The American patriot force meanwhile had moved cautiously southward down Cane Creek toward Gilbert Town on October 3. The following day, they learned that Ferguson had withdrawn from the town. At the time, he was miles away, camping at Tate’s plantation. Although the mountain men were disappointed that they could not engage Ferguson at Gilbert Town, they did not permit this to dampen their hopes. They now took up a relentless pursuit of his retreating army.
By the evening of October 4 they had pushed farther southward and camped near Denard’s Ford on the Broad River. At this point they temporarily lost Ferguson’s trail. Continuing southward, however, on October 5 they completed a march of 12 miles and rested that night at Alexander’s Ford on the Green River. On October 6 they pressed forward another 21 miles to reach the Cowpens. This point in South Carolina was so named because of the extensive cattle enclosures owned there by Hiram Saunders, a wealthy Tory. Ferguson’s hope that the mountain men would be misled and continue southward toward Ninety-Six was a false one. From the Cowpens, the route of the frontier army was to be generally southeastward toward the Broad River and then north and east to Kings Mountain.
Along their route to the Cowpens, the mountain men were favored by good fortune. They received accurate information from patriot supporters in the region regarding the country through which Ferguson’s corps had passed in its retreat toward Kings Mountain and Charlotte. Their spirits were also spurred by Col. Edward Lacey, of South Carolina, who visited the patriot camp on the Green River to report that a large body of North and South Carolina militia was ready to join the expedition at the Cowpens.
As early as September 23, Col. James Williams, of South Carolina, with the permission of North Carolina patriot authorities, had issued a call for patriot recruits from the border of both States. His appeal was headed: “A call to arms: Beef, bread, and potatoes,” and resulted in the assembling of 400 men. Included were the forces under local militia leaders, such as William Hill, Edward Lacey, James Hawthorne, Frederick Hambright, William Chronicle, and William Graham. When on the afternoon of October 6, these forces were united with Colonel Campbell’s command at the Cowpens, the combined volunteer army numbered approximately 1,790 men.
At the Cowpens the report of a patriot spy named Joseph Kerr that Ferguson was only a few miles ahead in the vicinity of Kings Mountain, confirmed earlier rumors of the British force’s position. To overtake Ferguson without delay, the leaders of the patriot expedition chose from their various commands a select group of stalwart fighting men, all mounted, who immediately rode ahead during the night of October 6 towards Kings Mountain. The exact strength of this advance party is not known, but it is certain to have exceeded 900 men.
By this time, Ferguson’s army was already encamped upon the top of King’s Mountain. From Tate’s plantation, his route on October 6 for 16 miles followed the old Cherokee Ferry Road between Buffalo and Kings Creek. He crossed a branch of Kings Creek near Whisnant’s mill site and continued along the old Ridge Road to the main branch of Kings Creek. Fording this creek, Ferguson bore off in a northeastward direction toward what is known today as Hambright’s Gap. Later in the day, he led his force through this gap toward the vital ridge of Kings Mountain, about three-quarters of a mile beyond.
The Kings Mountain Battleground, showing the north slope of the ridge, on the left, and the original Chronicle marker in the background. Sketched by Benson J. Lossing during his visit to the area on January 8, 1849.
The decision to post his army on the top of this ridge represented a change of his plan to push forward and join Cornwallis at Charlotte. It was a decision hard to understand when it is realized how close he was to the security of the main British army. It is generally believed, however, that Ferguson made the decision deliberately and with the definite intention of meeting the patriots in battle. That he felt secure in this position is shown from his letter of October 6 to Cornwallis, which stated: “I arrived to day at Kings Mountain & have taken a post where I do not think I can be forced by a stronger enemy than that against us.” Ferguson was also known to be a vain man. Operating with the largest independent command of his military career, it is probable that he could not resist the temptation to seek for himself the glory of still another victory.
Meanwhile, the picked group of mountain men rode through the night toward their objective under the cover of a drizzling rain. To keep the flint locks of their weapons dry, bags, blankets, or even hunting shirts were wrapped around them. To add to their difficulties, a number of Campbell’s men lost their way in the darkness. By the morning of October 7 they were rounded up and the progress of the march was delayed very little.