Last of all, touching two remaining examples: 1. The feast of the dedication was not ordained by the sole authority of Judas, but by his brethren and by the whole congregation of Israel;[928] and the days of Purim were established by Mordecai, a prophet. Esth. ix. 20, 21. 2. We have elsewhere made it evident, that the days of Purim, by their first institution, were only days of civil joy and solemnity, and that the feast of the dedication was not lawfully instituted.
Sect. 13. Thus having dismissed the Bishop, we will make us for clearing the purpose in hand. But before we come to show particularly what princes may do, and what they may not do, in making laws about things ecclesiastical, we will first of all lay down these propositions following:—
1. Whatsoever the power of princes be in things and causes ecclesiastical, it is not, sure, absolute nor unbounded. Solius Dei est (saith Stapleton),[929] juxta suam sanctissimam voluntatem, uctiunes suas omnes dirigere, et omniafacere quæcunquc voluit. And again, Vis tuam voluntatem esse regulam rerum omnium, ut omnia fiant pro uuo beneplacito? Whether we respect the persons or the places of princes, their power is confined within certain limits, so that they may not enjoin whatsoever they list. As touching their poisons, Bishop Spotswood would do no less than warrant the articles of Perth by king James's personal qualities: “His person (saith he[930]), were he not our sovereign, gives them sufficient authority, being recommended by him; for he knows the nature of things, and the consequences of them, what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than we do all.”
I mean not to derogate anything from king James's duly-deserved praise, nor to obscure his never-dying memory; only I say, that such a prince as the Bishop speaketh of, who knoweth what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than many learned and godly pastors assembled in a synod, is rara avis in terris nigroque simillima Cygno. For a prince being but a man, and so subject to error, being but one man, and so in the greater hazard of error; for plus videns oculi, quam oculus; and, “woe to him that is alone when he falleth, for he hath not another to help him up,” saith the wisest of mortal kings, Eccl. iv. 10; being [pg 1-285] also compassed or assailed with so many tentations which other men are free of; and lastly, being so taken up and distracted with secular affairs and cares, that very seldom is he found well versed or singularly learned in the controversies of religion; may not such a one, in the common sense of Christians, be thought more like to fail and miscarry in his judgment about things ecclesiastical, than a whole synod, wherein there are many of the learned, judicious, and godly ministers of the church. Papists tell us, that they will not defend the personal actions of the Pope, quasi ipse solus omnibus horis sapere potuerit, id quod recte nemini concessum perhibetur.[931] Their own records let the world know the abominable vices and impieties of popes. Witness Platina, in the life of John X., Benedict IV., John XIII., Boniface VII., John XX., John XXII., Paul II., &c. And further, when our adversaries dispute of the Pope's infallibility, they grant, for his own person, he may be an heretic, only they hold that he cannot err è cathedra.
And shall we now idolise the persons of princes more than Papists do the persons of popes? Or shall Papists object to us, that we extol the judgment of our princes to a higher degree of authority and infallibility than they yield to the judgment of their popes? Alas, why would we put the weapons in the hands of our adversaries!
Sect. 14. But what say we of princes in respect of their place and calling? Is not their power absolute in that respect? Recte quidam (saith Saravia),[932] illiberalis et inverecundi censet esse ingenii, de prencipum potestate et rebus gestis questionem movere, quando et imperator sacrilegium este scribit, de eo quod à principe factum est disputare. Camero holdeth,[933] that in things pertaining to external order in religion, kings may command what they will pro authoritate, and forbid to seek another reason beside the majesty of their authority; yea, that when they command frivola, dura, et iniqua respectu nostri, our consciences are bound by those their frivolous and unjust commandments, not only in respect of the end, because scandal should possibly follow in case we obey them not, but also jubentis respectu, because the Apostle biddeth us obey the magistrate for conscience' sake. At [pg 1-286] the reading of these passages in Saravia and Camero, horror and amazement have taken hold on me. O wisdom of God, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice, upon whose thigh and vesture is written, “King of kings and Lord of lords,” make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but regulae regulatae, and mensurae mensuratae! Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings, be instructed ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, and lay down your crowns at the feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne,[934] discite justitiam moniti, and remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ, who, albeit he hath given the kingdoms of this world unto your hands, and non auferet mortalia, qui regna datio caelestia, yet hath he kept the government of his church upon his own shoulder, Psalm ix. 6, xxii. 21. So that rex non est propie rector ecclesiae sed reipublicae, ecclesiae vero defensor est. O all ye subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, ye are not the servants of men, to do what they list, and that for their listing, 1 Cor. vii. 23. The Apostle, Rom. xiii. urgeth, not obedience to magistrates for conscience' sake, but only subjection for conscience' sake, for he concludeth his whole purpose,[935] ver. 7, “Render therefore to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour.”[936] There is not in all that chapter one word of obedience to magistrates.
And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just, they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of them. For, per se, they cannot bind more than the church's laws can. Which things Dr Forbesse[937] hath also told you out of Calvin.
And hence it followeth, that whensoever you may omit that which princes enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not holden to obey them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye Formalists, of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in [pg 1-287] Rome; publish it not among the vassals of antichrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the worshippers of the Beast triumph! O how small confidence have the cardinals, I say not now into the Pope's person, but even into his chair, when being entered in the conclave for the election of a new pope, they spend the whole day following in the making of laws belonging to the administration and handling of all things by him who shall be advanced to the popedom; which laws every one of them subscribeth, and sweareth to observe, if he be made pope, as Onephrius writeth. Though the Pope's own creatures, the Jesuits, in their schools and books, must dispute for his infallibility è cathedra, yet we see what trust the wise cardinals, shut up in the conclave, do put in him, with what bond they tie him, and within what bounds they confine his power. Albeit the Pope, after he is created, observeth not strictly this oath, as that wise writer of the History of the Council of Trent noteth,[938] yet let me say once again, Shall we set up the power of princes higher, or make their power less limited than Papists do the power of popes? or shall they set bounds to popes and we set none to princes?
Sect. 15. But I find myself a little digressed after the roving absurdities of some opposites. Now, therefore, to return,—the second proposition which I am here to lay down, before I speak particularly of the power of princes, is this: Whatsoever princes can commendably either do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any way appertain to the external worship of God, must be both lawful in the nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience.
For, 1. The very ground and reason wherefore we ought to obey the magistrate[939] is, for that he is the minister of God, or a deputy set in God's stead to us. Now, he is the minister of God only for our good, Rom. xiii. 4. Neither were he God's minister, but his own master, if he should rule at his pleasure, and command things which serve not for the good of the subjects. Since, therefore, the commandments of princes bind only so far as they are the [pg 1-288] ministers of God for our good,—and God's ministers they are not in commanding such things as are either in their nature unlawful, or in their use inconvenient,—it followeth that such commandments of theirs cannot bind.