A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. 3 of 3

by George Elliott Howard

c) Resulting character of divorce legislation.—What has just been said regarding the function of social legislation applies with special force to the laws relating to divorce. Here, as in the case of marriage, there is a wide sphere of useful activity for the lawmaker. He cannot, it is true, reach the root of the matter: the fundamental causes of divorce which are planted deeply in the imperfections of the social system—particularly in false sentiments regarding marriage and the family—and which, as will presently appear, can only be removed through more rational principles and methods of education. He can, however, by carefully drawn and uniform statutes render the external conditions—the legal environment—favorable for the operation of the proper remedy. In this sense it is possible to have "good divorce laws," just as we may have good charity laws, good laws for the check of contagious diseases, or good laws in any department of remedial social legislation.[735] So far as their ethical content is concerned, good divorce laws, like any other, will not lead, but must follow at some distance, the highest moral sentiment of the community. They should, however, follow as closely as practicable in order to secure the obedience of all. In this field it is highly essential that the laws should be simple, certain, and uniform. They should not from their very nature become a dead letter, or even an encouragement to domestic discord, by offering opportunity for evasion, collusion, or lax interpretation. Statutes which are not in good faith executed, like those of France under the old régime, are always a fruitful source of social disorder. They tend to destroy the reverence for law itself. In this respect the divorce laws of many of the states are still defective, although decided progress has been made during the last twenty years. Within this period the foundation of what may some time become a common and effective divorce code for the whole Union has slowly been laid. Little by little, as the detailed discussion already presented in the seventeenth chapter reveals, more stringent provisions for notice have been made, longer terms of previous residence for the plaintiff required, and more satisfactory conditions of remarriage after the decree prescribed; while some of the "omnibus" clauses in the list of statutory causes have been repealed. Much of the best of this work has been accomplished, it is but just to record, through the activity of the National Divorce Reform League and its successor, the National League for the Protection of the Family, under the able guidance of its alert and zealous corresponding secretary, Rev. Samuel Dike, of Auburndale.[736] By this league was suggested the compilation of the elaborate report of Hon. Carroll D. Wright, commissioner of labor, published in 1889; and this has had a powerful influence for good, providing the body of facts needful for the wise direction of legal reform. But in many ways in various states lax legislation is still a demoralizing social factor. Thus, until the statute of 1902 has perhaps put a stop to the traffic, Rhode Island was a favorite resort of persons from New York who were able to escape the marital bond through the institution of "fake suits" for nonsupport. Reno, Nev., has continued to be the Mecca of newly divorced people from California and elsewhere, seeking to evade their own laws by flight to a place where there are no legal obstacles to immediate remarriage.[737] Greenwich, Conn., sustains a similar relation to New York. Sioux Falls, S. D.—to produce one more from the many examples which might be mentioned—appears still to have a flourishing "divorce colony;" yet it may be true, as strongly urged, that the laws of this state, though liberal, are honestly and strictly interpreted.[738] Nor must it be inferred in such cases that those who seek relief in a foreign jurisdiction are for that reason unworthy people. There are sometimes wrongs committed under shelter of the marriage bond so monstrous as to warrant any legal means of gaining relief. Indeed, the evil of clandestine divorce in the United States has been much exaggerated. "A vital question connected with divorce," declares Commissioner Wright in 1891, "relates to the real or supposed migration of parties from one state to another for the purpose of seeking divorce. The popular idea is that a great deal of migration takes place for the purpose named. This idea is dispelled in some degree by the statistics that are available upon this point, and getting at the truth as nearly as possible, it is found that but little less than 20 per cent, of all the couples in the country were divorced in other states than those in which they were married. But the ordinary migration of parties for legitimate purposes, especially from the older to the newer states, which in 1870 showed that 23+ per cent. of the native born population, and for 1880 22+ per cent. of such population were living in states other than the ones in which they were born, would apparently reduce the percentage of persons migrating for the purpose of divorce to a point even less than that stated."[739] In fact, for the reason assigned by Mr. Wright, it seems highly probable that the number of such persons must be placed at considerably less than 10 per cent. of the whole number of persons divorced in the United States.[740] Accordingly, it has been inferred that uniformity of law throughout the country would do little to lower the divorce rate. "The establishment of uniform laws," concludes Mr. Dike, "is not the central point of the problem."[741] Furthermore, there is another important fact bearing on the evil of clandestine divorce. In a number of cases arising in various states the courts have declared null and void decrees secured in jurisdictions where the plaintiffs were not bona fide residents, even when they had dwelt in such jurisdictions for the statutory term prescribed as a condition for obtaining a divorce.[742]

To some extent the evil of lax administration of the divorce laws is exaggerated by popular opinion. In the main the courts are careful and conscientious in the trial of suits. According to the report of Commissioner Wright, in seventy counties scattered over twelve states but 67.8 per cent. of the petitions for divorce were granted. From this fact it is inferred that "judges exercise a reasonable care before issuing a decree." For the counties investigated "it is certain that in about 30 per cent. of the cases of petition a decree has been denied. The number of cases involved is sufficiently large and the localities sufficiently different to lead one to the conclusion that the same state of affairs exists throughout the country, and that our courts, instead of being careless in the matter of granting decrees, weigh well the causes alleged, and do not grant decrees unless the allegations of the libellants are fairly sustained."[743] Still, under the laws as they exist there is plenty of opportunity for abuse, even when the court is cautious. The service of notice on the absent defendant through the mails or through publication in the newspapers, allowed in many states, and the fact that only in a few instances is there any provision requiring the prosecuting attorney to resist an undefended libel, afford occasions for fraud.[744] Some of the usual statutory causes of divorce, under the refinement of judicial interpretation, seem virtually to invite divorce.[745] This is to some extent true of "nonsupport," "wilful absence," "desertion," and "gross neglect of duty;" while "cruelty" has become almost an "omnibus clause." Under plea of "constructive cruelty" or "mental anguish" the grievances admitted as valid grounds for dissolution of wedlock are often trivial or even absurd, although it is likely that they are sometimes put forward as a shield or substitute for graver wrongs which the plaintiff is reluctant to disclose.[746] The general introduction of the decree nisi, giving opportunity for reflection, might prove a wholesome correction of the almost necessarily liberal policy of the courts in such cases. Divorce suits are sometimes too hastily disposed of by the judges because of the pressure of other litigation. The creation of a limited number of special divorce courts in each of the states might prove a remedy, if care were taken not to so increase the cost of actions as virtually to discriminate against the poor.

The appearance of the government report in 1889 revealed for the first time something like the real facts regarding divorce in the United States. In the entire country during the period of twenty years (1867-86) covered by the report, 328,716 petitions for full or partial divorce were granted. From 9,937 decrees in 1867, the number rose to 11,586 in 1871, 14,800 in 1876, 20,762 in 1881, and to 25,535 in 1886, showing an increase in twenty years of 157 per cent., while there was a gain in population of but 60 per cent. during the same period. Comparing the last year with the first, only four states in the Union—Delaware, Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont—show a decrease in the divorce rate; while, more fairly, comparing the fourth quinquennium with the first, only the three states last named show such a "decrease in their divorce movement."[747] Of the whole number of divorces during the twenty years, 112,540 were granted to the husband and 216,176 to the wife. Among the principal causes, at each stage of the wedded life, only for adultery were more decrees granted on the husband's petition than on the wife's.[748] "As regards the ratio of divorces to marriages, six states report marriages fully enough for a trustworthy comparison. Of these, Connecticut has for the entire period a divorce to 11.32 marriages and for the worst year, 1875, one to 8.81; Rhode Island gives one to 11.11 for the period and one to 9.36 in 1884, closely approaching that for the preceding years; Vermont one to 16.96 for the period and at its worst, in 1871, one to 13; Massachusetts gives one to 31.28 for the period, its worst being one to 22.54 in 1878; Ohio averages one to 20.65, with an almost unvarying progress downward to one to 15.16 in 1886;" and in the District of Columbia the rate for the period is 31.28, while at the best it is 74.65 in 1868 and at the worst 20.82 in 1877. "In some other states where marriages are less fully reported, the ratios are as follows: Illinois one to 14.76 for the period, while Cook county gives one to 13.6; Michigan one to 12.92; Minnesota one to 30.05; New Hampshire one to 9.74 (its lowest, one to 7.6 in 1880, being evidently due to very imperfect returns of marriages); New Jersey shows one to 49.39; Kansas one to 17.42; Wisconsin one to 21.07; and Delaware one to 36.99. These last, it should be noted, are some of them for shorter periods than twenty years."[749] This method of comparing the number of divorces granted with the number of marriages celebrated is not very satisfactory. "It is vicious in this, that the marriages celebrated each year cannot be compared scientifically with the divorces drawn from the whole volume of marriages celebrated in the past thirty or forty years, many of which even took place in foreign countries."[750] The commissioner has therefore adopted another method of comparison, not entirely free from error, based on the estimated number of existing married couples. From this it appears that in 1870, for the entire country, there were 664 married couples to one divorce granted, while in 1880 the number of such couples to one decree had fallen to 481.[751] Estimated another way, on the basis of the eleventh census, in 1867 there were 173 divorces to 100,000 couples and 250 in 1886.[752]

The divorce rate in the United States is higher than in any other country for which statistics are collected and published, with the single exception of Japan,[753] being lowest in the southeastern and highest in the western and southwestern states.[754] As in Europe the divorce rate is higher and the marriage rate lower in the cities than in the country.[755] Again, while the marriage rate per capita of population is steadily descending, the divorce rate is on the average rising, although the "North Atlantic group of states, from Maine to Pennsylvania inclusive, shows no increase" in the twenty years, the growth of divorce just keeping pace "with the population."[756] For some of the western states the more recent statistics are sufficiently startling. "Divorces in Ohio increased from 2,270 in 1889 to 3,217 in 1899, and the ratio to marriages has become 1 to 10.9. There were 2,418 divorces in Michigan in the year 1900, or 1 to 9.6 marriages. Here about two-thirds of the applications are granted. In some states three-fourths of the suits are successful. In Michigan the statistics show that nearly all the divorces are granted to residents of the state. Indiana shows a remarkable change for the worse. Almost a generation ago Indiana was notoriously bad. Then the laws were improved and her divorce rate was no worse than that of some states in the east; but for some unexplained reason divorces of late have increased rapidly. In 1899 there were granted no less than 4,031 divorces, and 4,699 in the year 1900. In the last year the ratio of divorces to marriages of the same year became 1 to 5.7 for the entire state," and 1 to 3.8 in the county of Marion containing Indianapolis.[757] In Europe likewise the marriage rate is decreasing and the divorce rate increasing, each in some countries with even greater rapidity than on the average in the United States. Moreover, the growth of divorce in recent years is a remarkable phenomenon in Catholic as well as Protestant lands. Thus in the entire German Empire divorces rose from 5,342 in 1882 to 6,677 in 1891, the population during the same decade rising from 45,719,000 to 49,767,000. In Holland there were together 271 divorces and separations in 1883 and 474 in 1892, the population at the same time advancing from 4,225,065 to 4,669,576. During the same ten years divorces in Sweden rose from 218 to 316, the population being 4,603,595 at the beginning and 4,806,865 at the end of the period. In this decade, the population making but slight advance, the aggregate number of divorces and separations in Switzerland decreased from 1,013 to 953. In France for each 1,000 marriages celebrated 14 divorces were decreed in 1885 and 24 in 1891, the population showing a very small increase. For the decennium beginning in 1884 and closing in 1893 the number of divorces decreed in Belgium mounted from 221 to 497, while the population grew from 5,784,958 to 6,262,272. During the same period in Greece the number rose from 88 to 103. In Bavaria—like Greece or Belgium a Catholic state—there is also a rapid growth of divorce, the number of decrees advancing from 218 in 1882 to 308 in 1891, thus giving a rate of one divorce for 24,490 of the population at the commencement as compared with 18,279 at the close of the decade.[758] "In England divorces rose from 127 in 1860 to 390 in 1887, an increase much more rapid than that of population or of marriages. Judicial separations rose between the same years from 11 to 50. In Scotland divorces which in 1867 numbered 32 had, in 1886, grown to 96, a still more rapid rise, as it covers only twenty instead of twenty-seven years. It is worth noting that in England it is usually the husband who petitions for a divorce, and almost always the wife who seeks a judicial separation."[759]

It has long been observed that in Europe the marriage rate falls in hard times and rises again on the return of prosperity. "According to all experience," declares Mill, "a great increase invariably takes place in the number of marriages in seasons of cheap food and full employment."[760] The middle and upper classes, says Fawcett, "do not often marry unless they have reasonable prospect of being able to bring up a family in a state of social comfort.... But the laborers, who form the majority of the population, are but slightly influenced by such cautious foresight. Even a trifling temporary improvement in their material prosperity acts as a powerful impulse to induce them to marry; for it is a demonstrated statistical fact that the number of marriages invariably increases with the decline in the price of bread."[761] Farr and Bodio reach the same conclusion.[762] Ogle on the other hand, while agreeing entirely with these writers as to the favoring influence of prosperity and the depressing effect of hard times on the number of marriages, finds in England, so far as the price of bread alone is concerned, that the reverse is true, more marriages there taking place among the laboring class when bread is dear. In this case, he urges, the higher cost of bread may itself be an incident of increased industrial activity, depending in part on the rise of freight charges on imported wheat. So he concludes that "the marriage rate rises and falls with the amount of industrial employment, which in its turn is determined by the briskness of trade, as measured by the values of exports, which also rise and fall concomitantly, and produce by their effect upon freights a simultaneous rise or fall in the price of wheat."[763] The researches of Oettingen, Bertillon, and especially those of Cauderlier, have also disclosed a general variation in the marriage rate corresponding with the rise or fall in the price of the necessaries of life.[764] War in particular has a powerful influence in lowering the marriage rate, while on the restoration of peace the loss may be largely or entirely recovered. "In 1864 Denmark was at war with Prussia, and its marriage rate fell from 15.0 to 11.13" for each 1,000 inhabitants, "the lowest point it has ever yet reached, but in the next year, the war being over, rose to 17.8, and was higher than it has ever been again. In 1866 Austria was at war with Prussia, and, while the Prussian rate fell from 18.2 to 15.6, the Austrian rate fell from 15.5 to 13.0, but on the cessation of hostilities rose in 1867 to 19.3, a higher level than in any earlier year."[765] According to Willcox,[766] the same rule appears to hold good in the United States. In Massachusetts for the period 1850-90 the marriage rate was low in the years of industrial depression and during the Civil War. Furthermore, the same writer has for the first time demonstrated that the average divorce rate for the whole country is affected in the same way, sinking in hard times and rising again on the restoration of business. Represented graphically, the curve for the Massachusetts marriages and the curve for United States divorces (1867-86), with slight exceptions, "uniformly ascend and descend together and reach their maxima and minima in the same years. Depressions in trade have had a tendency to decrease divorces as well as marriages;" whereas in England, while the marriage rate falls the divorce rate rises in hard times. But in that country divorce is notoriously very expensive and hence mainly a luxury for the rich. So it is concluded that "this difference between the effect of hard times in England and in the United States, together with the very rapid increase of divorce among the southern negroes, and the fact that only about one wife in six of those obtaining divorces receives any alimony, are among the indications that divorce has become very frequent and perhaps most frequent among our lower middle classes, and has reached for weal or woe a lower stratum than perhaps anywhere in Europe."[767]

Whether the number of divorces is directly influenced by legislation is a question which has given rise to decided difference of opinion. Bertillon, writing in 1883 in favor of the new divorce law of France then under consideration, took the position that statutes extending the number of causes of divorce or relaxing the procedure in divorce suits have little influence "upon the increase in the number of decrees."[768] Yet, for obvious reasons, he predicted that the first, though not the lasting, result of a change in the law allowing absolute divorce instead of mere separation would be the opposite of this conclusion. Such, in fact, was the case. In 1883 there were 3,010 separations; while, after the new code took effect, 4,478 divorces and separations were granted in 1884, 6,245 in 1885, and 6,211 in the following year.[769] Only a part of this can be accounted for by the change in law, for there had been a rapid increase during the preceding fifty years.[770] For the United States this point has been examined by Professor Willcox, and his results go to show that the difference in the divorce rate existing among the states cannot very largely be accounted for by the difference in the number of grounds of petition sanctioned by the respective statutes. Thus in 1880 New York admitted one cause, New Jersey two causes, and Pennsylvania four; yet on the average in that year for each 100,000 married couples New York was granting 81 divorces, New Jersey 68, and Pennsylvania 111.[771] "This means that more divorces for adultery are granted in New York, relatively to population, than for adultery and desertion in New Jersey, and almost as many as for adultery, desertion, cruelty, and imprisonment in Pennsylvania. Assume the number of married couples in the three states in 1875 to be a mean between the estimates for 1870 and 1880, and compare with this mean the total number of divorces for adultery in the three states for the twenty years. Pennsylvania had annually 16 such divorces to 100,000 couples, New Jersey had 26, and New York 78. Judging from the court records, one would say that adultery was about three times as frequent in New York as in New Jersey, and about five times as frequent as in Pennsylvania. No such inference is warranted. The true conclusion is that limiting the causes increases the number of divorces in those which remain, but without materially affecting the total number. A certain proportion of the married couples in the three states desired divorce, and was willing to offer the evidence required in order to obtain the decree. The number of causes, then, seems to have affected the grounds urged for divorce, but in no large degree the total number."[772] It is possible that this conclusion is somewhat too emphatic. The problem is very complex, and it is hard to make allowance for all its conditions. For example, it should not be forgotten that New Jersey has but one tribunal, the court of chancery, authorized to grant divorce, whereas New York has many; and if states sanctioning a wider range of causes were selected for comparison, the result might be changed, though scarcely to any wide extent.

Commissioner Wright has attempted to discover the general influence of legislation by examining every change in the laws during twenty years in connection with the divorce statistics. Often a sudden increase, and occasionally a slight decrease, in the rate is observed without any alteration in the statutes. In fourteen instances, however, he believes it "quite apparent that the lines of statistics are curved in accordance with laws enacted just previous to the curves."[773] The changes effected by these laws are of many kinds, including the addition and repeal of causes and various alterations in the procedure, some of them complex. But under careful scrutiny in some instances the statistics reveal no certain causal relation between the change in the divorce rate and the antecedent change in the statute. Indeed, in the light of Professor Willcox's detailed criticism of the figures, four of Mr. Wright's test cases must be rejected, so far as evidence afforded by the statistics is concerned;[774] four or five others show considerable influence of legislation; while in the rest that influence is slight, temporary, or questionable.[775] Contrary to the popular opinion, restrictions upon the remarriage of divorced persons would not affect in a large degree the divorce rate, although only foreign statistics are available to test the point. These show that within the first two or three years after dissolution of marriage divorced men are not much more inclined to remarry than are widowers, while during the same period a considerably greater number of divorced women than widows renew the nuptial ties.[776] With an increasing rate, which does not advance uniformly, it is perhaps impossible to measure exactly the effects of lax or restrictive legislation. The divorce movement is dependent upon social forces which lie far beyond the reach of the statute-maker. Yet it seems almost certain that there is a margin, very important though narrow, within which he may wisely exert a restraining influence. Good laws may, at any rate, check hasty impulse and force individuals to take proper time for reflection. They may also by securing publicity prevent manifold injustice in the granting of decrees.

After all, in this fact do we not catch a glimpse of the proper sphere of divorce legislation? Divorce is a remedy and not the disease. It is not a virtue in a divorce law, as appears to be often assumed, to restrict the application of the remedy at all hazards, regardless of the sufferings of the social body. If it were always the essential purpose of a good law to diminish directly the number of bona fide divorces, the more rational course would be to imitate South Carolina and prohibit divorce entirely. Divorce is not immoral. It is quite probable, on the contrary, that drastic, like negligent, legislation is sometimes immoral. It is not necessarily a merit, and it may be a grave social wrong, to reduce the legal causes for a decree to the one "scriptural" ground. The most enlightened judgment of the age heartily approves of the policy of some states in extending the causes so as to include intoxication from the habitual use of strong drinks or narcotics as being equally destructive of connubial happiness and family well-being. Indeed, considering the needs of each particular society, the promotion of happiness is the only safe criterion to guide the lawmaker in either widening or narrowing the door of escape from the marriage bond. The divorce movement is a portentous and almost universal incident of modern civilization. Doubtless it signifies underlying social evils vast and perilous. Yet to the student of history it is perfectly clear that this is but a part of the mighty movement for social liberation which has been gaining in volume and strength ever since the Reformation. According to the sixteenth-century reformer, divorce is the "medicine" for the disease of marriage. It is so today in a sense more real than Smith or Bullinger ever dreamed of; for the principal fountain of divorce is bad matrimonial laws and bad marriages. Certain it is that one rises from a detailed study of American legislation with the conviction that, faulty as are our divorce laws, our marriage laws are far worse; while our apathy, our carelessness and levity, regarding the safeguards of the matrimonial institution are well-nigh incredible. Indeed, there has been a great deal of misdirected and hasty criticism of American divorce legislation. Even thoughtful scholars sometimes indulge in the traditional arraignment. The laws of the American states produced since 1789, declares Bryce, present "the largest and the strangest, and perhaps the saddest, body of legislative experiments in the sphere of family law which free self-governing communities have ever tried."[777] Such sweeping assertions are in many ways misleading and fail to advance the solution of the divorce problem. There is, of course, in the aggregate a "large" body of statutes; for each of the fifty-three commonwealths, on this subject as on all others, has a separate code; but the harm resulting either from the bulk or the perplexity of the laws, while needing a remedy, is not so serious as is commonly assumed. More and more in their essential features the divorce laws of the states are duplicating each other; and there is already ground for hope that in reasonable time they may attain to practical uniformity. Furthermore, it may well be questioned whether the complexity or the conflict in the American codes is so pronounced as in the numerous systems of divorce law maintained in the states of the German Empire until the enactment of the imperial code of 1900. In some cases in German lands the law was obscure and well-nigh past finding out. Prussia alone had three different systems; and Bavaria was in the same plight.[778] If American legislation is on the average more liberal in extending the enumerated grounds of divorce, it would surely be rash to assume that it is the "sadder" on that account. The question is: Has American social liberalism, in this regard as in so many other respects, increased the sum of human happiness? Besides, "laxity" in this connection is not exclusively a feature of American legislation. It may be reasonably doubted whether any "omnibus clause" in the country gives wider discretion to the court than the fourth of the five causes sanctioned by the new uniform law of Germany, allowing divorce when "either spouse has been guilty of grave violation of the obligations based on the marriage or of so deeply disturbing the marital relation through dishonorable or immoral behavior that the continuance of the marriage cannot be expected from the other."[779] Even broader provisions formerly existed in the codes of some of the separate German states, and may still be found elsewhere in Europe.