And “come as the waves come when navies are stranded;”
one thing only will be required to enable squares of infantry, like deep-rooted rocks, to disperse these wild winds and waves, right and left, in dust, froth, and confusion—a well impressed knowledge of their own strength; accompanied as a natural consequence, by a deliberate employment of that, when properly used, most destructive weapon, the musket.[[15]] Nor can more blame attach to cavalry for such results, than would apply to infantry for failing, in clear day-light, before well-barricadoed buildings or well-scarped redoubts. Neither in similar cases owe success, when they get it, to their own conduct or efficiency, but to the needless panic of their enemy.
Such conclusions as to the relative strength of cavalry, are established by a string of facts more or less evident, stretching from Ilium, through Pharsalia, to Waterloo; and every fact is worth a thousand opposing ingenious speculations.
VIII.
Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well nigh all is lost.
In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the extended line.
In attacks, supports are useful for filling up accidental gaps in the front line—for prolonging its flanks or covering them obliquely or perpendicularly—for strengthening the skirmishers at any moment that these may find their numbers unequal to important work before them—for relieving them when they or their ammunition become exhausted—for coming up in close order to charge bridges, streets, villages, or other defiles, too strongly occupied to be forced by the skirmishers, and to serve as bases, when time allows it, for the formation of squares against cavalry.
In defences, in addition to the foregoing duties reversed as to bodies retiring, supports have the highly important responsibilities of leading the skirmishers in the true and best line of retreat—of opening that line in all suitable places for their convenient passage, and of taking care that it be not intercepted by the enemy.
Reserves, particularly so called, supply the places of supports when necessary, and go to the front for any object requiring the intervention of a particularly strong, steady, and concentrated force.
Without express orders, supports should not move forward to occupy accidental gaps in the extended line, except on ground so intricate, or under circumstances so emergent, that the skirmishers themselves cannot readily regain their lost communications.