On Friday, Nov. 27th, the enemy still appeared to threaten our troops on the south side of the river, moving their forces from one part of their line to another, but did not attack us.
Saturday, Nov. 28th, opened cold and rainy. The water in and around the fort formed into quite heavy ice during the night, while men woke with a coating of ice on their clothing which occasioned them much inconvenience in moving about. All the afternoon the enemy were moving large bodies of troops towards our right, constantly pushing our pickets nearer our works. In front of the northwest angle of Fort Sanders our picket line was only a few yards from the fort.
That the assault was near at hand, and must come in a few hours, we were all certain. That every one was on the alert was proven when at about ten o'clock in the evening a general alarm was sounded; our artillery immediately opened from Battery D's section at Battery Galpin, under Lieut. Parker, around Fort Sanders to Battery Noble, occupied by the right piece of Battery D, under Lieut. Rhodes.
Our fire at this time was only continued for a short time, ceasing as soon as we ascertained that the enemy were not coming. One of the greatest difficulties labored under by us was the absolute necessity of using the closest economy with regard to ammunition.
This ten o'clock attack had been for the purpose of driving in our pickets close under the fort, where they now lay. This enabled the enemy to advance within one hundred yards of our guns, and at that moment they were lying in a depression a short distance from the northwest angle of the bastion of the fort, waiting for the first dawn of day that they might rush on to what?—victory, they thought, but we had quite a different idea, and our idea was nearer right than theirs.
By five o'clock on Sunday morning, Nov. 29th, every man in our line had been aroused, and was occupying his position, either at the parapets or embrasures. The third piece of our battery was located on the north side of the fort some two hundred feet from the bastion; the fifth piece was located on the line running south about one hundred and fifty feet from the Kingston road; while the fourth had been mounted in the northwestern bastion, in barbette. This gun, under command of Sergt. Chas. C. Gray, was by far the most serviceable in the fort on that morning, as will be seen as our story progresses.
All of the guns were loaded with double canister, and at half-past five the cannoneers were at their posts in the position of "Ready," every number four holding his lanyard taut, ready to pull at a second's warning, and send the gun's charge of death into the ranks of the enemy.
It was a minute or two of half-past six when a signal gun was fired from the rebel battery near the Armstrong house, the shell passing over Fort Sanders and exploding in its rear. Instantly all the artillery in the enemy's line opened, and for twenty minutes poured a furious fire of shot and shell into and beyond the fort.
Suddenly the firing ceased, and the cannoneers who were straining their eyes trying to pierce the gloom and mist of the early winter's morning, saw our pickets hurry across the plank which gave them passage over the deep ditch through the embrasure into the fort, and rapidly fall into their places. Then we were certain that there was work before us. At this instant the first gun in the fort to fire—Sergt. Gray's—was discharged.
During the twenty minutes cannonading by the enemy not a gun had been fired from our side, every man having been cautioned to reserve his fire until he could see or hear the enemy. Soon the cannoneers caught the sound as of the rushing of many feet, followed quickly by a confused sound as the rebels encountered the wire entanglement, over which many of them stumbled and fell. Then we saw them coming through the mist, and greeted them with the contents of our double-shotted guns.