THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, PROVED BY A THIRD REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE URGED UPON SUCH AS, IN THEIR CONSCIENCES, DO CONDEMN THEM.
Sect. 1. If Christian liberty be taken away, by adstricting conscience in any, much more by adstricting it in them who are fully persuaded of the unlawfulness of the thing enjoined; yet thus are we dealt with. Bishop Lindsay gives us to understand, that after the making and publication of an ecclesiastical canon, about things of this nature, albeit a man in his own private judgment think another thing more expedient than that which the canon prescribeth, yet in that case his conscience must be ruled by the will of the law, and not by his own judgment. And Bishop Spotswood, to such as object, that their conscience will not suffer them to obey, because they are persuaded that such things are not right, answereth; that the sentence of their superiors ought to direct them, and make their conscience yield to obedience. Their words I have before transcribed. By which it doth manifestly appear, that they would bear dominion over our consciences, not as lords only, by requiring the willing and ready assent of our consciences to those things which are urged upon us by their sole will and authority, but even as tyrants, not caring if they get so much as constrained obedience, and if by their authority they can compel conscience to that which is contrary to the πληροφορια and full persuasion which it hath conceived.
Sect. 2. It will be said, that our consciences are in an error, and therefore ought to be corrected by the sentence of superiors, whose authority and will doth bind us to receive and embrace the ceremonies, though our consciences do condemn them. Ans. [pg 1-022] Giving, and not granting, that our consciences do err in condemning the ceremonies, yet, so long as they cannot be otherwise persuaded, the ceremonies ought not to be urged upon us; for if we be made to do that which our consciences do condemn, we are made to sin, Rom. xiv. 23. It is an audacious contempt, in Calvin's judgment,[134] to do anything repugnante conscientia. The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though non obligat, yet ligat; though we be not obliged to do that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to do that which it condemneth. Quicquid fit repugnante et reclamante conscientia, peccatum est, etiamsi repugnantia ista gravem errorem includat, saith Alsted.[135] Conscientia erronca obligat, sic intelligendo, quod faciens contra peccet, saith Hemmingius.[136] This holds ever true of an erring conscience about matters of fact, and especially about things indifferent. If any say, that hereby a necessity of sinning is laid on them whose consciences are in an error, I answer, that so long as a man keeps an erroneous conscience, a necessity of sinning lies on him, and that through his own fault. This necessity ariseth from this supposition, that he retain his erring conscience, and so is not absolute, because he should inform his conscience rightly, so that he may both do that which he ought to do, and do it so from the approbation of his conscience. If it be said again, What should be done to them who have not laid down the error of conscience, but do still retain the same? I answer, eligatur id quod tutius et melius est.[137] If therefore the error of conscience be about weighty and necessary matters, then it is better to urge men to the doing of a necessary duty in the service of God, than to permit them to neglect the same, because their erring conscience disapproveth it; for example, it is better to urge a profane man to come and hear God's word than to suffer him to neglect the hearing of the same, because his conscience alloweth him not to hear. But if the error of conscience be about unnecessary things, or such as are in themselves indifferent, then it is pars tutior, the surest and safest part not to urge men to do that which in their consciences they condemn. Wherefore, since the ceremonies [pg 1-023] are not among the number of such necessary things as may not be omitted without the peril of salvation, the invincible disallowance of our consciences should make our opposites not press them upon us, because by practising them we could not but sin, in that our consciences judge them unlawful. If any of our weak brethren think that he must and should abstain from the eating of flesh upon some certain day, though this thing be in itself indifferent, and not necessary, yet, saith Baldwin,[138] “he who is thus persuaded in his conscience, if he should do the contrary, sinneth.”
Sect. 3. Conscience, then, though erring, doth ever bind in such sort, that he who doth against his conscience sinneth against God. Which is also the doctrine of Thomas.[139] But, without any more ado, it is sufficiently confirmed from Scripture. For, was not their conscience in an error who thought they might not lawfully eat all sorts of meat? Yet the Apostle showeth that their conscience, as erring as it was, did so bind, that they were damned if they should eat such meat as they judged to be unclean, Rom. xiv. 14, 23. The reason wherefore an erring conscience bindeth in this kind is, quoniam agens, &c.[140] “Because he who doth any thing against his conscience doth it against the will of God, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, forsomuch as that which conscience counselleth or prescribeth, it counselleth it under the respect and account of the will of God. He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the king, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the king himself. So he that contemneth his conscience contemneth God himself, because that which conscience counselleth or adviseth is taken to be God's will.” If I go with certain men upon such a course as I judge and esteem to be a treasonable conspiracy against the king (though it be not so indeed), would not his Majesty (if he knew so much), and might he not, justly condemn me as a wicked traitor? But how much more will the King of kings condemn me if I practice the ceremonies which I judge in my conscience to be contrary to the will of God, and to rob him of his royal prerogative?
CHAPTER VI.
THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A FOURTH REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESSED UPON US BY NAKED WILL AND AUTHORITY, WITHOUT GIVING ANY REASON TO SATISFY OUR CONSCIENCES.
Sect. 1. When the Apostle forbiddeth us to be the servants of men, 1 Cor. vii. 23, is it not his meaning that we should do nothing upon the mere will and pleasure of men, or propter hominem et non propter Deum, as Becane the Jesuit expoundeth it,[141] illustrating what he saith by another place, Eph. vi. 6, 7. Christian servants thought it an unworthy thing to serve wicked men,[142] neither yet took they well with the serving of godly men, for that they were all brethren in Christ. The Apostle answereth them, that they did not the will of man, because it was the will of man, but because it was the will of God, and so they served God rather than man, importing that it were indeed a grievous yoke for any Christian to do the will of man, if he were not sure that it is according to the will of God. Should any synod of the church take more upon them than the synod of the apostles did, who enjoined nothing at their own pleasure, but only what they show to be necessary, because of the law of charity? Acts xv. 28. Or should Christians, who ought not to be children, carried about with every wind, Eph. iv. 14; who should be able to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; in whom the word of God ought to dwell plentifully, Col. iii. 16; who are commanded to beware of men, Matt. x. 17; not to believe every spirit, to prove all things, 1 John iv. 1; and to judge of all that is said to them, 1 Thes. v. 21; should they, I say, be used as stocks and stones, not capable of reason, and therefore to be borne down by naked will and authority? 1 Cor. x. 15. Yet thus it fareth with us. Bishop Lindsey will have the will of the law to rule our consciences,[143] which is by interpretation, Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas. He gives us not the reason or equity of the law, but only the will of it, to be our role. Bishop Spotswood[144] will have us to be so directed by the sentence of our superiors, that we take their sentence as [pg 1-025] a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Which is so much as to say, you should not examine the reason and utility of the law, the sentence of it is enough for you: try no more when you hear the sentence of superiors, rest your consciences upon this as a sufficient ground: seek no other, for their sentence must be obeyed. And who among us knoweth not how, in the Assembly of Perth, free reasoning was shut to the door, and all ears were filled with the dreadful pale of authority? There is this much chronicled[145] in two relations of the proceedings of the same, howbeit otherwise very different. They who did sue for a reformation of church discipline in England, complained that they received no other answer but this:[146] “There is a law, it must be obeyed;” and after the same manner are we used. Yet is this too hard dealing, in the judgment of a Formalist, who saith,[147] that the church doth not so deal with them whom Christ hath redeemed: Ac si non possint capere quid sit religiosum, quid minus, itaque quae ab ecclesia proficiscuntur, admonitiones potius et hortationes dici debent, quam leges. And after, he says of ecclesiastical authority, tenetur reddere paerscripti rationem. “I grant (saith Paybody[148]) it is unlawful to do, in God's worship, anything upon the mere pleasure of man.” Chemnitius[149] taketh the Tridentine fathers for not expounding rationes decreti. Junius observeth,[150] that in the council of the apostles, mention was made of the reason of their decree. And a learned historian observeth[151] of the ancient councils, that there were in them, reasonings, colloquies, discussions, disputes, yea, that whatsoever was done or spoken, was called the acts of the council, and all was given unto all. Caeterum (saith Danaeus[152]) quoniam ut ait Tertullianus in Apologetico, iniqua lex est quae se examinari non patitur; non tam vi cogere homines ad obsequium quam ratione persuadere debent cae leges, quae scribuntur à pio nomotheta. Ergo fere sunt duae cujusvis legis partes, quemadmodum etiam Plato, lib. 4, de legibus scribit, nimirum praefacio [pg 1-026] et lex ipsa, i.e. jussio lege comprehensa. Praefatio causam affert, cur hominum negotiis sic prospiciatur. Ecclesiastical authority should prescribe what it thinks fit, Magis docendo, quam jubendo; magis monendo, quam minando, as Augustine speaketh.[153] Non oportet vi vel necessitate constringere, sed ratione et vitae exemplis suadere, saith Gregory Nazianzen,[154] speaking of ecclesiastical regiment. They, therefore, who give their will for a law, and their authority for a reason, and answer all the arguments of opponents, by bearing them down with the force of a public constitution and the judgment of superiors, to which theirs must be conformed, do rule the Lord's flock “with force and with cruelty,” Ezek. xxxiv. 4; “as lords over God's heritage,” 1 Pet. v. 3.
Sect. 2. Always, since men give us no leave to try their decrees and constitutions, that we may hold fast no more than is good, God be thanked that we have a warrant to do it (without their leave) from his own word, 1 Thess. v. 25. Non numeranda suffragia, sed appendenda, saith Augustine in Psal. xxxix. Our divines hold,[155] that all things which are proposed by the ministers of the church, yea, by aecumenical councils,[156] should be proved and examined; and that, when the guides of the church do institute any ceremonies as necessary for edification, yet ecclesia liberum habet judicium approbandi aut reprobandi eas.[157] Nay, the canon law,[158] prohibiting to depart or swerve from the rules and discipline of the Roman church, yet excepteth discretionem justitiae and so permitteth to do otherwise than the church prescribeth, if it be done cum discretione justitiae. The schoolmen also give liberty to a private man, of proving the statutes of the church, and neglecting the same, if he see cause for doing so, Si causa fit evidens, per se ipsum licite potest homo statuti observantiam praeterire.[159] If any be not able to examine and try all such things, debebant omnes posse, Dei jussu: Deficiunt ergo sua culpa, saith Parcus.[160] Si recte probandi facultate destitui nos sentimus, ab eodem spiritu qui per prophetas suos [pg 1-027] loquitur portenda est, saith Calvin.[161] We will not then call any man rabbi, nor jurare in verba magistri, nor yet be Pythagorean disciples to the church herself, but we will believe her and obey her in so far only as she is the pillar and ground of truth.