Early in April, however, a more serious insurrection broke out in the Morea, and was followed a few weeks later by one in Central Greece. The war was disgraced from the first by inhuman massacres on both sides. The Greek patriarch at Constantinople together with three archbishops was executed by the Turks on Easter Sunday, April 22. A great ferment in Russia was the result, where the people were anxious to assist their co-religionists and to avenge the death of the patriarch, whom they regarded as a martyr. The grievances of the Orthodox religion were seconded by the proper grievances of Russia. Greek ships, sailing under the Russian flag, had been seized in the Dardanelles; the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had not been evacuated by the Turkish troops as was required by treaty, while an ancient treaty rendered it possible to regard the wrongs of the Greek Church as the political wrongs of Russia. A Russian ultimatum was despatched on June 28; and, while awaiting a reply, Russia consulted the other powers as to the course they would pursue in the event of war breaking out between Russia and Turkey, and the system with which they would propose to replace the Turkish domination if it came to be destroyed. The principle of joint intervention, adopted at Troppau, seemed to require the powers to give their support to Russia. Great Britain and Austria, however, refused to treat war with Turkey as a possibility. The Greek revolt seemed to them to express the principle of revolution, and the tsar himself became inclined to take this view of the situation when the Greeks established an advanced republican form of government. They accordingly distinguished between the treaty rights of Russia, which the four powers would urge Turkey to respect, and the provision of a more secure state of order in Turkey, which would be discussed at a European congress. The Russian ambassador had been withdrawn from Constantinople on August 8, and the negotiation was conducted mainly by Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at Constantinople, who was supported by Austria, France, and Prussia. He succeeded in inducing Turkey to evacuate the principalities and to open the Dardanelles to ships of all nations, but Turkish obstinacy deferred the conclusion of a treaty.
THE SPANISH QUESTION.
Meanwhile the Spanish question became more critical. As time went on Spain grew less instead of more settled, while the ultra-royalist party gained strength in France. To them the position to which the Bourbon King of Spain had been reduced seemed at once an insult and a menace to France. The establishment of Austrian supremacy in Italy made them long for French supremacy in Spain. In August, 1821, the presence of yellow fever in Spain was made the occasion for establishing a body of troops, professing to act as a sanitary cordon, upon the frontier. They were retained there when the fever had disappeared, and their numbers were gradually raised to 100,000. In December, 1821, an ultra-royalist ministry entered on office in France under the leadership of Villèle. Villèle, like King Louis XVIII., was opposed to war, but he might easily be forced to adopt the war policy which was popular with his party. Fresh evidence was given of the contagious nature of the Spanish revolution by the adoption, on the 27th of the preceding June, by the Portuguese cortes, of a constitution modelled on that of Spain. Six days later the Portuguese king arrived at Lisbon and was induced to sign the new constitution. This event was the more significant in the eyes of the powers, because the proclamation of the constitution had been accompanied by an insult to the Austrian embassy.
If Spanish liberalism placed Spain in danger of a war with France, Spain was in equal danger of a war with Great Britain because she was not liberal enough. The revolution of 1820, instead of reconciling the revolted colonies, had served as an example to the loyal colonies to seek their liberty. By the summer of 1822 Upper Peru was the only part of the American mainland where Spain held more than isolated posts; she had been compelled to sell Florida to the United States, and San Domingo had joined the revolted French colony of Hayti. The Spanish cortes, however, were even more resolute than the king had been to maintain the authority of the mother country, and protested against the right which the British had claimed and exercised of trading with the revolted colonies. The disorderly state of these colonies encouraged the growth of piracy, which flourished even in the ports which still acknowledged the supremacy of Spain. Special irritation was caused in 1822 by the condemnation of the Lord Collingwood for trading with Buenos Ayres, a place over which Spain had exercised no authority for twelve years. In the same year the new navigation acts greatly increased the facilities for trading with Great Britain enjoyed by such places in America as admitted British ships. In April, 1822, the United States recognised the independence of Colombia, but Great Britain refrained as yet from recognising any of the Spanish-American states, partly because of their unsettled condition and partly because the threat of recognition was a valuable diplomatic counter in negotiations with Spain.
Instead of a congress being held at Florence it was finally determined that the Italian questions should be referred to a congress which was to meet at Verona in September, 1822, and was to be preceded by a conference at Vienna on the Eastern question; there could, however, be little doubt that the Spanish question would also be raised. Castlereagh, or as we should now call him Lord Londonderry, would have preferred that Great Britain should stand aloof from the Spanish and Italian questions, but he desired that she should participate in the discussion of the Eastern question; it was accordingly arranged that he should represent Great Britain at the conference of Vienna, and he had actually drawn up instructions in favour of non-intervention in Spain and of accrediting agents to some of the South American republics, when his departure was prevented by his death on August 12. He was succeeded by Wellington as plenipotentiary, and by Canning as foreign secretary. The change was, however, one of persons rather than of policies. Canning was less conciliatory in manner, and had less sympathy with the principle of European congresses, but was prepared to carry on Castlereagh's policy on the questions which for the time being agitated the world.
THE CONGRESS OF VERONA.
The Spanish question was, as a fact, the one question which occupied the attention of the powers at Vienna and Verona. In consequence of the efforts of Strangford at Constantinople and his own growing dissatisfaction with the Greeks, the tsar was willing to allow the Greek question to drop; at the same time the kings of the Two Sicilies and Sardinia themselves desired the continuance of Austrian occupation, and thus postponed the Italian question. As in 1820, Austria held the balance between two rival policies. She had then thrown her weight on the side of non-intervention, and, had the Spanish question stood by itself, she would probably have done so again. But in Metternich's opinion the Spanish question was of less importance than the Eastern, and it was important that the tsar should not doubt her loyalty to the principle on which she had persuaded him to refrain from an attack upon the Porte.
On passing through Paris on his way to Vienna, Wellington found Villèle desirous of avoiding war, but counting on it as a probability. He arrived at Vienna too late for the actual conference, but in time to have some conversation with Metternich and the tsar before leaving for Verona. So far it appeared that Montmorency, the more active of the French representatives, though professing to desire a peaceful termination to the dispute between France and Spain, advocated French intervention, if intervention should be necessary, but was opposed to the passage of foreign troops through France. Metternich and the tsar distrusted French troops when brought face to face with revolutionists, and Metternich was therefore opposed to intervention, while the tsar still desired to be allowed to march a Russian army on behalf of the combined powers through Piedmont and southern France into Spain. Metternich of course did not wish to see any Russian troops to dispute Austria's supremacy in Italy. But all three desired the suppression of the Spanish constitution, if they could find a trustworthy instrument. Wellington adhered to Castlereagh's policy of non-intervention.[76]
When the congress opened at Verona on October 20, Montmorency proposed three skilfully drawn questions. Avoiding the direct discussion of hostilities, he asked whether, if France were compelled to withdraw her ambassador from Madrid, the other powers would do the same. Then, assuming their sympathy, he asked what form of moral support they would give her in event of war. Lastly, he propitiated Russian views of joint action by asking what form of material support the powers would give France, if she should require it. Wellington refused to consider hypothetical cases, but the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia answered the first question in the affirmative, and assured France of their moral, and, if necessary, of their material support. So far no power had abandoned its original attitude, but the promises had been given in a form which lent itself best to the sole interference of France, as the representative of the congress. Metternich now advocated British mediation, but this was refused by Montmorency on the ground of the differences between the policy adopted by Great Britain and that adopted by the other powers. It was then agreed that Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia should address notes of the same tenor to their ambassadors at Madrid, who should make corresponding representations to the Spanish government, and a procès verbal was concluded between these four powers defining the causes which would justify the recall of their ambassadors.
As the French king was not present at Verona, the sending of the French note was made conditional on the approval of the French government. The occupation of Spain by foreign troops was to be discussed when the King of Spain should have been restored to liberty. The tenor of the notes agreed on seemed to Wellington more likely to inflame the Spanish government than to win concessions, and he lost no time in informing Villèle through Sir Charles Stuart, the British ambassador at Paris, of the course of negotiations.[77] Although Wellington had been assured at Verona that Villèle's decision would not affect the transmission of notes from the other courts, he hoped and Canning believed that it was still in the power of Villèle to arrest the machinery that Montmorency, his representative at Verona, had set in motion. On November 30 Wellington left Verona, but the emperors remained. On December 5 Villèle sent a message to Verona proposing to postpone sending the despatches till an occasion for breaking off diplomatic relations as defined in the procès verbal should arise, and suggesting that the ambassadors at Paris should determine when such an occasion had occurred. This proposal was rejected. It was inconsistent with Russia's desire for war, while Austria was anxious to please Russia in the west, so long as she remained pacific in the east. The three eastern powers therefore resolved that they would only delay sending their notes till the French note was ready.