5. The reverend brother had said in his sermon, “Of other governments besides magistracy I find no institution.” I cited 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. v. 17; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, to prove another government (yea, the institution of another government) besides magistracy. And, in my Nihil Respondes, I told he had laughed, but had not yet loosed the knot. Now hear his two answers: Male Dicis, p. 8, “First, for the institution; for the Commissioner affirms so much. Had he said that these texts hold out an office or officer already instituted, the words would have borne him out,” &c. “But the institution in this place I cannot see.” See the like in Mr Hussey, p. 19, 22. I thank them both. That Scripture which supposeth an institution, and holds out an office already instituted, shall to me (and, I am confident, to others also) prove an institution; for no text of Scripture can suppose or hold out that which is not true. Nay, hath Mr Coleman forgotten that himself proved an institution of magistracy from Rom. xiii. 1, 2? Yet that text doth but hold out the office of magistracy already instituted: but the institution itself is not in that place.
Secondly, Mr Coleman answereth to all these three texts. To that, 1 Thess. v. 12, [pg 4-007] “Them which are over you in the Lord,” he saith that these words prove not that it is not meant of magistracy. But he takes not the strength of the argument. My words were, “Here are some who are no civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians in the Lord.” This the reverend brother must admit to be a good proof, or otherwise say that the civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians, though they were heathens, yet were set over them in the Lord.
For that of 1 Tim. v. 17, he saith it doth not hold out ruling elders. Whether it doth hold ruling elders or not, doth not at all belong to the present question. It is easy to answer something, so that a man will not tie himself to the point. The place was brought by me to prove “another government beside magistracy,” which he denied. Now suppose the place to be meant only of preaching elders, yet here is a rule or government: “Elders that rule well;” and these are no civil magistrates, but such as “labour in the word and doctrine.” Come on now. “But I will deal clearly (saith the brother): These officers are ministers which are instituted not here, but elsewhere,—and these are the rulers here mentioned. And so have I loosed the knot.” Now, Sir, you shall see I will not male dicere, but bene dicere. My blessing on you for it. You have at last loosed the knot so perfectly, that you are come to an agreement with me in this great point, which I thus demonstrate: He that acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy. But Mr Coleman acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, therefore Mr Coleman acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy.
To the other texts, Heb. xiii. 7, 17, he saith nothing against my argument, only expounds the rulers to be guides, as Mr Hussey also doth, of which more elsewhere; meanwhile it is certain that ὁ ἡγουμένοις is usually taken for a name of highest authority, yea, given to emperors; for which see learned Salmasius in his Walo Messalinus, p. 219, 220. It is Joseph's highest title to express his government of Egypt, Acts vii. 10. It must the rather be a name of government and authority in this place, Heb. xiii. 17, because subjection and obedience is required: “Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves.” [pg 4-008] When the word signifieth ὀδηγὸν, seu viæ ducem (and it is very rarely so used by the Septuagints, but frequently, and almost in innumerable places, they use it for a name of rule and authority), obedience and subjection is not due to such an one qua talis; for obedience and subjection cannot be correlata to the leading of the way, when it is without authority and government.
6. I having charged Mr Coleman's doctrine with this consequence, “That there ought to be neither suspension from the sacrament, nor excommunication, nor ordination, nor deposition of ministers, nor receiving of appeals, except all these things be done by the civil magistrate,” which things, I said, “are most of them corrective, and all of them more than doctrinal,”—instead of making answer, the reverend brother expresseth the error, which I objected to him, thus: “That here are no church censures,” which is the quæsitum, saith he, Male Dicis, p. 10. Here, again, he brings an imagination of his own, both for matter and words, instead of that which I said, and doth not take the argument right. If the minister's power be merely doctrinal, and government wholly in the magistrate's hands, then all the particulars enumerated; for instance, suspension from the sacrament, and the receiving of appeals (which he must not bring under the quæsitum, except he bring the ordinance of Parliament under the quæsitum), shall be wholly in the magistrate's hand; and elderships may not suspend from the sacrament; classes and synods may not receive appeals, which yet, by the ordinance, they have power to do. One of the particulars, and but one, the reverend brother hath here touched, and it is this: “For ordination of ministers, I say, it is within the commission of teaching, and so appertains to the doctrinal part.” This is the effect of his zeal to maintain that all ecclesiastical ministerial power is merely doctrinal. But mark the consequence of it: He that holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, and to appertain to the doctrinal part, must hold, by consequence, that the power of ordination is given uni as well as unitati; that is, that every single minister hath power to ordain, as well as the classes. But Mr Coleman holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, &c. The reason of the proposition is clear, because the commission of teaching belongs to every [pg 4-009] single minister, so that if the power of ordination be within that commission, it must needs belong to every single minister. Quid respondes?
7. The reverend brother having brought an odious argument against me, which did conclude the magistrate to manage his office for and under the devil, if not for and under Christ, I show his syllogism to have four terms, and therefore worthy to be exploded. I get now two replies:
First, “This is an error (if one) in logic, not divinity. Is it an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms?” Male Dicis, p. 15. See now if he be a fit man to call others to school, who puts an if in this business—if one. Who did ever doubt of it? And if it be an error in divinity to be fallacious, and to deceive, then it is an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms, yea, as foul an error as can be.
Secondly, He admitteth not my distinction of those words, “Under Christ, and for Christ.” I said the Christian magistrate is under Christ, and for Christ, that is, he is serviceable to Christ, but he is not under Christ nor for Christ as Christ's vicegerent, vice Christi, in Christ's stead, as Christ is Mediator. The reverend brother saith, He foresaw that this would be said (the greater fault it was to make his argument so unclear and undistinct), but he rejecteth the distinction as being distinctio sine differentia. “If a magistrate (saith he) be thus far a servant of Christ, as Mediator, that he is to do his work, to take part with him, to be for his glory, then he doth it vice Christi.” He adds the simile of a servant. Hence it follows, by the reverend brother's principles, that the king's cook, because he doth work and service for the king, therefore he doth it vice regis, and as the king's vicegerent. Likewise, that a servant who obeyeth his master's wife, and executeth her commands, because it is his master's will, and for his master's honour, doth therefore obey his master's wife vice domini, as his master's vicegerent; and, by consequence, that the duty of obedience to the wife doth originally belong to the husband; for the capacity of a vicegerent, which he hath by his vicegerentship, is primarily the capacity of him whose vicegerent he is. These, and the like absurd consequences, will unavoidably follow upon the reverend brother's argumentation, that he who doth Christ service doth [pg 4-010] it vice Christi, as Christ's vicegerent; and that to be a man's vicegerent, and to do a man's work or service, which I made two different things, are all one. But, further, observe his tergiversation. I had, p. 13, proved my distinction out of these words of his own: “The Commissioner saith, Magistracy is not derived from Christ. I say, magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom; so that, though the Commissioner's assertion be sound (which in due place will be discussed), yet it infringeth nothing that I said.” I asked, therefore, qua fide he could confound in his argument brought against me those two things which himself had so carefully distinguished. There is no reply to this in Male Dicis. When the brother thought it for his advantage, he denied that the magistrate's being serviceable to Christ doth enter the derivation of his power by a commission of vicegerentship from Christ (for that was the derivation spoken of), and yielded that the magistrate may be said to be serviceable to Christ, though his power be not derived from Christ. Now he denieth the very same distinction for substance.
8. Whereas the reverend brother had told the Parliament that he seeth not, in the whole Bible, any one act of that church government which is now in controversy, I brought some scriptural instances against his opinion, not losing either the argument from Matt. xviii. (concerning which he asketh what is become of it), or other scriptural arguments, which I intend, by God's assistance, to prosecute elsewhere. Now hear what is replied to the instances which were given. First, To that, 1 Cor. v. 13, “Put away that wicked person from among you,” his answer is, “I say, and it is sufficient against the Commissioner, If this be a church censure, then the whole church jointly, and every particular person, hath power of church censure.” Male Dicis, p. 10. I hope, Sir, it is not sufficient against me that you say it, so long as you say nothing to prove it. I told you that Mr Prynne himself (who holds not that every particular person hath power of church censure) acknowledged that text to be a warrant for excommunication, and when you say “every particular person,” you say more than the Independents say, and I am sure more than the text will admit, for the text saith, “Put away from among you,” therefore this power was given not uni, but [pg 4-011] unitati, and this unitas was the presbytery of Corinth. The sentence was inflicted ὑπὸ τῶν πλείονων,—by many, 2 Cor. ii. 6, it is not said by all. I might say much for this, but I will not now leave the argument in hand; for it is enough against Mr Coleman that the place prove an act of church government, flowing from a power not civil but ecclesiastical. To whom the power belonged is another question.
To the next instance, from 2 Cor. ii. 6, which is coincident with the former, a punishment or censure inflicted by many. “It is only a reprehension (saith he),—ἐπιτιμία,—which, by all the places in the New Testament, can amount no higher than to an objurgation, and so is doctrinal.” Ans. 1. He made it even now an act of the whole church jointly, and of every particular person. Why did he not clear himself in this,—how the whole church, men, women, children and all, did doctrinally reprehend him? 2. If the objurgation must be restricted, To whom? Not to a single minister (yet every single minister hath power of doctrinal objurgation), but to the presbytery. It was an act of those πλειόνες I spake of; and this is a ground for that distinction between ministerial and presbyterial admonition, which Mr Coleman, p. 22, doth not admit. 3. If it were granted that ἐπιτιμία in this text amounteth to no more but an objurgation, yet our argument stands good; for the Apostle having, in his first epistle, required the Corinthians to put away from among them that wicked person, which they did accordingly resolve to do (which makes the Apostle commend their obedience, 2 Cor. ii. 9), no doubt either the offender was at this time actually excommunicated and cast out of the church, or (as others think) they were about to excommunicate him, if the Apostle had not, by his second epistle, prevented them, and taken them off with this sufficit: Such a degree of censure is enough, the party is penitent, go no higher. 4. When the reverend brother appealeth to all the places in the New Testament, he may take notice that the word ἐπιτιμία is nowhere found in the New Testament, except in this very text. And if his meaning be concerning the verb ἐπιτιράω he may find it used to express a coercive power, as in Christ's rebuking of the winds and waves, Matt. viii. 26; Mark iv. 39; his rebuking of the fever, Luke iv. 39; his rebuking of the devil (which was not a doctrinal, but a [pg 4-012] coercive rebuke), Mark i. 25; ix. 25; Luke iv. 35; ix. 42. Sometimes it is put for an authoritative charge, laying a restraint upon a man, and binding him from liberty in this or that particular, as Matt. xii. 16; Mark iii. 12; viii. 30; Luke ix. 21. The word ἐπιτιμία I find in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, chap. iii. 10. It is said of the wicked, ἓξουσιν ἐπιτιμίαν, they shall have correction or punishment. The whole chapter maketh an opposition between the godly and the wicked, in reference to punishments and judgments. The Hebrew געד (which, if the observation hold which is made by Arias Montanus, and divers others, following Kimchi, when it is construed with ב signifieth objurgavit, duriter reprehendit; when without ב, it signifieth corrupit, perdidit, or maledixit), the Septuagint do most usually turn it ἐπιτιμάω and that in some places where it is without ב, as Psal. cxix. 21, “Thou hast rebuked the proud that are cursed;” ἐπιτίμησας,—Pagnin, disperdidisti,—thou hast destroyed, so the sense is; it is rebuke, with a judgment or a curse upon them. The second part of the verse, in the Greek, is exegetical to the first part, “Thou hast rebuked the proud, ἐπικατάρατοι, cursed are they,” &c.; so Zech. iii. 2, “The Lord rebuke (ἐπιτιμήσαι) thee, O Satan.” The same phrase is used in Jude, ver. 9, which must needs be meant of a coercive, efficacious, divine power, restraining Satan. The same original word they render by ἀφορίζω, which signifieth to separate and to excommunicate, Mal. ii. 3, “Behold I will corrupt your seed,” &c. In the preceding words, God told them that he would curse them. The same word they render by ἀποσκορανίζω, extermino, Isa. xvii. 13, a place which speaks of a judgment to be inflicted, not of a doctrinal reproof. Yet Aquila readeth there ἐπιτιμήσει; likewise the word which the Septuagint render ἀπώλεια, perdition, Prov. xiii. 6, and θυμὸς, wrath, Isa. li. 20, in other places they render it ἐπιτίμησις: Psal. lxxvi. 6, “At thy rebuke, O God of Jacob, both the chariot and horse are cast into a dead sleep;” lxxx. 16, “They perish at the rebuke of thy countenance.” These are real rebukes, that is, judgments and punishments.