New Jersey, whose early history ran so closely parallel to that of New York, has during the century pursued a policy regarding divorce more liberal than that of the neighboring commonwealth. As so often happens, the act of 1794 confuses the grounds of annulment with those of divorce proper. The court of chancery is authorized to decree "divorces from the bond of matrimony" (1) when the husband and wife are within the prohibited degrees of kinship; (2) for adultery; (3) for "wilful, continued, and obstinate desertion for the term of seven years;" or (4) when either person had a lawful spouse living at the time of the later marriage, although the statute inconsistently declares such unions "invalid from the beginning" and "absolutely void." This last-named provision is still in force.[380] By the law of 1794, moreover, separation from bed and board is sanctioned for "extreme cruelty" in either spouse.[381]
A new statute appears in 1820. The conditions as to residence are now defined; the court of chancery may grant absolute dissolution of wedlock for the same causes as in 1794; and separation from bed and board is still permitted for extreme cruelty, but now it may be decreed, "forever, or for a limited time."[382] In the revision of the divorce laws approved April 15, 1846, the term of wilful and continued desertion is reduced to five years;[383] in 1857 two years more are lopped off;[384] and finally a statute of 1890 declares a period of two years' such desertion sufficient to constitute a ground of full divorce.[385]
Accordingly, by the present law of New Jersey dissolution of wedlock may be decreed by the court of chancery (1) when the marriage is bigamous; (2) when it is within the forbidden degrees of kinship;[386] (3) for adultery; (4) for "wilful, continued, and obstinate desertion during the term of two years;" and (5) when at the time of the marriage either spouse was "physically and incurably impotent," in which case the contract is declared "invalid from the beginning and absolutely void."[387] But it is important to observe that in certain cases the term of desertion is subject to a peculiar statutory definition. It is declared that "wilful and obstinate desertion shall be ... construed as 'continued' ... notwithstanding that after such desertion has ... begun, the deserting party has ... been imprisoned in this or any other state or country upon conviction by due process of law for a crime, misdemeanor or offence, not political," anywhere committed; provided, however, that such desertion has continued without interruption a sufficient length of time after discharge from prison to make up when added to the term of desertion prior to the confinement the full term of three [two] years.[388] Since 1891 three causes of separation from bed and board have been allowed. For desertion, adultery, or extreme cruelty, in either spouse, the court of chancery may now decree such partial divorce "forever thereafter, or in the case of extreme cruelty, for a limited time, as shall seem just and reasonable;" but in every case except for extreme cruelty the petitioner "shall prove that he or she has conscientious scruples against applying for a divorce from the bond of matrimony."[389]
The framers of the Pennsylvania statute of 1785 saw fit to indulge in an apologetic preamble. "Whereas," we are assured, "it is the design of marriage, and the wish of the parties entering into that state, that it should continue during their joint lives, yet where the one party is under natural or legal incapacities of faithfully discharging the matrimonial vow, or is guilty of acts and deeds inconsistent with the nature thereof, the laws of every well-regulated society ought to give relief to the innocent and injured person;" therefore it is enacted that the justices of the supreme court may grant divorce, "not only from bed and board, but also from matrimony,"(1) when either person at the time of the contract was and still is physically incompetent; (2) has knowingly entered into a bigamous marriage; (3) has committed adultery; or (4) has been guilty of "wilful and malicious desertion, without a reasonable cause," for the space of four years. The court is empowered to grant a divorce from bed and board, but not from the bond of wedlock, "if any husband shall, maliciously, either (1) abandon his family, or (2) turn his wife out of doors, or (3) by cruel and barbarous treatment endanger her life, or (4) offer such indignities to her person, as to render her condition intolerable, or life burdensome, and thereby force her to withdraw from his house and family." In these cases the wife is allowed "such alimony as her husband's circumstances will admit of so as the same do not exceed the third part of the annual profits or income of his estate, or of his occupation or labour," or the court may decree "but one of them" as justice may require. She shall continue to enjoy this alimony "until a reconciliation shall take place, or until the husband shall by his petition or libel, offer to receive or cohabit with her again, and to use her as a good husband ought to do." Then the court is authorized either to suspend the decree; or, if the wife refuse "to return and cohabit under the protection of the court," it may discharge and annul the same. But if he fail to make good his offers and engagement, the "former sentence and decree may be revived and enforced;" and the arrears of alimony may be ordered paid.[390]
By the first statute of the period, it thus appears, a liberal divorce policy was adopted by Pennsylvania, and besides, it should be remembered, the courts were not the only source of relief. For many years, as already seen, the assembly exercised jurisdiction in divorce matters. After 1785 the first step in the practical relaxation of the law was taken in 1804, when jurisdiction, hitherto vested exclusively in the supreme court, was extended to the county courts of common pleas, where it still remains.[391] Since that date the progress of legislation has been rapid enough. Under the existing law, as the result of a century's growth, not less than eleven grounds of complete divorce are recognized. By the statute of 1815, repealing the law of 1785, the four causes sanctioned by the latter are re-enacted, the term of "malicious desertion and absence from the habitation of the other"—as the clause is now phrased—being reduced to two years; and it is further provided that full dissolution of marriage may be decreed (5) when any husband, by cruel and barbarous treatment, shall have endangered the life of his wife; or (6) offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and life burdensome, thereby forcing her to withdraw from his house and family.[392] Marriage within the forbidden degrees of affinity or consanguinity (7) was made a ground in the same year;[393] lunacy of the wife (8) came next in 1843;[394] and in 1854 divorce was sanctioned (9) when the alleged marriage was procured by fraud, force, or coercion, and has not been later confirmed by the acts of the person injured; (10) when the wife, by cruel and barbarous treatment, has rendered the condition of her husband intolerable or life burdensome; or (11) when either spouse has been convicted for felony with imprisonment for more than two years.[395] These eleven causes are still in force, although in 1903 a new law regarding the crimes of either spouse to constitute a cause was adopted.[396]
On the other hand, the century has produced but one change in the special grounds of partial divorce. Petitions for separation from bed and board are still allowed only in favor of the wife. The four causes sanctioned in 1785, re-enacted in 1815 and 1817, are yet in force;[397] while, since 1862, adultery on the part of the husband is admitted as a fifth ground of complaint.[398]
An important innovation appears in 1893. A new group of discretionary causes is then created. The courts are empowered to grant the wife a divorce, either from bed and board or from the bond of wedlock, on four several grounds. Three of these are identical with the third, fourth, and fifth causes of partial divorce just enumerated. In addition, two years' "wilful and malicious desertion" by the husband is admitted. These same four causes are declared valid "where it shall be shown to the court by any wife that she was formerly a citizen of this commonwealth, and that having intermarried with a citizen of any other state or any foreign country, she has been compelled to abandon the habitation and domicile of her husband" in such place, thereby being "forced to return to this commonwealth in which she had her former domicile." In any such case, if personal service by subpœna cannot be made upon the husband by reason of his non-residence, the court before entering a decree shall require proof that, in addition to the publication required by law, actual or constructive notice of the proceedings has been given him, either "by personal service or by registered letter to his last known place of residence, and that a reasonable time has thereby been afforded to him to appear" and make defense. The wife, however, is only entitled to the benefits of this act when she has been a citizen and resident of the state for one year previous to bringing suit.[399]
It must further be observed, in connection with the present laws of Pennsylvania regarding absolute divorce, that the principle of the colonial statute touching cases of long absence has unfortunately been perpetuated. The snare is still set for the feet of the unwary. "If any husband or wife, upon false rumor, in appearance well founded, of the death of the other (when such other has been absent for the space of two whole years), hath married ... again, he or she shall not be liable to the pains of adultery;" but on return the person remaining unmarried may elect either to have the former spouse restored or to have the former contract dissolved, leaving the second marriage undisturbed.[400]
By the Delaware statute of February 3, 1832, the superior court is authorized to grant absolute divorce, or, in its discretion, partial divorce or merely alimony, where either spouse (1) had a lawful husband or wife living at the time of the marriage; (2) has been wilfully absent from the other for three years with the intention of abandonment; (3) has committed adultery; or (4) extreme cruelty; or (5) where the male was actually impotent when the marriage took place.[401] Just twenty years later an entirely new grouping of causes and kinds of separation was introduced. The superior court is empowered to grant a full divorce (1) for adultery of the wife; and (2) for impotency of either person at the time of marriage; while separation from bed and board is allowed (1) for adultery of the husband; (2) for extreme cruelty; or (3) for wilful absence of either for three years with intent to abandon. At the same time a distinction was made between divorce and annulment. The court is authorized to declare null and void a marriage (1) within the prohibited degrees of affinity or consanguinity; (2) between a white person and a negro or mulatto; (3) where either person was insane; or (4) had a spouse living at the time of the contract.[402] At present the annulment of voidable contracts is still governed by the enactment of 1852.[403]
In 1859 a revised scheme was substituted. Absolute divorce is authorized on the same two grounds as in 1852, the unjust discrimination regarding the husband's infidelity being still maintained. On the other hand, "a divorce from the bond of matrimony, or from bed and board, at the discretion of the court," may now be decreed for (1) adultery of the husband; (2) extreme cruelty; (3) procurement of the marriage by force or fraud; (4) want of legal age—sixteen for males and fourteen for females—if after that age the marriage has not been voluntarily ratified; (5) wilful abandonment for three years; (6) conviction in any place, before or after marriage, of a crime deemed felony by the laws of the state; (7) habitual gross drunkenness for three years, contracted after marriage; or (8) three years' wilful neglect by the husband to provide his wife with the common necessaries of life.[404]