In the next place, the reverend brother makes short work of my five arguments to prove the repugnancy of his doctrine to the solemn league and covenant. They were too hot for him to be much touched upon: “All is but this much (saith he), the covenant mentioneth and supposeth a distinct church government.” It is hard when arguments are neither repeated nor answered. He repeats a point which was proved (and but a part of that), but not the proofs; and so he answereth (rather to the conclusion than to the arguments) these two things: “First (saith he), the expressions in the covenant are according to the general apprehensions of the times, which took such a thing for granted, yet I believe Mr Gillespie cannot make such a supposition obligatory.” Now you yield, Sir, what before [pg 4-020] you eagerly contended against, viz., that the covenant doth suppose a church government. Remember your simile of the jury sworn to inquire into the felony of a prisoner, which oath doth not suppose the prisoner to be guilty of felony, but he is to be tried, guilty or not guilty. We are now so far agreed, that the covenant doth suppose a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, for that was the point which I proved, and which here he yields. As for the obligation of an oath sworn upon such supposition, I answer, 1. It is more than supposed, the words and expressions of the covenant do plainly hold out the thing as I proved, and as the reverend brother here seems to yield. 2. That which an oath doth necessarily suppose, if the oath be lawful, and the thing supposed lawful, is without all controversy obligatory. Now the reverend brother doth acknowledge both the covenant itself to be a lawful oath, and that which the covenant supposeth, namely, a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, to be a lawful thing; for he professeth to yield it (though not jure divino, yet) in prudence, which he cannot do, if he make the thing unlawful. 3. That which an oath doth suppose is sometimes supposed vi materiæ, or consequentiæ, that is, the words of the oath do necessarily imply such a thing, though it be not intended by the swearer; and here I will tell Mr Coleman one story of Alexander for another: When Alexander was coming against a town to destroy it, he met Anaximenes, who, as he understood, came to make intercession and supplication for sparing the town. Alexander prevented him with an oath that he would not do that thing which Anaximenes should make petition for, whereupon Anaximenes made petition that he would destroy the town. Alexander found himself bound by the plain words of his oath not to do what he intended, and so did forbear. And to add a divine story to an human, Joshua and the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites upon a supposition that was not true, yet they found themselves tied by their oath. So he that sweareth to his own hurt must not change, the oath being otherwise lawful, Psal. xv. 4, yet that self-hurt which is wrapped up in the matter of his oath was not intended in swearing. Sometimes, again, that which is supposed and implied in an oath, lieth also in the thoughts and intentions of [pg 4-021] those that swear. Now, where those two are coincident, that is, where the thing supposed in an oath is both implied necessarily in the words of the oath, and is also according to the apprehensions of those that swear (which is the case here in the covenant, and is acknowledged by the reverend brother), I should think it most strange how any divine can have the least doubt concerning the obligation of such a thing, except he conceive the thing itself to be unlawful.
His second answer is this: “In my way (saith he) the governments, civil and ecclesiastical, are in the subject matter clearly distinct. When the Parliament handles matters of war, it is a military court; when business of state, it is a civil court; when matters of religion, it is an ecclesiastical court.” If this hold good, then it will follow, 1. That the Parliament, when they deliberate about matters of war or matters of religion, are not, at least formally and properly, a civil court, else how makes he these so clearly distinct? 2. That ministers may be called civil officers, for consider his words in his Re-examination, p. 11: “I do not exclude ministers, neither from ecclesiastical nor civil government, in a ministerial way, doctrinally and declaratively.” Compare this with his present answer, it will amount to thus much: That different denominations being taken from the different subject matter, ministers, when they handle doctrinally matters of religion, are ecclesiastical ministers; and when they handle doctrinally matters of civil government, which himself alloweth them to do, they are civil ministers. But now to apply his answer to the argument, How doth all this solve the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant? If he had examined my arguments, he had found that most of them prove from the covenant a church government distinct from civil government, subjective as well as objective; that is, another government besides magistracy; different agents as well as different acts; different hands as well as handling of different matters. I know the Christian magistrate may and ought to have a great influence in matters of religion; and whatsoever is due to him by the word of God, or by the doctrine either of the ancient or reformed churches, I do not infringe, but do maintain and strengthen it. But the point in hand is, that the covenant doth undeniably suppose, and clearly hold forth a government in the church distinct [pg 4-022] from magistracy, which is proved by these arguments (which, as they are not yet answered, so I will briefly apply them to the proof of that point which now Mr Coleman sticks at): 1. The church covenant mentioned in the covenant is as distinct from the privileges of parliament, as the first article of the covenant is distinct from the third article. 2. The church government in the first article of the covenant, the reformation whereof we are to endeavour, differeth from church government by archbishops, bishops, &c., mentioned in the second article, as much as a thing to be reformed differeth from a thing to be extirpated; so that the church government formerly used in the church of England is looked upon two ways in the covenant, either qua church government, and so we swear to endeavour the reformation of it (which I hope was not meant of reforming that part of the privileges of Parliament whereby they meddle with religion in a parliamentary way), or qua church government, by archbishops, bishops, &c., and so we swear to endeavour the extirpation of it. This difference between the first and second articles, between reformation and extirpation, proveth that the covenant doth suppose that the church government formerly used in the church of England, in so far as it was a church government, is not eatenus to be abolished, but in so far as it was a corrupt church government, that is, prelatical. 3. Church government, in the covenant, is matched with doctrine, worship, and catechising. Now these are subjectively different from civil government, for the civil magistrate doth not act doctrinally nor catechetically, neither can he dispense the word and sacraments, as Mr Coleman acknowledgeth. 4. In the first part of the first article of the covenant, concerning “the preservation of the reformed religion in the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” it is uncontroverted, that discipline and government are ecclesiastical, and subjectively different from civil government, that is, though divers who have a hand in the civil government are ruling elders, yet it is as true that divers members of Parliament and inferior civil courts are not church officers; and of the ministry none are civil governors which makes the two governments clearly distinct subjectively. Now the second part of that article concerning “the reformation of religion in the kingdoms [pg 4-023] of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” cannot so far differ from the first part of that article in the sense of the words, “discipline and government,” as that the same words, in the same article of the same covenant, should signify things differing toto genere, which will follow, unless “discipline and government” in the second branch, and “form of church government” in the third branch, be understood of the power of church officers, and not of the magistrate. 6. We did swear to “endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches.” Now the word of God holds forth another government besides magistracy; for Mr Coleman himself hath acknowledged, that he finds in the New Testament ministers to be rulers, yea, instituted rulers; and the example of the best reformed churches, without all doubt, leadeth us to an ecclesiastical government different from magistracy. Neither hath the reverend brother so much as once adventured to allege the contrary, except of the church of Israel, which, as it is heterogeneous, being none of the reformed churches mentioned in the covenant, so it shall be discussed in due place; from all which reasons I conclude, that the wit of man cannot reconcile Mr Coleman's doctrine with the covenant. 6. I add a confutation of him out of himself, thus: No such church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing, can be, by his principles, the power of magistracy in things ecclesiastical, but another government beside magistracy. But the church government, mentioned in the first article of the covenant, is such a church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing; therefore the church government mentioned in the first article of the covenant cannot be, by his principles, the power of magistracy, but another government beside magistracy. The proposition he will easily admit, unless he alter his assertions; the assumption is clear from his Re-examination, p. 15.
CHAPTER IV.
MR COLEMAN AND MR HUSSEY'S ERRORS IN DIVINITY.
Mr Hussey all along calls for divinity schools: I confess himself hath much need of them, that he may be better grounded in his divinity; and that if he will plead any more for Christian magistracy, he may not involve himself into such dangerous heterodoxies as have fallen from his pen in this short tractate. I instance in these:—
First, In his epistle to the Parliament he hath divers passages against synodical votes; he will have no putting to the vote: “For votes (saith he, p. 6) are of no other use but to gather parties, and ought nowhere to be used but by those that have the power of the sword.” And, p. 3, he will have the business of assemblies to be only doctrinal, and “by dispute to find out truth. Their disputes ought to end in a brotherly accord, as in Acts xv., much disputing, but all ended in accord, no putting to the vote.” And, p. 5, he will have things carried “with strength of argument and unanimous consent of the whole clergy.” Behold how he joineth issue with the remonstrants against the contra-remonstrants, to introduce not only an academical, but a sceptical and Pyrrhonian dubitation and uncertainty, so that there shall never be an end of controversy, nor any settlement of truth and of the ordinances of Jesus Christ, so long as there shall be but one tenacious disputer to hold up the ball of contention. One egg is not liker another than Mr Hussey's tenet is like that of the Arminians, for which see the Synod of Dort, sess. 25.[1356] It was the ninth condition which the Arminians required in a lawful and well-constituted synod, that there might be no decision of the controverted articles, but only such an accommodation as both sides might agree to. And, generally, they hold that synods ought not to meet for decision, or determination, but for examining, disputing, discussing; so their Examen Censurae, cap. 25; and their Vindiciae, lib. 2, cap. 6, p. 131, 133.
Secondly, In that same epistle to the [pg 4-025] Parliament, p. 4, he hath this passage: “Will-worship is unlawful, I mean in matters that are essential to God's worship, which are matters of duty; as for circumstantials of time and place, except the Sabbath, which are matters of liberty, in these the commonwealth may vote, &c.; and this is your Christian liberty, that in matters of liberty ye make rules and laws to yourselves, not crossing the ends that you are tied to in duty.” And is the Sabbath only a circumstantial of time contradistinct from matters of duty? It seems he will cry down not only the jus divinum of church censures with the Erastians, but the jus divinum of the Sabbath with the Canterburians. And if will-worship be unlawful only in the essentials of God's worship, why was the argument of will-worship so much tossed, not only between Prelates and Nonconformists, but between Papists and Protestants, even in reference to ceremonies? And whether hath not Mr Hussey here engaged himself to hold it free and lawful to the Christian magistrate, yea, to private Christians (for he calls it Christian liberty, not parliamentary liberty—now Christian liberty belongs to all sorts of Christians), to make laws to themselves for taking the sacrament anniversarily on Christmas, Good-Friday, and Easter, or to appoint a perpetual monthly fast or thanksgiving; yea, another Parliament may, if so it should seem good to them, impose again the surplice and cross in baptism, fonts, railing of communion tables, the reading of divert passages of Apocrypha to the congregations, doxologies, anthems, responsories, &c., as heretofore they were used; or they may appoint all and every one to sit in the church with their faces towards the east, to stand up at the epistles and gospels, &c.; yea, what ceremonies, Jewish, popish, heathenish, may they not impose, provided they only hold the foundation, and keep to those essentials which he calls matters of duty? By restraining the unlawfulness of will-worship to the essentials, he leaves men free to do anything in religion, præter verbum, so that it appear not to them to be contra verbum; anything they may add to the word, or do beside the word, so that the thing cannot be proved contrary to the word.
Thirdly, Mr Hussey, ibid., p. 4, 5, saith, That the Parliament may require such as they receive for preachers of truth, “to send out able men to supply the places, and that [pg 4-026] without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of the people,” where, in the first part of that which he saith, there is either a heterodoxy or a contradiction. A heterodoxy, if he mean that ministers are to be sent out without ordination: a contradiction, if he mean that they must be ordained; for then he gives classes a work which is not merely doctrinal. But most strange it is, that he so far departeth from Protestant divines in point of the church's liberty in choosing ministers. He tells us, p. 14, that Mr Herle, “for want of skill and theological disputations,” hath granted to people a right to choose their minister. Mr Herle's skill, both logical and theological, is greater than it seems he can well judge of; neither can this bold arrogant censure of his derogate from Mr Herle's, but from his own reputation. For the matter itself, it is one, and not the least, of the controversies between the Papists and Protestants, what right the church hath in the vocation of ministers: read Bellarmine, de Cleric., and those that write against him, and see whether it be not so. The Helvetic Confession tells us that the right choosing of ministers is by the consent of the church, and the Belgic Confession saith, “We believe that the ministers, seniors and deacons, ought to be called to those their functions, and by the lawful elections of the church to be advanced into those rooms.” See both these in the Harmony of Confessions, sect. 11. I might here, if it were requisite, bring a heap of testimonies from Protestant writers; the least thing which they can admit of is, that a minister be not obtruded renitente ecclesia. Factum valet, fieri non debet. It may be helped after it is done, without making null or void the ministry; but in a well-constituted church there ought to be no intrusion into the ministry, the church's consent is requisite; for which also I might bring both scripture and antiquity, but that is not my present business. One thing I must needs put Mr Hussey in mind of, that when the prelates did intrude ministers, without any regard to the disallowance of the people, it was cried out against as an oppression and usurpation, and we are often warned by Mr Prynne, by Mr Coleman, and by myself, to cast away the prelates' usurpation with themselves. But who lords it now over the Lord's inheritance, the Presbyterians or the Erastians? Nay, he who will have ministers put in churches [pg 4-027] “without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of people,” falls far short of divers prelatical men, who did much commend the ancient primitive form of calling ministers, not without the church's consent. See Dr Field, Of the Church, lib. 5, cap. 54; Bilson, de Gubern. Eccl., cap. 15, p. 417; the author of The History of Episcopacy, part 2, p. 360.
Fourthly, Mr Hussey, Epist., p. 7, saith, That upon further consideration he found “the minister charged only with preaching and baptising.” The like he hath afterwards, p. 39, “Let any man prove that a minister hath any more to do from Christ than to teach and baptise.” And again, p. 44, he propounds this query, “Whether Christ gave any more government (he should have said any more to do, for preaching and baptising are not acts of government) than is contained in preaching and baptising,” and he holds the negative. If only preaching and baptising, then not praying and reading in the congregation, ministering the Lord's supper, visiting the sick and particular families.