I quote from Capt. Monroe's account of this battle:
"It was evident that we were in for it, and I hastened back to the battery, which started at a quick trot for a knoll that I had observed, and which appeared to be a good position. As the leading carriage reached the foot of the knoll an officer rode rapidly towards me from its top saying, 'For God's sake, Captain, get out of this; they are putting a battery right on this hill.' I lost no time, for I could see the horses of the rebel artillery above me, and we turned back to the road. We took cover in the road where timbers skirted both sides of it for a short distance. We were very uncomfortable here, for the battery that had stolen the hill from us knew our position, and at less than six hundred yards range, sent its shot and shell crashing through the trees and over them, exploding their shells directly above us.
We were where we could do nothing, and I determined to run the gauntlet of fire that swept over the open road beyond the timber we were in, to another copse that would afford more shelter, and at the same time probably an opportunity to get our guns into action; therefore the necessary order was given, and the battery passed over the space intervening at a rapid gallop. This movement resulted in few if any casualties to the men, but a shot struck the stock of a caisson, disabling it. To prevent its capture by the enemy it was blown up by Lieut. Parker.
It had now grown quite dark, and the opposing lines were easily traced by the sheets of flame and flashes of powder pouring from each, while the positions were plainly discernible. The ground the battery had secured appeared in the darkness to be unfavorable for the use of all the guns; therefore two were posted in the road, where they had a flank fire upon both the infantry and artillery of the enemy. A captain of one of the rebel batteries engaged here told me several years afterwards that the guns away off to his left, which he had understood were those of a Rhode Island battery, inflicted terrible punishment upon him, and that he lost more heavily in men, horses and material, than in any one action of the war. Considering that we had but two guns in this position, this was a high compliment to the efficiency of Battery D.
Before or about nine o'clock the action was over. Its close was terrific: fire leaped in waves from the musket's mouth, and men saw in the darkness the angry flames; bullets filled the air, or struck with heavy thud a living mark, and men heard the cruel sound; but neither fire, scream nor blow, nor the presence of almost certain death, appalled the Federal lines."
Soon after nine o'clock the heavy firing ceased, and in a half hour everything was quiet, save occasional shots from the pickets. By ten o'clock the men were sleeping quietly, the drivers near their horses, and the cannoniers in their positions about the guns.
About midnight a staff officer entered the battery, found the captain and ordered him to awaken his men, have the guns limbered, and move the command into the road with the least possible noise. Sergeants were awakened and sent around among the men, who were awakened with great care, and cautioned not to speak save in a whisper. Everything about the harnesses and carriages which would rattle or make a noise of any kind was muffled. When everything was ready the battery started out of its position, and gaining the Warrenton Pike, took up its line of march back towards Gainesville.
The explanation of this movement was, that our division commander had become very much exercised in his mind as to the wisdom of his remaining in this position, as it seemed to him untenable; and as Gen. McDowell, our corps commander, was inaccessible, he decided not to remain.
After-knowledge has made it plain that it would have been much better for our side if our position had been firmly held, for our army had the rebel Gen. Jackson at such disadvantage and his supporting force, under Gen. Longstreet, was so far away, that in all probability had he (Gen. Jackson) been assaulted by our combined forces at daylight, he would have been so disabled as to have been of no service to his side in the fighting of the two following days.
Upon reaching the intersection of the Warrenton and Manassas Pikes, just beyond the village of Gainesville, the direction of our march turned towards Manassas Junction, to which place we now marched, reaching there just as the day began to dawn. The battery was parked without unharnessing, and the men allowed to prepare their breakfast.
About the middle of the forenoon we left the Junction, taking the Sudley road towards the old Bull Run battlefield. Our progress was slow and tedious, the road being filled with troops and wagon trains. As we neared our destination we could hear the sound of battle, which grew louder and seemingly more extended with every mile we traveled. Our halting and hitching-along progress became very annoying to the men of Battery D, for it seemed to them that with such delay it was extremely doubtful about their reaching the battlefield in time to be of any service.