Sect. 3. Two things are here replied, 1. That there is reason for adstricting of our practice in these things, because we are commanded to obey them that have the rule over us, and to submit ourselves, Heb. xiii. 17,[77] and to submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 16, and that except public constitutions must needs be obeyed, there can be no order,[78] but all shall be filled with strife and contention. Ans. 1. As touching obedience to those that are set over us, if they mean not to tyrannise over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Pet. v. 3; and to make the commandments of God of no effect by their traditions, Mark vii. 9, they must give us leave to try their precepts by the sure will of God's word; and when we find that they require of us anything in the worship of God which is [pg 1-008] either against or beside his written word, then modestly to refuse obedience, which is the only way for order, and shunning of strife and contention. It will be said again, that except we prove the things commanded by those who are set over us to be unlawful in themselves, we cannot be allowed to refuse obedience to their ordinances. Ans. This unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves hath been proved by us already, and shall yet again be proved in this dispute. But put the case, they were lawful in themselves, yet have we good reason for refusing them: “David thought the feeding of his body was cause sufficient to break the law of the shew-bread; Christ thought the satisfying of the disciples' hunger to be cause sufficient to break the ceremony of the Sabbath. He thought, also, that the healing of the lepers' bodies was a just excuse to break the law that forbade the touching of them; much more, then, may we think now in our estimation, that the feeding of other men's souls, the satisfying of our own consciences, together with the consciences of other men, and the healing of men's superstition and spiritual leprosy, are causes sufficient to break the law of the ceremonies and of the cross, which are not God's but men's,” saith Parker.[79] 2. As touching submission or subjection, we say with Dr Field,[80] that subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not, and even when our consciences suffer us not to obey, yet still we submit and subject ourselves, and neither do nor shall (I trust) show any the least contempt of authority.
Sect. 4. Secondly, It is replied, that our Christian liberty is not taken away when practice is restrained, because conscience is still left free. “The Christian liberty (saith Paybody[81]), is not taken away by the necessity of doing a thing indifferent, or not doing, but only by that necessity which takes away the opinion or persuasion of its indifferency,” So saith Dr Burges,[82] “That the ceremonies in question are ordained to be used necessarily, though the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to God, be left free.” Ans. 1. Who doubts of this, that liberty of practice may be restrained in the use of things which are in [pg 1-009] themselves indifferent? But, yet, if the bare authority of an ecclesiastical law, without any other reason than the will and pleasure of men, be made to restrain practice, then is Christian liberty taken away. Junius saith,[83] that externum opus ligatur from the use of things indifferent, when the conscience is not bound; but in that same place he showeth, that the outward action is bound and restrained only quo usque circumstantiae ob quas necessitas imperata est, se extendunt. So that it is not the authority of an ecclesiastical law, but the occasion and ground of it, which adstricts the practice when the conscience is left free. 2. When the authority of the church's constitution is obtruded to bind and restrain the practice of Christians in the use of things indifferent, they are bereaved of their liberty, as well as if an opinion of necessity were borne in upon their consciences. Therefore we see when the Apostle, 1 Cor. vii., gives liberty of marriage, he doth not only leave the conscience free in its judgment of the lawfulness of marriage, but also give liberty of practice to marry or not to marry. And Col. ii. 21, when he giveth instances of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty, he saith not, you must think that you may not touch, &c., but “touch not,” &c., telling us, that when the practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling, by the ordinances of men, then is Christian liberty spoiled, though the conscience be left free. Camero, speaking of the servitude which is opposed to Christian liberty, saith,[84] that it is either animi servitus, or corporis servitus. Then if the outward man be brought in bondage, this makes up spiritual thraldom, though there be no more. But, 3. The ceremonies are imposed with an opinion of necessity upon the conscience itself, for proof whereof I proceed to the next point.
CHAPTER IV.
THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A SECOND REASON, NAMELY, BECAUSE CONSCIENCE ITSELF IS BOUND AND ADSTRICTED.
Sect. 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us,[85] that the will of the law must be the rule of our [pg 1-010] conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience,[86] and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies,[87] not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat.[88] And shall they who call themselves the apostles' successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of God? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants,[89] Nullam vim ipsorum conscientiis illatum iri. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.
Sect. 2. Concerning the first of these we will hear what Dr Field saith:[90] “To bind the conscience (saith he) is to bind the soul and spirit of man, with the fear of such punishments (to be inflicted by him that so bindeth) as the conscience feareth; that is, as men fear, though none but God and themselves be privy to their doings; now these are only such as God only inflicteth,” &c. This description is too imperfect, and deserves to be corrected. To bind the conscience is illam auctoritatem habere, ut conscientia illi subjicere sese debeat, ita ut peccatum sit, si contra illam quidquam fiat, saith Ames.[91] “The binder (saith Perkins[92]) is that thing whatsoever which hath power and authority over conscience to order it. To bind is to urge, cause, and constrain it in every action, either to accuse for sin, or to excuse for well-doing; or to say, this [pg 1-011] may be done, or it may not be done.” “To bind the conscience (saith Alsted[93]) est illam urgere et adigere, ut vel excuset et accuset, vel indicet quid fieri aut non fieri possit.” Upon these descriptions, which have more truth and reason in them, I infer that whatsoever urges, or forces conscience to assent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as God alone inflicteth. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, ad assensum, is a binding of it.[94]
Sect. 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. Neque enim cum hominibus, sed cum uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris, saith Calvin.[95] Over our souls and consciences, nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo, saith Tilen.[96] From Jerome's distinction, that a king praeest nolentibus but a bishop volentibus, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: Volentibus gregi praeesso, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui praeest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere adigat ad parendum.[97] This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of God or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither ἀντοκρατορικῶς nor νομοθετικῶς, but declarativè, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by [pg 1-012] the law of God nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws qua tales, that is, as they are the constitutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only vim dirigendi et monendi.[98] It is said of the apostles, that they were constituted doctrinae Christi testes, non novae doctrinae legist tores.[99] And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis.[100] And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith:[101] “The wisest and best among the guides of God's church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their constitutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolishing of them again;” for seeing, lex instituitur, cum promulgatur, vigorem habet, cum moribus utentium approbatur.
Sect. 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is ratio legis, “the reason of the law,” without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most principal power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius,[102] διαταξις sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed διατυπωσις aut canon, ac proindedirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit. An ecclesiastical canon, [pg 1-013] saith Tilen,[103] ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena, Calvin's judgment is,[104] that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when manifestam utilitatem prae se fert, and when either tu prepon or charitatis ratio doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself?[105] Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticae prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsae. Hence Junius saith,[106] that the law binds not per se, but only propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandali. Hence Ames,[107] quamvis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientiis suis a Deo; ipsae tamen leges humanae, qua sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam. Hence Alsted:[108] “Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with God's word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience.” Hence the professors of Leyden say,[109] that laws bind not primo et per se, sed secundario, et per accidens; that is,[110] quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violator. Hence I may compare the constitutions of the church with responsa juris consultorum among the Romans, which obliged no man, nisi ex aequo et bono, saith Daneus.[111] Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind scandali et contemptus ratione, as Hospinian,[112] and in case libertas fiat cum scandalo, as Parcus;[113] for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.
Sect. 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made [pg 1-014] about order and policy. Extra casum scandali et destinatae rebellionis, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra constitutiones istas fecerit, saith Junius.[114] “If a law (saith Perkins)[115] concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience.” Alsted's rule is,[116] Leges humanae non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris. And Tilen teacheth us,[117] that when the church hath determined the mutable circumstances, in the worship of God, for public edification, privatorum conscientiis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil que ex contemptu ecclesiae ac ministerii publici petulanti καινοτομια vel κειοδοξια facere videantur.