like Canning, he lent the moral support of Great Britain to the liberal party in every continental country, it was not, as it had professedly been with Canning, because their success would promote the interests of Great Britain, but because he had a genuine sympathy with their cause. It is impossible to deny that in his earlier years at least Palmerston's policy met with a success such as Castlereagh and Wellington had not attempted to gain; real or imaginary dangers at home left the foreign governments too weak to oppose the will of the one strong man of the moment. Yet it is doubtful whether any resultant benefits were not more than counterbalanced by the distrust and ill-will with which the greater nations of Europe have learned to regard the British government and people.