7. Except this judgment of discretion which we plead for be permitted unto us, it will follow that in point of obedience we ought to give no less, but as much honour unto princes as unto God himself. For when God publisheth his commandments unto us, what greater honour could we give him by our obedience than to do that which he commandeth, for his own sole will and authority, without making further inquiry for any other reason?

8. The Apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 23, forbiddeth [pg 1-291] us to be the servants of men, that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant beside the pleasure and will of men. Which interpretation is grounded upon other places of Scripture, that teach us we are not bound to obey men in anything which we know not to be according to the will of God, Eph. vi. 6, 7; that we ought not to live to the lusts of men, but to the will of God, 1 Pet. iv. 2, and that, therefore, we ought in everything to prove what is acceptable to the Lord, Eph. v. 20.

9. They who cleanse their way must take heed thereto according to the word, Psal. cxix. 9; therefore, if we take not heed to our way, according to the word, we do not cleanse it. They who would walk as the children of light, must have the word for a lamp unto their feet, and a light unto their path, Psal. cxix. 105; therefore, if we go in any path without the light of the word to direct us, we walk in darkness and stumble, because we see not where we go. They who would not be unwise, but walk circumspectly, must understand what the will of Lord is, Eph. v. 17; therefore, if we understand not what the will of the Lord is concerning that which we do, we are unwise, and walk not circumspectly.

10. Dona Dei in sanctis non sunt otiosa.[943] Whatsoever grace God giveth us, it ought to be used and exercised, and not to lie idle in us; but God giveth us actionem cognoscendi, τα διαφεροντα discernendi,[944] &c. a certain measure of the spirit of discretion, to teach us what to choose as good, and what to refuse as evil, 1 John ii. 27, “The same anointing teacheth you of all things;” 1 Cor. ii. 15, “He that is spiritual judgeth all things.” Therefore God would have us to exercise that measure of the gift of discretion which he hath bestowed on us, in discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be done or not.

11. Do not our divines plead for this judgment of private discretion which ought to be permitted to Christians, when anything is propounded to be believed or done by them? And this their judgment is to be seen in their writings against Papists about the controversies de interpretatione Scripturae, de fide implicita, &c.

12. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his prelections [pg 1-292] de Judice Controversiarum, doth often and in many places commend unto Christians the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holdeth it necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or prelates command them to do. Coactiva, &c. “The coactive power of a prince (saith he[945]), doth not absolutely bind the subject, but only with this condition, except he would compel him to that which is unlawful. Therefore there is ever left unto subjects a power of proving and judging in their own mind, whether that which is propounded be ungodly and unlawful or not; and if it be ungodly, that which the king threateneth should be suffered, rather than that which he commandeth be done. This Augustine hath taught,” &c. And whereas it may be objected, that this maketh a subject to be his prince's judge, he answereth thus.[946] Non se, &c. He maketh not himself another's judge, who pondereth and examineth a sentence published by another, in so far as it containeth something either to be done or to be believed by him; but only he maketh himself the judge of his own actions. For howsoever he who playeth the judge is truly said to judge, yet every one who judgeth is not properly said to play the judge. He playeth the judge who, in an external court pronounceth a sentence, which by force of jurisdiction toucheth another; but he judgeth, who in the inferior court of his own private conscience, conceiveth such a sentence of the things to be believed or done, as pertaineth to himself alone. This latter way private men both may and ought to judge of the sentences and decrees of magistrates, neither by so doing do they constitute themselves judges of the magistrates, but judges of their own actions.

Sect. 17. Finally, there is none of our opposites but saith so much as inferreth the necessity of this judgment of private and practical discretion; for every smatterer among them hath this much in his mouth, that if the king or the church command anything unlawful, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but when they command things indifferent and lawful, then their ordinance ought to be our rule. But (good men) will they tell us how we shall know whether the things which the king or the church (as they speak) do enjoin are lawful [pg 1-293] or unlawful, indifferent or not indifferent? and so we shall be at a point. Dare they say, that they may judge those things indifferent which our superiors judge to be such? and those unlawful which our superiors so judge of? Nay, then, they should deliver their distinction in other terms, and say thus: If our superiors enjoin anything which they judge to be unlawful, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but if they enjoin such things as they judge to be indifferent, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey their ordinance. Which distinction, methinks, would have made Heraclitus himself to fall a laughing with Democritus. What then remaineth? Surely our opposites must either say nothing, or else say with us, that it is not only a liberty but a duty of inferiors, not to receive for a thing lawful that which is enjoined by superiors, because they account it and call it such, but by the judgment of their own discretion following the rules of the word, to try and examine whether the same be lawful or unlawful.

Sect.. 18. These praecognita being now made good, come we to speak more particularly of the power of princes to make laws and ordinances about things which concern the worship of God. The purpose we will unfold in three distinctions: 1. Of things; 2. Of times; 3. Of ties. First, Let us distinguish two sorts of things in the worship of God, viz., things substantial, and things circumstantial. To things substantial we refer as well sacred and significant ceremonies as the more necessary and essential parts of worship, and, in a word, all things which are not mere external circumstances, such as were not particularly determinable within those bounds which it pleased God to set to his written word, and the right ordering whereof, as it is common to all human societies, whether civil or sacred, so it is investigable by the very light and guidance of natural reason. That among this kind of mere circumstances sacred significant ceremonies cannot be reckoned, we have otherwhere made it evident. Now, therefore, of things pertaining to the substance of God's worship, whether they be sacred ceremonies, or greater and more necessary duties, we say that princes have not power to enjoin anything of this kind which hath not the plain and particular institution of God himself in Scripture. They may indeed, [pg 1-294] and ought to publish God's own ordinances and commandments, and, by their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the same. Notwithstanding, it is a prince's duty, “that in the worship of God, whether internal or external, he move nothing, he prescribe nothing, except that which is expressly delivered in God's own written word.”[947] We must beware we confound not things which have the plain warrant of God's word with things devised by the will of man. David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, Josiah, and other kings among the people of God, did, as well laudably as lawfully, enjoin and command that worship and form of religion which God, in his law and by his prophets, commanded; and forbid, avoid, and abolish such corruptions as God had forbidden before them, and appointed to be abolished; whence it followeth not that kings may enjoin things which want the warrant of the word, but only this much, which all of us commend, viz., “That a Christian prince's office in religion,[948] is diligently to take care that, in his dominion or kingdom, religion out of the pure word of God, expounded by the word of God itself, and understood according to the first principles of faith (which others call the analogy of faith), either be instituted, or, being instituted, be kept pure, or, being corrupted, be restored and reformed, that false doctrines, abuses, idols, and superstitions, be taken away, to the glory of God, and to his own and his subjects' salvation.”

Sect. 19. But in all the Scripture princes have neither a commendable example, nor any other warrant, for the making of any innovation in religion, or for the prescribing of sacred significant ceremonies of men's devising. Jeroboam caused a change to be made in the ceremonies and form of God's worship, whereas God ordained the ark of the covenant to be the sign of his presence, and that his glory should dwell between the cherubims. Jeroboam set up two calves to be the signs representative of that God who brought “Israel out of Egypt;” and this he means while he saith, “Behold thy gods,” &c., 1 Kings xii. 28, giving to the signs the thing signified; whereas God ordained Jerusalem to be the place of worship, and all the sacrifices to be brought to [pg 1-295] the temple of Solomon, Jeroboam made Dan and Bethel to be places of worship, and built there altars and high places for the sacrifices; whereas God ordained the sons of Aaron only to be his priests, Jeroboam made priests of the lowest of the people, which were not of the sons of Levi; whereas God ordained the feast of tabernacles to be kept on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, Jeroboam appointed it on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. Now, if any prince in the world might have fair pretences for the making of such innovations in religion, Jeroboam much more. He might allege for his changing of the signs of God's presence, and of the place of worship, that since Rehoboam's wrath was incensed against him, and against the ten tribes which adhered unto him (as appeareth by the accounting of them to be rebels, 2 Chron. xiii. 6, and by the gathering of a huge army for bringing the kingdom again to Rehoboam, 2 Chron. xi. 1), it was no longer safe for his subjects to go up to Jerusalem to worship, in which case God, who required mercy more than sacrifice, would bear with their changing of a few ceremonies for the safety of men's lives. For his putting down of the priests and Levites, and his ordaining of other priests which were not of the sons of Levi, he might pretend that they were rebellious to him, in that they would not assent unto his new ordinances,[949] which he had enacted for the safety and security of his subjects, and that they did not only simply refuse obedience to these his ordinances, but in their refusal show themselves so stedfastly minded, that they would refuse and withstand even to the suffering of deprivation and deposition; and not only so, but likewise drew after them many others of the rest of the tribes to be of their judgment, 2 Chron. xi. 16, and to adhere to that manner of worship which was retained in Jerusalem. Lastly, For the change which he made about the season of the feast of tabernacles, he might have this pretence, that as it was expedient for the strengthening of his kingdom[950] to draw and allure as many as could be had to associate and join themselves with him in his form of worship (which could not be done if he should keep that feast at the same time when it was kept at Jerusalem); so there [pg 1-296] was no less (if not more) order and decency in keeping it in the eighth month, when the fruits of the ground were perfectly gathered in[951] (for thankful remembrance whereof that feast was celebrated) than in the seventh, when they were not so fully collected.

These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine faith and religion, that the changes which he had made were only about some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of God, and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin. Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xvi. 10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the people's sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged[952] specious reasons for excusing themselves,—as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange gods, but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in wherein God was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs, that the groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to the worship [pg 1-297] of God, and that they did consecrate these places for divine worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to God's honour,—yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of God, neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly God was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies to those which he himself hath appointed.[953]