Sect. 5. 8th. The occasion of a scandal which is only passive should be removed, if it be not some necessary thing, and we are not only to shun that which giveth scandal, but also that whereupon followeth a scandal taken, whatsoever it be, if it be not necessary. This is so evident, that Papists themselves subscribe to it; for both Cardinal Cajetan[356] and Dominicus Bannes say, that we should abstain even a spiritualibus non necessariis when scandal riseth out of them.
9th. Neither can the indifferency or lawfulness of the thing done, nor the ordinance of authority commanding the use of it, make the scandal following upon it to be only passive, which otherwise, i.e., in case the thing were neither lawful nor ordained by authority, should be active. Not the former; for our divines teach,[357] that scandalum datum riseth sometimes, ex facto in se adiaphoro, when it is done intempestive, contra charitatis regulam. Not the latter; for no human authority can take away the condition of scandal from that which otherwise should be scandal, because nullus homo potest vel charitati, vel conscientiis nostris imperare, vel periculum scandali dati prestare, saith a learned Casuist.[358]
10th. A scandal is passive and taken by the scandalised without the fault of the doer, only in this case,[359] cum factum unius est alteri occasio peccandi praeter intentionem facientis, et conditionem facti, so that to the making of the doer blameless, is not only required that he intend not his brother's fall, but also that the deed be neither evil [pg 1-090] in itself, nor yet done inordinately, and with appearance of evil.
Sect. 6. 11th. The scandal not to be cared for is only in necessary things, such as the hearing of the word, prayer, &c., from which we may not abstain, though all the world should be offended at us. In these, I say, and these only, scandalum quod oritur ex rebus per se bonis et necessariis, non licet evitare, &c., at rerum legitimarum sed non necessariarum dispar est ratio, &c., saith a great Formalist.[360]
12th. We ought, for the scandal of the malicious, to abstain from all things from which we ought to abstain for the scandal of the weak; for we ought not to abstain from necessary things for the scandal of the weak, no more than for the scandal of the malicious, and from things that are not necessary, we ought to abstain for the scandal of the malicious as well as for the scandal of the weak. So that weakness and malice in the offended non variant speciem scandali, but only gradum ejusdem speciei. Both his fault who is offended through malice, is greater than his fault who is offended through weakness, and likewise his fault who offends the weak in the faith, is greater than his fault who offends those who are malicious against the faith, because as we ought to do good to all men, so chiefly to those of the household of faith. Nevertheless, the kind of scandal remains the same, whether we have to do with the malicious or the weak.
They are, therefore, greatly mistaken, who conclude from Paul's not circumcising of Titus, Gal. ii. 4, 5, that he cared not for the scandal of the malicious. The argument were good if those false brethren had been scandalised by his not circumcising of Titus; but they were only displeased hereby, not scandalised. The Apostle saw that they were to be scandalised by his circumcising of Titus; therefore, of very purpose, he circumcised him not, because he foresaw statim fore ut illi traherent in calumniam, saith Calvin.[361] Ne eo circumciso gloriarentur evangelicam libertatem quam Paulus praedicabat sublatam, saith Bullinger.[362] If they had compelled him to circumcise Titus, falsis fratribus parata erat calumniandi ansa adversus Paulum, saith Pareus,[363] who also inferreth well from this place, that we are taught to beware of two extremes, to wit, [pg 1-091] the scandal of the weak on the one part, and the pervicacy of false brethren on the other part: Si enim, saith he, usu rerum mediarum videmus, vel illos offendi, hoc est, in fide labefactari vel istos in falsa opinione obfirmari omittendae potius sunt, quia tunc per accidens fiunt illicitae. Whereupon I throw back the argument, and prove from this place, that Paul cared to shun the scandal of the malicious, which should have followed upon his circumcising of Titus, as well as he cared to shun the offence of the weak, which should have followed upon his not circumcising of Timothy; and that Paul cared for the scandal of the malicious is further confirmed by his not taking wages at Corinth. They who would have been offended at his taking wages there were malicious, and did but seek occasion against him, 2 Cor. xi. 12, yet his taking wages there not being necessary (as appeareth from 2 Cor. xi. 9), he abstained.
Christ's not caring for the scandal of the Pharisees is also objected, to prove that if the thing be lawful or indifferent, we are not to care for the offence of the malicious. But Parker answereth well:[364] “The scandal there not cared for is, when the Pharisees are offended at his abstaining from their washings and his preaching of true doctrine,—both of which were necessary duties for him to do. And when he defendeth his healing on Sabbaths, Luke xiii. 15, and his disciples' plucking ears, Matt. xii. 7, upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, he plainly insinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unnecessary when the malicious are scandalised. When the thing was indifferent, doth he not forego his liberty for to please them, as when he paid tribute, lest he should offend them, although he knew they were malicious?” Matt. xvii. 27.
Thus have I evinced a main point, namely, that when scandal is known to follow upon anything, if it be not necessary, there is no respect whatsoever which can justify it.