The demise of the great East India Company has now to be recorded—the cessation of functions in the mightiest and most extraordinary commercial body the world ever saw. The natives of India never did and never could rightly understand the relations borne by the Company to the crown and nation of England. They were familiar with some such name as ‘Koompanee;’ but whether this Koompanee was a king, a queen, a viceroy, a minister, a council, a parliament, was a question left in a state of ludicrous doubt. And no wonder. It has at all times been difficult even for Englishmen, accustomed to the daily perusal of newspapers, to understand the relations between the Crown and the Company. Men asked whether the Punjaub was taken possession of by the Queen or by the Company; and if by the Queen, why the Company was made to bear the expense of the Punjaub war? So of the war in Persia, the annexation of Oude, the disastrous campaign in Afghanistan, the Burmese war—were these operations conducted by and for the Queen, or by and for the Company?—who was to blame if wrong?—who to bear the cost whether right or wrong?—who to reap the advantage? Even members of parliament gave contradictory answers to these and similar questions; nay, the cabinet ministers and the Court of Directors disputed on these very points. The Company was gradually shorn of its trading privileges by statutes passed in the years 1813, 1833, and 1853; and as its governing privileges had, in great part, gone over to the Board of Control, it seemed by no means clear for what purpose the Company continued to exist. There was a guarantee of 10½ per cent. on £6,000,000 of India stock, secured out of the revenues of India—the stock to be redeemable by parliament at cent. per cent. premium after the year 1874; and it appeared as if the whole machinery of the Indian government was maintained merely to insure this dividend, and to obtain offices and emoluments for persons connected with the Company. The directors always disowned this narrow view of the Company’s position; and there can be no doubt that many of them and of their servants had the welfare of the magnificent Indian empire deeply at heart. Still, the anomaly remained, of a governing body whose governing powers no one rightly understood.
When the Revolt began in 1857, the nation’s cry was at once against the East India Company. The Company must have governed wrongly, it was argued, or this calamity would never have occurred. Throughout a period of six months did a storm of indignation continue, in speeches, addresses, lectures, sermons, pamphlets, books, reviews, magazines, and leading articles in newspapers. By degrees the inquiry arose, whether the directors were free agents in the mode of governing India; whether the Board of Control did not overrule them; and whether the disasters were not traceable fully as much to the Board as to the directors? Hence arose another question, whether the double government—by a Court sitting in Leadenhall Street, and a Board sitting in Cannon Row—was not an evil that ought to be abolished, even without reference to actual blame as concerning the Revolt? The virulent abuse of the Company was gradually felt to be unjust; but the unsatisfactory nature of the double government became more and more evident as the year advanced.
There was a preliminary or short session of parliament held in that year, during a few days before Christmas, for the consideration of special business arising out of the commercial disasters of the autumn; but as every one knew that India and its affairs must necessarily receive some notice, the speech from the throne was looked for with much eagerness. On the 3d of December, when parliament met, the ministers put into the Queen’s mouth only this very brief allusion to projected changes in the Indian government: ‘The affairs of my East Indian dominions will require your serious consideration, and I recommend them to your earnest attention.’ These vague words were useless without a glossary; but the glossary was not forthcoming. Ministers, when questioned and sounded as to their plans, postponed all explanations to a later date.
The first public announcement of the intentions of the government was made shortly before Christmas. A General Court of Proprietors of the East India Company was held on the 23d of December, for the discussion of various matters relating to India; and, in the course of the proceedings, the chairman of the Company announced that, on the 19th, an official interview had been held, by appointment, with Lord Palmerston. On this occasion, the prime minister informed the Court of Directors that it was the intention of the ministry, early in the approaching year, to bring a bill into parliament for the purpose of placing the government of British India under the direct authority of the crown. In this interview, as in the royal speech, no matters of detail were entered upon. The members of parliament in the one assembly, the proprietors of East India stock in the other, were equally unable to obtain information concerning the provisions of the intended measure. All that could be elicited was, that the ‘double government’ of India would cease; and a written notice or letter to this effect was transmitted from the First Lord of the Treasury to the Court of Directors on the 23d.
During the period of six or seven weeks between the preliminary and the regular sessions, the journalists had full scope for their speculations. Those who, from the first, had attributed the Revolt in India to the Company’s misgovernment, rejoiced in the hoped-for extinction of that body, and sketched delightful pictures of happy India under imperial sway. Those who supported the Company and vested interests, predicted the utter ruin of British influence in India if ‘parliamentary government’ were introduced—a mode of government, as they alleged, neither cared for nor understood by the natives of that region, and utterly unsuited to oriental ideas. Those, the moderate thinkers, who believed that on this as on other subjects the truth lies between two extremes, looked forward hopefully to such a change as might throw new vigour, and more advanced ideas, into the somewhat antiquated policy of the East India Company, without destroying those parts of the system which had been the useful growth of long experience. Many things had transpired during the year, tending to shew that the Court of Directors had been more prompt than the Board of Control, in matters requiring urgent attention; and that, therefore, whatever might be the evils of the double government, it would not be just to throw all the onus on the Company.
Early in January 1858, on a requisition to that effect, a special Court of Proprietors was summoned, to meet on the 15th, for considering ‘the communication addressed to the Court of Directors from the government respecting the continuance of the powers of this Company.’ At this meeting, it transpired that the directors had written to Lord Palmerston, just before the Christmas vacation; but as no cabinet council had been held in the interim, and as no reply to that letter had been received, it had been deemed most courteous towards the government to withhold the publication of the letter for a time. A long debate ensued. One of the proprietors brought forward a resolution to the effect, ‘That the proposed transfer of the governing power of the East India Company to the crown is opposed to the rights and privileges of the East India Company, fraught with danger to the constitutional interests of England, perilous to the safety of the Indian empire, and calls for the resistance of this corporation by all constitutional means.’ Many of the supporters of this resolution carried their arguments to the verge of extravagance—asserting that ‘our Indian empire, already tottering and shaking, will fall to the ground without hope of recovery, if the East India Company should be abolished’—and that ‘by means of the enormous patronage that would be placed in the hands of the government, ministers would possess the power of corrupting the people of this country beyond the hope of their ever recovering their virtue or their patriotism.’ Most of the defenders of the Company, however, adopted a more moderate tone. Colonel Sykes, speaking for himself and some of his brother-directors, declared: ‘If we believed for one moment that any change in the present administration of the government of India would be advantageous to the people of India, would advance their material interests, and promote their comforts, we should gladly submit to any personal suffering or loss contingent upon that change.’ He added, however, ‘By the indefeasible principles of justice, and the ordinary usages of our courts of law, it is always necessary that a bill of indictment with certain counts should be preferred before a man is condemned; and I am curious to know what will be the counts of the indictment in the case of this Company; for at present we have nothing but a vague outline before us.’ Finally it was agreed to adjourn the discussion, on the ground that, until the views of the government had been further explained, it would be impossible to know whether the words of the resolution were true, that the proposed change would be ‘fraught with danger to the constitutional interests of England, and perilous to the safety of the Indian empire.’
On the renewal of the debate at the India House, on January 20th, the directors presented a copy of a letter which they had addressed to the government on the last day of the old year. In this letter they said: ‘The court were prepared to expect that a searching inquiry would be instituted into the causes, remote as well as immediate, of the mutiny in the Bengal native army. They have themselves issued instructions to the government of India to appoint a commission in view to such an inquiry; and it would have been satisfactory to them, if it had been proposed to parliament, not only to do the same, but to extend the scope of the inquiry to the conduct of the home government, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the mutiny could, wholly or partially, be ascribed to mismanagement on the part of the court acting under the control of the Board of Commissioners. But it has surprised the court to hear that her Majesty’s government—not imputing, so far as the court are informed, any blame to the home authorities in connection with the mutiny, and without intending any inquiry by parliament, or awaiting the result of inquiry by the local government—should, even before the mutiny was quelled, and whilst considerable excitement prevailed throughout India, determine to propose the immediate supersession of the authority of the East India Company; who are entitled, at least, to the credit of having so administered the government of India, that the heads of all the native states, and the mass of the population, amid the excitements of a mutinous soldiery inflamed by unfounded apprehension of danger to their religion, have remained true to the Company’s rule. The court would fail in their duty to your lordship and to the country if they did not express their serious apprehension that so important a change will be misunderstood by the people of India.’ This letter failed to elicit any explanatory response from the government. Lord Palmerston, in a reply dated January 18th, after assuring the directors that their observations would be duly considered by the government, simply added: ‘I forbear from entering at present into any examination of those observations and opinions; first, because any correspondence with you on such matters would be most conveniently carried on through the usual official channel of the president of the Board of Control; and, secondly, because the grounds on which the intentions of her Majesty’s government have been formed, and the detailed arrangements of the measure which they mean to propose, will best be explained when that measure shall be submitted to the consideration of parliament.’ The directors about the same time prepared a petition to both Houses of Parliament, explanatory of the reasons which induced them to deprecate any sudden transference of governing power from the Company to the Crown. As this petition was very carefully prepared, by two of the most eminent men in the Company’s service; as it contains a considerable amount of useful information; and as it presents in its best aspects all that could be said in favour of the Company—it may fittingly be transcribed in the present work. To prevent interruption to the thread of the narrative, however, it will be given in the Appendix (A), as the first of a series of documents.[[191]]
When these various letters and petitions came under the notice of the Court of Proprietors, they gave rise to an animated discussion. Most of the proprietors admired the petition, as a masterly document; and many of the speakers dwelt at great length on the benefits which the Company had conferred upon India. One of the directors, Sir Lawrence Peel, feeling the awkwardness of dealing with a government measure not yet before them, said: ‘I have not signed the petition which you have just heard read; and I will shortly state the reason why. I entirely concur in the praises which have been bestowed upon that document. It is a most ably reasoned and worded production; it does infinite credit to those whose work it is; and it is much to the honour of this establishment that it has talent capable of producing such a document. But I have not signed the petition, because I have not thought it a prudent course to petition against a measure, the particulars of which I am not acquainted with.’ The debate was further adjourned from the 20th to the 27th, and then to the 28th, when the speeches ran to great length. On one or other of the four days of meeting, most of the directors of the Company expressed their opinions—on the 13th, Mr Ross D. Mangles (chairman), and Colonel Sykes; on the 20th, Sir Lawrence Peel and Captain Eastwick; on the 27th, Mr Charles Mills, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Captain Shepherd, Mr Macnaghten, and Sir F. Currie (deputy-chairman); on the 28th, Mr Prinsep and Mr Willoughby. As might have been expected, a general agreement marked the directors’ speeches; they were the arguments of men who defended rights which they believed to be rudely assailed. Some of the directors complained that the government notice was not explicit enough. Some thought that, at any rate, it clearly foreshadowed the destruction of the Company’s power. Some contended that, if the Company did not speak out at once, it would in a few weeks be too late. Some insisted that the government brought forward the proposed measure in order to shift the responsibility for the mutiny to other shoulders. Some accused the ministers of being influenced by a grasping for patronage, a desire to appropriate the nominations to appointments. One of the few who departed from the general tone of argument was Sir Henry Rawlinson, who assented neither to the resolution nor to the petition. He dwelt at some length on the two propositions mainly concerned—namely, ‘that the transfer of the government of India to the Crown would be unjust to the East India Company;’ and that such transfer ‘would be fatal to British rule in India.’ Most of the other speakers had contended or implied that the first clause of this statement involved the second; that the transfer would be equally unjust to the Company, and injurious to India. Sir Henry combated this. He contended that the connection was not a necessary one. After a very protracted debate, the original resolution was passed almost unanimously; and then the petition to both Houses of Parliament was sanctioned as that of the Company generally.
Just at this period, the directors caused to be prepared, and published at a cheap price, an elaborate ‘Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India during the last Thirty Years.’ It was evidently intended to fall into the hands of such members of parliament as might be disposed to take up the cause of the Company in the forthcoming debates, and to supply them with arguments in favour of the Company, derived from a recital of the marked improvements introduced in Indian government. To this extent, it was simply a brief placed in the hands of counsel; but the Memorandum deserves to be regarded also in a historical light; for nothing but a very narrow prejudice could blind an observer to the fact that vast changes had been introduced into the legislative and administrative rule of India, during the period indicated, and that these changes had for the most part been conceived in an enlightened spirit—corresponding in direction, if not in intensity, with the improved state of public opinion at home on political subjects.