Sect. 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate quo ad speciem, forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason, but is like Gehazi, running away without his master's leave, let the learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such actions may be and are of a civil quo ad individuum,[1203] or in respect of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, quo ad speciem, yet none of them are, nor can be indifferent, quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or kind,[1204] from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another man's goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise of them when we speak of them quo ad individuum, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent, quo ad individuum; because oportet (saith Thomas[1205]) quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis. [pg 1-393] Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of Trent,[1206] that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all circumstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the circumstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good or evil; and because among the circumstances the end is one, all works referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the same is the judgment of our own divines. De bis rebus indifferentibus (saith Martyr[1207]) statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur nihil est indifferens; and so saith Pareus likewise.[1208]
Sect. 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr Forbesse[1209] himself acknowledged no less than that every individual human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting, the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even quo ad individuum, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are neither commanded of God, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.
Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: Manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum ea quae exercitii seu contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas appellatur. He holdeth, that though such an action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to God), yet the action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he illustrateth by this example:—
If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is [pg 1-394] faith, because, as the Apostle teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as Calvin observeth:[1210] 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approven by the word of God. 2. Such actions, as though they be approven by the word of God, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and profitably?
Sect. 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,
1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing it.
2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.
3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.
4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity, and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent; therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those words, “It must needs be that offences come,” to be this, it is profitable that offences come. Which gloss, though it be not to be received, yet as Camero noteth,[1211] it is ordinary to call that necessary which is very profitable [pg 1-395] and expedient. Besides this, I say, we further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also necessary, though not necessitate absoluta seu consequentis, yet necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione. Paul's circumcising of Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he behoved by this means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him,[1212] otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circumcised Timothy, since the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because de partibus idem est judicium) whensoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is profitable for God's glory, and man's edification, and the doer is persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.
Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.