During this critical period, when Great Britain was gradually drifting into a position of isolation, the course of parliamentary history becomes inseparable from the progress of those mighty events on the continent, which Grenville's government would fain have treated as outside the sphere of British interests. For, notwithstanding Windham's schemes for a reconstruction of the army, that government had allowed the naval and military establishments of Great Britain to fall below their former standard. The leading idea of their policy was non-intervention, and at the opening of 1807, there was no longer any thought of sending a force to cope with Napoleon's veterans on the continent When in 1805 a British force was operating in North Germany, it was possible that if Prussia had been faithful to her engagements, the disaster of Austerlitz might at least have been partially retrieved. It was otherwise when, after the collapse of Prussia, France and Russia stood face to face with each other. The drawn battle of Eylau in East Prussia, marked by fearful carnage, was fought on February 8, 1807. This check, breaking the spell of Napoleon's victorious career, had a remarkable effect in raising the spirits of the allies, Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, some remains of whose army were still in the field. These powers now drew closer together, but they received a lukewarm support from Great Britain, which might have done much to save Europe by timely reinforcements and liberal subsidies. In reply to an urgent appeal from the tsar for a loan of £6,000,000, the Grenville ministry doled out £500,000 to Russia, and a still more pitiful gift to Prussia. No troops were sent to aid Sweden on the Baltic coast, although, when, at Napoleon's instigation, Turkey declared war against Russia, expeditions were despatched to Alexandria and the Dardanelles. The notion of making war on a large scale, in concert with allies, on the continent of Europe, as in the days of Marlborough, and even of Lord Granby, seems to have vanished from the minds of English statesmen, except Castlereagh, who always advocated concentrated action.
The succession of Portland and Canning to Grenville and Howick brought no immediate change in our insular policy and the new government had been in office for above three months before a British force at last appeared in the Swedish island of Rügen. It arrived too late, Danzig surrendered in May, and on June 14 Napoleon obtained a decisive victory over the Russian army and its Prussian contingent at Friedland. Russia now gave a supreme example of that national selfishness, and contempt for the rights of independent states which had dominated the counsels of sovereigns ever since the first partition of Poland. Doubtless the tsar might plead that Great Britain, too, had been wasting her strength in selfish attempts to secure her mastery of the seas, and to open new markets for her trade. He also deeply resented her recent failure to aid him in the hour of his utmost need, while he still cherished the policy of the "armed neutrality," and was eager to prosecute his designs against Turkey. Dazzled and flattered by Napoleon, he welcomed overtures for peace at the expense of Great Britain, and there is no doubt that his imaginative nature indulged in the vision of a regenerated Europe, divided between himself as emperor of the east and Napoleon as emperor of the west. It is therefore far from surprising that he should have held a private interview with Napoleon, on a raft in the Niemen, which led to the treaty of Tilsit on July 7.
THE TREATY OF TILSIT.
This treaty, in which the King of Prussia shared as a helpless partner, contained both public and secret articles, but the distinction was not very material, for the secret articles almost immediately became known to Canning. The general effect of the whole agreement was the utter humiliation of Prussia, the recognition by that country and Russia of all Napoleon's acquisitions, and their combination with France against the maritime claims and conquests of Great Britain. The western provinces of Prussia were to be incorporated with other German annexations to form the new kingdom of Westphalia; Prussian Poland was to be converted into the duchy of Warsaw under the crown of Saxony, to which a right of passage through Silesia was reserved; and Berlin with other great Prussian fortresses were to remain in the hands of the French until an exorbitant war indemnity should have been paid.[34] At one stroke Prussia was thus reduced to a second-rate power, with a territory little greater than it possessed before the first partition of Poland. The rule of Joseph Bonaparte at Naples, that of Louis in Holland, and the confederation of the Rhine, were solemnly confirmed. Above all, Russia pledged herself to join France in coercing Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal into an adoption of the organised commercial exclusion, known as the "continental system," and hostility to Great Britain in the event of her resistance. If Sweden refused to join this league, Denmark was to be compelled to declare war on her.
No sooner did it receive information of this alliance than the British government despatched a naval armament to Denmark and landed troops, which were soon reinforced by those withdrawn from Rügen. There had been no open rupture with Denmark, though much irritation existed between Denmark and Great Britain with reference to neutral commerce. But there were the best reasons for believing that the Danish fleet, as well as that of Portugal, would be demanded by France and Russia, to be employed against Great Britain, and it was certain that Denmark could not withstand such pressure. The British envoy, Jackson, was accordingly instructed to offer Denmark a treaty of alliance, of which one condition was to be the deposit of her fleet on hire with the British government. The proposal was accompanied by a threat of force, and the crown prince, with a spirit worthy of admiration, refused the terms. In consequence a peremptory summons to deliver up her ships of war and naval stores was addressed to the governor of Copenhagen by the British commanders, Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart, under whom Sir Arthur Wellesley was entrusted with the reserve. The surrender, if made peaceably, was to be in the nature of a deposit, and the fleet was to be restored at the end of the war. The governor returned a temporising reply, and a bombardment of Copenhagen followed (September 2); the fleet was brought to England as prize of war; and Denmark naturally became the enemy of Great Britain.[35] Sweden declined the proffered alliance of France and Russia, and actually invaded Norway, then a part of the Danish kingdom. The result was the loss of Finland and Swedish Pomerania. The king, Gustavus IV., resembled Charles XII. in quixotic temperament, but not in ability; and Sir John Moore, sent to his support with an army of 10,000 men, found it hopeless to co-operate with him. Shortly afterwards, his subjects formed the same opinion, and he was compelled to make way for his uncle, who succeeded as Charles XIII. with Marshal Bernadotte as crown prince. In consequence of this change Sweden became reconciled to Russia, and estranged from Great Britain.
The seizure of the Danish fleet, in time of so-called peace, roused great indignation throughout most of Europe, and, in some degree, strained the conscience of the British parliament itself. The justice and wisdom of it were strenuously challenged in both houses, especially by Grenville, Sidmouth, and Lord Darnley, who moved an address to the crown embodying an impressive protest against it. It was defended, however, by the high authority of the Marquis Wellesley, as well as by Canning and other ministers, on the simple ground of military necessity. Napoleon himself never ceased to denounce it as an international outrage of the highest enormity. This did not prevent his doing his best to justify it and to imitate it by sending Junot's expedition to Portugal, with instructions to seize the Portuguese fleet at Lisbon. It is strange that in the debates on this subject, peace with France was still treated on both sides as a possibility; but Canning declared that neither Russian nor Austrian mediation could have been accepted as impartial, or as affording the least hope of pacification. However, on September 25, the king addressed a declaration to Europe, in which, after justifying himself in regard to Copenhagen, he professed his readiness to accept conditions of peace "consistent with the maritime rights and political existence of Great Britain".
COMMERCIAL EXCLUSION.
Still more reasonable attacks, supported by strong petitions, were made by the opposition upon the "orders in council," whereby the British government retaliated against Napoleon's "continental system". This system was founded on a firm belief, shared by the French people, that Great Britain, as mistress of the seas, was the one great obstacle to his imperial ambition, and the most formidable enemy of French aggrandisement, only to be crushed by the ruin of her trade. Prussia had, in conformity with her treaty of February 15, 1806, issued a proclamation on March 28 of that year, closing her ports, which would now include those of Hanover, against British trade. The British government replied by first laying an embargo on Prussian vessels in the harbours of Great Britain and Ireland, and by proclaiming a blockade of the coast of Europe from Brest to the Elbe. This was followed on May 14 by an order in council for seizing all vessels found navigating under Prussian colours. As yet the policy of commercial exclusion had not been carried to any great length, but the Berlin decree issued by Napoleon on November 21 after the battle of Jena proclaimed the whole of the British Isles to be in a state of blockade, prohibited all commerce with them from the ports of France and her dependent states, confiscated all British merchandise in such ports, and declared all British subjects in countries occupied by French troops to be prisoners of war. Howick replied by further orders in council in January, 1807, forbidding neutrals to trade between the ports of France and her allies, or between the ports of nations which should observe the Berlin decree, on pain of the confiscation of the ship and cargo. On the 27th another decree, issued at Warsaw, ordered the seizure in the Hanse Towns of all British goods and colonial produce. The reply of Great Britain was a stricter blockade of the North German coast.
The accession of Russia to Napoleon's commercial policy at Tilsit seemed to have brought the combination against British trade to its furthest development, and it was answered by new orders in council, treating any port from which the British flag was excluded as if actually blockaded, and further limiting the carriage by neutral vessels of produce from hostile colonies. The Milan decree issued on December 17, and further orders in council published during the same winter, carried to greater extremes, if possible, this intolerable form of commercial warfare, under which neutral commerce was gradually crushed out of existence. Great Britain, owing to her command of the sea, was more independent of this kind of commerce than her rival, and both the decrees and the orders in council inflicted far more damage on France and her allies than on Great Britain. But neither party was able to enforce completely its policy of commercial exclusion. Europe could not dispense with British goods or colonial produce carried in British vessels. The law was deliberately set aside by a regular licensing system, and evaded by wholesale smuggling; neutral ships continued to ply between continental ports, and Napoleon did not disdain to clothe his troops with 50,000 British overcoats during the Eylau campaign. Still, Great Britain was enabled to cripple, if not to destroy, the merchant shipping of all other countries, and the interests of consumers all over Europe were enlisted against the author of the continental system. On the other hand, a heavy blow was dealt to friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States, the chief victim of these belligerent pretensions.[36]
FRUITLESS EXPEDITIONS.