Tertullian's testimony[891] is known: Nulla lex, &c. “No law (saith he) owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth rule.”
It is well said by our divines,[892] that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power “to destruction, but to edification;” and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons “must carry before them a manifest utility.”[893] Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt.[894] If here it be objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example, in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church's prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and authority to put to order things of this nature.
I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church's determination; anterior, I say, de congruo, though not de facto, that is to say, before ever the church prescribe [pg 1-265] it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church's prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the conveniency of a thing must always go before the church's prescribing of it; go before, I mean, at least de congruo. Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she showeth not to have been convenient, even before her determination.
Sect. 8. These things being permitted, I come to extract my projection, and to make it evident that the lawfulness of the controverted ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three arguments:—
1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.
For, 1. They are not mere circumstances, such as have place in all moral actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr Burges[895] calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And again,[896] he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of the minister of God. Wherefore the replier[897] to Dr Mortoune's Particular Defence saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.
2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross, kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.
Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all such things were easily determinable in Scripture.
3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender [pg 1-266] consciences, but we are borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough elsewhere.[898]
Sect. 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church's own authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first; for divines hold,[899] legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera inspirata, quam divinam, &c. Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit: hoec incunabila illius à quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis nomine. We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody himself,[900] “I grant it is unlawful to do in God's worship anything upon the mere pleasure of man?”