It will be remembered, from the details given in the last chapter, that Sir Colin, after the capture of Furruckabad and Futteghur early in January, remained during the greater part of that month encamped in that neighbourhood, organising the military arrangements necessary for an advance into Oude. These arrangements involved the arrival of siege-guns from Delhi and Agra, and the concentration at one point of different columns under his brigadiers. Among various subsidiary operations, Captain Taylor, of the Engineers, was sent to the Alum Bagh, to report as far as possible on the defensive works thrown up by the enemy in and near Lucknow, and to gather a strong engineer force to aid the commander-in-chief. Sir Colin remained nearly stationary during these preliminary proceedings, elaborating the details of his plan of strategy, in conjunction with his chief of the staff, General Mansfield. When his troops and his missiles, his personnel and matériel, were pretty well collected, he returned from Futteghur to Cawnpore on the 4th of February. Viscount Canning had shortly before gone up from Calcutta to Allahabad; and Sir Colin started off on the 8th to meet him. What these two representatives of British power agreed on during their interview, they of course kept to themselves; but every one felt the probability that some extensive scheme of policy, military and political, to be worked out by soldiers and civilians in unison, was discussed and mutually accepted. Returning again to Cawnpore, the commander-in-chief made the last arrangements for giving activity to the force which had been so slowly and with so much difficulty collected. Fain would many critics have censured the old general for delay; fain would they have urged that in two months he had only fought two battles—at Cawnpore and at Furruckabad—while the world was impatiently waiting to hear of the reconquest of Oude; but as he kept his own council with remarkable reticence, criticism gave way to a belief that there must have been good and sufficient cause for the caution which marked all his proceedings.
On or about the 11th of February, all the preparatory operations were completed, and an army, larger than any which had up to that time appeared against the rebels, began to cross the Ganges from Cawnpore into Oude. It had originally been intended to effect the crossing of a portion of the army at Futteghur; but Cawnpore was afterwards selected. The crossing was necessarily a slow and difficult one, on account of the vast impedimenta of an Indian army. To increase the facilities, a second bridge of boats was constructed. Even with this addition the passage across the Ganges lasted several days; for each bullock-cart carried but little. A small portion only of the ammunition, irrespective of all other equipage and baggage, required the services of fifteen hundred carts. The artillery was on an enormous scale; the siege-guns, the naval-brigade guns, the field-guns, and the horse-artillery guns, numbered not much less than two hundred in all. After crossing, the army distributed itself at certain places on the line of route from Cawnpore to Lucknow. For instance, on the 15th of the month, the head-quarters were still at Cawnpore; one portion of the army was encamped at Onao, one march from Cawnpore; another at Busherutgunje, a march and a half from Cawnpore; a third at Nawabgunge, two marches from Cawnpore; a fourth, under Outram, at the Alum Bagh; and a fifth at Sheorajpore, twenty miles from Cawnpore on the Allygurh road. Sir Colin himself still remained with head-quarters at Cawnpore—partly to provide for the safety of convoys of ladies and children passing down from Agra through Cawnpore to Allahabad; partly to await the entry into Oude, from the east, of the forces under Jung Bahadoor and Brigadier Franks; and partly to watch the proceedings of a large body of the enemy near Calpee, who were threatening again to overrun the Doab unless strongly held in check.
It may here usefully be stated that Sir Colin organised his Oudian army before any of the regiments began to cross into that province. As a permanent record of the component elements of that fine force, we give the details in a note at the end of the present chapter; but a summary may not be out of place here. The ‘army of Oude,’ as tabulated on the 10th of February, comprised such regiments and corps as were at that time under the more immediate command of Sir Colin Campbell; and took no account of the separate forces under Jung Bahadoor, Franks, Seaton, Macgregor, Windham, Inglis, Van Cortlandt, Rose, Stuart, Steuart, Orr, Whitlock, Greathed, Penny, M’Causland, Roberts, and other officers whose services were required elsewhere, or who had not reached the Oudian frontier at that date. The army of Oude, thus limited in its meaning, was systematically classified. There were three divisions of infantry, under Outram, Walpole, and a third general afterwards to be named. These were subdivided into six brigades, under Hamilton, Russell, Franklyn, Adrian Hope, Douglas, and Horsford—two brigades to each division. Each brigade was further divided into three regiments or battalions. The Queen’s regiments of infantry in the six brigades were the 5th, 23d, 34th, 38th, 42d, 53d, 78th, 79th, 84th, 90th, and 93d, and two battalions of the Rifle Brigade. The other infantry regiments were Company’s Europeans, Sikhs, and Punjaubees; the Goorkhas were in corps not yet incorporated in the army of Oude. A fourth division of infantry, under Franks, Wroughton, and Puhlwan Singh, was provided for, but did not at that time form a part of the army of Oude. The cavalry formed one division, under Hope Grant, and was separated into two brigades, under William Campbell and Little. The Queen’s cavalry regiments in this division were the 2d Dragoon Guards, the 7th Hussars, and the 9th Lancers; the other cavalry were Sikhs, Punjaubees, and a few volunteers and irregulars of miscellaneous origin. The artillery division, under Archdale Wilson (the conqueror of Delhi), comprised a field-artillery brigade under Wood, a siege-artillery brigade under Barker, a naval brigade under Peel, and an engineer brigade under Napier.
Not until the last day of February did the commander-in-chief cross over the Ganges, and take command of the army destined to besiege and finally capture the great city of Lucknow. Meanwhile Sir James Outram, at the Alum Bagh, had been daily in communication with the other officers, and had prepared detailed plans of everything relating to Lucknow and its defences, so far as he was acquainted with them. The engineers, too, had been busily engaged in preparing that vast store of siege-materials which is necessary for the attack of strongly defended fortifications.
What the army of Oude effected during the month of March, the next chapter will shew. Before quitting this part of the February operations, however, it may be well to notice episodically the remarkable connection between the newspaper press and the battle-field in recent times. In the great wars of former days, correspondents residing at the chief cities in foreign countries were wont to send such items of information as they could pick up to the editors of English newspapers; and military officers, cautiously and anonymously, sent occasional criticisms on the details of the battles in which they were engaged. It was left for the period of the Crimean war, however, to commence, or at least to perfect, a system by which a non-military writer is sent out at enormous expense, to join an army in the field or at a siege, to bear some danger and much privation, to see with his own eyes everything that can be seen, and to write such descriptions of the scenes as shall be intelligible to ordinary newspaper readers. Mr W. H. Russell, of the Times, gave an importance to such communications never before equalled, by the brilliant style in which he described the military operations in Bulgaria and the Crimea during the Russian war of 1854-5; and the system was ably carried out by special correspondents connected with the staff of some of the other London newspapers. When the Indian mutiny was half a year old, Mr Russell started from England, to do that for India which he had before done for the Crimea—mix in the turmoil of war, and describe battles in a graphic and vivid way. What he saw and what he did in February initiated him into many of the peculiarities of Indian life, when scenes of slaughter had not yet come under his notice. Leaving Calcutta on the 4th of February, he went like other travellers to Raneegunge by railway, and thence to Benares by gharry dâk—a four-wheeled, venetian-blinded, oblong vehicle, driven by a native with ‘mail post guard’ inscribed on his brass belt-plate, and drawn at the rate of seven miles an hour by a single horse, the horse being changed at post-houses at every few miles’ distance. On the way were troops going up with great regularity, travelling 35 miles per day in bullock-carts, and supplied with comfortable meals and sleeping-places at the dâk-bungalows. Travelling thus by way of Burdwan, Nimeaghat, Sheergotty, and Noubutpore, he arrived at Benares; this city, ‘long, straggling, and Turkish looking,’ was completely commanded by a new fort at Rajghat, built since the troubles of the preceding summer. Thence to Allahabad the fields were rich with corn, and the roads thronged by natives and trains of bullock-hackeries laden with cotton for the Benares and Mirzapore markets. Arrived at Allahabad, Mr Russell commenced his camp-life, messing generally with some of the officers, and sleeping under a tent. Viscount Canning and his suite were at that time living under canvas within the fort; while all around were evidences of military preparation for the English regiments sent up from Calcutta. Thence he travelled for fifty miles by the second portion of the great trunk-railway. The rebels in the preceding June had attacked the locomotives in an extraordinary way, if his account is to be taken as anything more than mere raillery: ‘They fired musketry at the engines for some time at a distance, as if they were living bodies; then advanced cautiously, and finding that the engines did not stir, began to belabour them with sticks, all the time calling them names and abusing them.’ By horse-dâk Mr Russell proceeded through Futtehpoor to Cawnpore, where he, like all others, was struck with astonishment that poor Sir Hugh Wheeler’s ‘intrenchment’ could ever have held out so long as it did. Sir Colin Campbell was then at Cawnpore, living in a small subaltern’s tent, working incessantly, and provided with an amount of personal ‘baggage’ so marvellously small as to shew how little the old soldier regarded luxuries. Mr Russell remained at Cawnpore till the 27th, when he joined the army in the march towards Lucknow. He had provided, in true Indian fashion, for the carriage of himself and baggage, a saddle-horse, a horse-gharry, and four camels. His account of the preparations for his march is not only amusing from the way in which it is told, but is instructive on matters relating to travelling in India.[[137]] The end of February found Mr Russell, a civilian immersed in all the bustle of an army, ready to see and hear whatever the month of March should present to his attention.
Leaving for the present the commander-in-chief and his army, we shall briefly trace the operations, so far as they occurred in the month of February, of such of his generals as were employed in duties away from his immediate control and supervision.
Sir James Outram at once presents claims for notice; for though appointed general of one of the divisions of the army of Oude, he held an independent command until the month had expired. During more than three months this distinguished officer had never seen Sir Colin Campbell; during more than five months he had never once been away from the vicinity of Lucknow and the Alum Bagh. He marched with Havelock and Neill from Cawnpore to the capital of Oude in September, and relieved or rather reinforced Inglis; he commanded the British Residency at Lucknow during October, with Havelock and Inglis as his subordinates; he aided Sir Colin to effect the ‘rescue’ in November; and then he commanded at the Alum Bagh throughout the whole of December, January, and February. What he did in the first two of these months, we have seen in former chapters; what were his military proceedings in February, a few lines will suffice to shew.
Whether the enemy supposed that, by another attack on the Alum Bagh, they might disturb the extensive plans of the British; whether they were influenced by a sudden impulse to achieve a limited success; or whether another motive existed, presently to be mentioned—they fought another battle with Sir James Outram, and received their usual defeat. On the morning of the 21st of February, no less than 20,000 of the enemy attacked the Alum Bagh. Having filled all the trenches with as many men as they could hold, and placed large masses of infantry in the topes as a support, they commenced a simultaneous movement round both flanks of Outram’s position—threatening at the same time the whole length of front, the northeast corner of the Alum Bagh, and the picket and fort at Jelalabad. Outram, perceiving at a glance the nature of the attack, strengthened the several endangered points. At the Alum Bagh and Jelalabad posts the enemy received a severe check, having come within range of the grape-shot which the British poured out upon them. He detached about 250 cavalry, and two field-pieces, under Captain Barrow, to the rear of Jelalabad; here Barrow came suddenly upon 2000 of the enemy’s cavalry, and 5000 infantry, whom he kept at bay so effectually with his two field-guns, that they were quite frustrated in their intended scheme of attack. The enemy’s attack on Outram’s left flank was made by no fewer than 5000 cavalry and 8000 infantry. To oppose these he sent only four field-guns and 120 men of the military train, under Major Robertson; but this mere handful of men, with the guns, drove away the enemy. A large convoy was at the time on the road from Cawnpore; and the escort for this convoy had taken away most of Outram’s cavalry. It is not surprising that the enemy should select such a time for attacking the Alum Bagh and endeavouring to intercept the convoy; but it is certainly a matter for wonder that such a large army should suffer itself to be beaten by a few hundred men. The casualty-list, too, was as surprising as anything else; for Outram had only 9 wounded and none killed; whereas the enemy’s loss was adverted to in the following terms: ‘The reports from the city state the enemy to have lost 60 killed and 200 wounded in their attack on the Alum Bagh, and about 80 or 90 killed in front of Jelalabad. This was exclusive of their loss on the left flank, and along our front, where our heavy artillery had constant opportunities of firing shell and shrapnel into the midst of their moving masses. I consider their loss to have been heavier than on any of their previous attacks.’ At this very time the bulk of Sir Colin’s army was approaching the Alum Bagh; the enemy well knew that fact, and had only been induced to hazard the attack on the 21st by the temporary absence of some of Outram’s troops. The attack having failed, they hastened back to strengthen their defensive arrangements at Lucknow.
It may now be well to notice what was doing eastward of Oude. The strong Goorkha force under Jung Bahadoor, and the effective column of miscellaneous troops under Brigadier Franks, had greatly improved the condition of that portion of country which lay between Oude and Lower Bengal, around the cities and stations of Patna, Dinapoor, Arrah, Buxar, Ghazeepore, Azimghur, Goruckpore, Jounpoor, Benares, and Mirzapore. Mutineers there were, and marauders connected with rebel chieftains; but their audacity, except in the immediate vicinity of Oude, was checked by the increasing power of the forces brought to bear against them.
Brigadier Franks, one of the most energetic and admired of the officers whom the wars of the mutiny brought forth, had since the month of December commanded a column called the Jounpoor Field-force, which had been employed in chastising and expelling bodies of rebels from the Azimghur, Allahabad, and Jounpoor districts. During these operations, he had defeated the enemy at many places. The time was now approaching when Franks was to join Sir Colin in the final operations against Lucknow; and when his Jounpoor field-force, losing its individuality, was to form the fourth division of infantry in the army of Oude, with Franks as its general of division. That change, however, was not likely to occur until the month of March had arrived. About the middle of February he was with his force at Budleepore, a town on the route from Jounpoor to Sultanpore in Oude. His force comprised H.M. 10th, 20th, and 97th regiments, six regiments of Goorkhas, and twenty guns. Colonel Puhlwan Singh commanded the Goorkhas, and Colonel Maberley the artillery. The force was a strong one, containing 2300 Europeans and 3200 Goorkhas, and an excellent park of guns. There was one month’s provisions collected; and Franks was awaiting the orders of Sir Colin for an advance into Oude. Colonel Wroughton was with him, having no distinct military command, but acting as a medium of communication between Franks and Puhlwan Singh; being familiar with the Goorkhas, his services were valuable in giving such instructions to the Nepaulese auxiliaries as would enable them to understand and obey the orders of the brigadier.