Russia's determination to act singly was, however, already made. On the same day, February 26, on which Wellington sketched his policy, Nesselrode issued a despatch declaring that war was inevitable, including among his reasons the repudiation of recent treaties by the Porte and the proclamation by it of a holy war. At the same time he endeavoured to disarm any possible opposition on the part of the powers by an invitation to them to make use of the coming war to carry out the treaty of London. In any case Russia would execute the treaty, but if she were left to herself, the manner of execution would be determined by her own convenience and interest.[96] So far Russia had done nothing directly inconsistent with the maintenance of her concert with France and Great Britain, whose representatives had been sitting in conference with hers at London since January, 1827. But the reference in this last note to the possibility of a settlement of the Greek question according to the convenience and interest of Russia appeared like a threat of breaking up the alliance in case France and Great Britain refused to send their fleets to the Mediterranean. At least Wellington so understood it, and, rather than be a party to the war, he dissolved the conference of London in the middle of March. But he soon found that by so doing he lost the co-operation of France, and he was therefore compelled to accept the assurances of Russia that she intended to keep within the limits of the treaty of London, and to regard the Mediterranean as a neutral area. The conference was in consequence reopened at the beginning of July. Meanwhile hostilities had actually begun between Russia and the Turks. Russia declared war on April 26. On May 7 her troops crossed the Pruth. They rapidly overran the Danubian provinces, and on June 7 crossed the Danube into Bulgaria. They were destined, however, to spend more than a year between the Danube and the Balkans before they could force their way into Rumelia.
During the interval considerable progress was made with the settlement of the Greek question. The treaty of London in providing for the autonomy of Greece had specified no boundaries, and the first problem demanding the attention of the powers that had assumed the task of the settlement of Greece was to determine the limits within which that settlement was to be effected. It might be urged that all the Greeks who had accepted the armistice imposed by the powers in consequence of the treaty of London had a right to share in the settlement at which that treaty aimed. But the armistice had been broken by Greek attacks on Chios and Crete, and Wellington held that the powers were, in consequence, free from any obligation imposed by the nominal acceptance of the armistice. He, accordingly, desired to adopt the simple principle of granting the proposed autonomy to those parts of Greece in which the insurrection had proved successful, namely, the Morea and the Ægean Islands, and refusing it in Northern and Central Greece, where the Turkish forces still held their own. But the British cabinet was far from being unanimous; many, among whom Palmerston was specially prominent, urged the concession of a greatly increased territory. The changes which took place in the British ministry towards the end of May, 1828, deprived Palmerston of his share in its deliberations, and by substituting Aberdeen for Dudley at the foreign office, placed our foreign relations under the direction of a man of talent and experience, who had already exercised an important influence on British policy and who was more in sympathy with the policy of the prime minister than Dudley had been, but who was not content, like Dudley, to be a mere cipher in the department over which he was called to preside. Aberdeen, though opposed to the narrow boundaries which Wellington wished to assign to liberated Greece, was no less antagonistic than his chief to any attempt to make the new Greek state politically important; and he was even of opinion that the Russian declaration of war had released Great Britain from any further obligation under the treaty of London.
Such were the composition and policy of the British government when the conference of London reassembled in July. The differences between the powers had prevented any active intervention in Greece, since the battle of Navarino. The ports in the Morea, still occupied by Ibrahim, had indeed been blockaded, but it had been found impossible to induce Austrian vessels to acknowledge a blockade of such questionable legality, and the allied fleets had even permitted the embarkation of Ibrahim's sick and wounded together with 5,500 Greek prisoners, who were sold into slavery on their arrival at Alexandria. The renewal of the concert of the three powers was followed by a rapid change in the situation. On the 19th it was decided that France should send an expedition to expel the Turco-Egyptian troops from the Morea, while Great Britain should render her any naval assistance that might be necessary. This step was valued by the British government as definitely committing France to a share in the settlement of the Greek question, and therefore interesting that power in opposition to any attempt at a separate settlement by Russia. It also furnished a safe outlet for French military ardour, disappointed by the results of the Spanish expedition. In fact, the evacuation of Spain, which was in progress at the date when this agreement was concluded, materially reduced the strain which the new undertaking imposed upon the French government. France immediately prepared to send out a force amounting to nearly 22,000 men. But before they could arrive, the greater part of their task had been performed by other hands.
TURKS EXPELLED FROM THE MOREA.
Codrington's conduct in permitting the embarkation of the Turkish sick and wounded with their prisoners had given great dissatisfaction at home, and the cabinet had resolved on his recall before the ministerial crisis of the latter part of May. That crisis occasioned a fortnight's delay, and, in consequence, Codrington was able, before his successor arrived, to make a naval demonstration before Alexandria and on August 6 to obtain the consent of Mehemet Ali to the following proposals: an exchange of prisoners was to take place, involving the liberation of the recently enslaved Greeks, and the Egyptian army was to be withdrawn from the Morea, but Ibrahim was to be allowed to leave behind 1,200 Egyptian troops to help to garrison five fortresses which were held by the Turks. Before either the new London protocol or the Alexandria convention could be carried into effect, further differences had arisen. Russia had proclaimed a blockade of the Dardanelles and ordered her admiral to carry it out. This proceeding was regarded by the British government as a breach of faith and a menace to British commerce. It was, however, impossible to abandon co-operation with Russia for fear that the Greek question might become involved in the issues at stake between her and the Porte. Wellington, in consequence, contented himself with obtaining certain exemptions from the operation of the blockade on behalf of British subjects trading with Turkey, and with the exclusion of the Russian fleet from the operations conducted in the Mediterranean in accordance with the orders of the London conference. The French force for expelling the Egyptians from the Morea arrived almost simultaneously with the Egyptian transports for removing them. On October 5 Ibrahim set sail for Egypt, with 21,000 men, leaving 1,200 behind in the five fortresses in accordance with the terms settled at Alexandria. The French began their attack on the remaining fortresses two days later, and by the end of November had expelled all the Turks from the Morea. By the terms of their engagements, they ought now to have departed. But it was hardly to be expected that France would so readily abandon the advantage that the presence of her troops gave her in the settlement of the eastern question.
Meanwhile the negotiations made slow progress. On November 16 a protocol was issued placing the Morea with the neighbouring islands under the guarantee of the powers. Wellington had opposed any extension of the guarantee to Central Greece on the ground that the allies had to provide both the necessary military force and the cost of maintaining the Greek government, so that any undertaking beyond the Morea would involve heavy expense without rendering lighter the task of maintaining order. But the real decision of the question lay not with the diplomatists at London, but with the diplomatists on the spot. Representatives of the three powers had been sent to Poros to make detailed arrangements in accordance with the terms of the treaty of London. Stratford Canning, who represented Great Britain, was one of the supporters of an extended frontier, and in the end the ambassadors at Poros drew up a protocol in favour of erecting Greece south of a line connecting the Gulfs of Arta and Volo into a hereditary principality, which was also to include nearly all the islands. Even Samos and Crete were recommended to the benevolent consideration of the courts. All Mohammedans were to be expelled from this territory. The tribute payable to Turkey was to be fixed at 1,500,000 piastres, but this was to be paid not to the Turkish government, but to those who might suffer pecuniary loss by the confiscation of lands hitherto owned by Mohammedans.
PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE.
The spring of 1829 was marked by events which went far to cancel the arguments on which Wellington had based his case for a restricted frontier. Not only the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth but Acarnania and Ætolia were liberated by the Greek forces under Sir Richard Church the castle of Vonitza falling on March 17, Karavasara shortly afterwards, Lepanto on April 30, and Mesolongi on May 17.[97] Meanwhile the terms agreed upon at Poros had been adopted and further defined by the conference at London on March 22. It was now provided that the future hereditary prince was to be chosen by the three powers and the sultan conjointly, and that the terms were to be offered to the Porte by the British and French ambassadors in the name of the three powers; any Turkish objections were to be weighed.[98] It was not till June that Robert Gordon and Guilleminot, representing Great Britain and France respectively, were able to lay these proposals before the Porte, and it was only after a Russian army under Diebitsch had crossed the Balkans that the Porte on August 15 accepted them, and even then only with extensive modifications. These limited the new state to the Morea and the adjacent islands, and left the tribute assigned to the same purposes as before the revolt; a limit was to be set to the military and naval forces of Greece, and Greeks were not to be allowed to migrate from Turkish dominions to the new state.
Wellington was of opinion that these concessions were adequate. He attached great importance to the consent of the Porte, to dispense with which seemed to him a sure method of encouraging a general revolt in the Turkish dominions; and he also advocated a limited frontier in the interests of the Ionian Islands. He doubted whether it would be found possible to remove Capodistrias, who had been elected president of Greece for a period of seven years on April 14, 1827, from his office to make room for a hereditary prince, and he felt sure that if Capodistrias were once granted Central Greece he would not hesitate to attempt the conquest of the Ionian Islands. Capodistrias had in fact refused to accept any of the arrangements proposed by the London conference, and was still engaged in the vigorous prosecution of the war. Wellington did not, however, succeed in inducing France and Russia to remain content with the Turkish concessions. Diebitsch's successful march through Rumelia encouraged Russia to demand more, and filled the minds of the French ministers with the wildest schemes of aggression. They actually proposed to Russia that the northern part of the Balkan peninsula should be divided between Austria and Russia while the whole peninsula south of the Balkans, with Bulgaria to the north, was to be formed into a new state under the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands, whose hereditary dominions were in their turn to be divided between France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
Such chimerical projects were based on the assumption that Constantinople lay at the mercy of the army of Diebitsch; and this was believed to be the case not only by the court of Paris, but by that of London, and even by that of Constantinople. But no one knew better than Diebitsch how precarious his situation was, and, if Russia wished to obtain advantageous terms, it was necessary for her to make the most of the illusion while it lasted. On September 14 the peace of Adrianople was signed, which established the virtual independence of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and secured for all powers at peace with Turkey a free passage for merchant ships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; Russia received a small addition to her Asiatic territories, and Turkey accepted both the treaty of London of July 6, 1827, and the protocol of London of March 22, 1829. The difficulties raised by Turkey's opposition to the full terms of the protocol were thus swept aside, and it was now clear that, if that protocol was to be further modified, it would be modified out of regard for the interests of Europe not by way of concession to Turkey. France and Great Britain were naturally averse from a settlement of the question by Russia alone, even when that settlement was on lines to which they had given their consent, and they might have been expected to propose some alteration in the scheme. But the conciliatory action of Russia rendered such proposals needless. On September 29, only fifteen days after the treaty, Aberdeen received a formal proposal from Russia that Turkey should be offered a restriction of the Greek boundary in return for a recognition of the total independence of Greece.[99] This proposal removed Wellington's fear that the new principality might be used as a basis for an attack on the Ionian Islands; while the maintenance of Turkish suzerainty seemed less important after the apparent prostration of Turkish military power in the recent war.