2. If we be not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the law of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them, except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the violating of the law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore the latter. It is God's peculiar sovereignty, that his will is a rule ruling, but not ruled, and that therefore a thing is good because God will have it to be good. Man's will is only such a rule as is ruled by higher rules, and it must be known to be norma recta before it can be to us norma recti.
3. If we be bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion (following the rules of the word), whether the things which princes command be right, and such as ought to be done; and if we find them not to be such, to neglect them, then their laws cannot bind absolutely and by themselves, (else what need were there of such trial and examination?) but only conditionally, and in case they cannot be neglected without violating some other law, which is of a superior bond. But the former we have proved by strong reasons, therefore the latter standeth sure.
4. If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful and expedient, and according to the other rules of the word, then the laws of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting [pg 1-316] of them cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the word; but the former hath been evinced and made good, therefore the latter necessarily followeth.
5. If the laws of princes could bind absolutely and simply, so that in no case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the matter and thing itself which is commanded, but from neither of these it can arise, therefore from nothing. It cannot arise from any authority which they have, for if, by their authority, we mean their princely pre-eminence and dignity, they are princes when they command things unlawful as well as when they command things lawful, and so if, because of their pre-eminence their laws do bind, then their unlawful ordinances do bind no less than if they were lawful; but if by their authority we mean the power which they have of God to make laws, this power is not absolute (as hath been said) but limited; therefore from it no absolute bond can arise, but this much at the most, that “kings on earth must be obeyed,[984] so far as they command in Christ.”
Neither yet can the bond be absolute in respect of the thing itself which is commanded.
When princes publish the commandments of God, the things themselves bind whether they should command them or not, but we speak of such things as God's word hath left in their nature indifferent, and of such things we say, that if being enjoined by princes they did absolutely bind, then they should be in themselves immutably necessary, even secluding as well the laws of princes which enjoin them, as the end of order, decency, and edification, whereunto they are referred. To say no more, hath not Dr Forbesse told us in Calvin's words,[985] Notatu dignum, &c.? “It is worthy of observation, that human laws, whether they be made by the magistrate or by the church, howsoever they be necessary to be observed (I speak of such as are good and just), yet they do not, therefore, by themselves bind the conscience, because the whole necessity of observing them looketh to the general end, but consisteth not in the things commanded.”
6. Whatsoever bond of conscience is not confirmed and warranted by the word is, [pg 1-317] before God, no bond at all. But the absolute bond wherewith conscience is bound to the obedience of the laws of princes is not confirmed nor warranted by the word; therefore the proposition no man can deny, who acknowledged that none can have power or dominion over our consciences but God only, the great Lawgiver, who alone can save and destroy, James iv. 12. Neither doth any writer, whom I have seen, hold that princes have any power over men's consciences, but only that conscience is bound by the laws of princes, for this respect, because God, who hath power over our consciences, hath tied us to their laws. As to the assumption, he who denyeth it must give instance to the contrary. If those words of the Apostle be objected, Rom. xiii. 5, “Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake.”
I answer, 1. The Apostle saith not that we must obey, but that we must be subject, for conscience' sake; and how oft shall we need to tell our opposites that subjection is one thing, and obedience another?
2. If he had said that we must obey for conscience' sake, yet this could not have been expounded of an absolute bond of conscience, but only of an hypothetical bond, in case that which the magistrate commandeth cannot be omitted without breaking the law of charity. If it be said again, that we are not only bidden be subject, but likewise to obey magistrates, Tit. iii. 1: Ans. And who denyeth this? But still I ask, are we absolutely and always bound to obey magistrates? Nay, but only when they command such things as are according to the rules of the word, so that either they must be obeyed or the law of charity shall be broken; in this case, and no other, we are bidden obey.
Sect. 31. Thus have we gained a principal point, viz., that the laws of princes bind not absolutely but conditionally, not propter se, but propter aliud. Whereupon it followeth, that except the breach of those ceremonial ordinances wherewith we are pressed include the breach of the law of charity, which is of a superior bond, we are not holden to obey them. Now that it is not the breach, but the obedience of those ordinances which violateth the law of charity, we have heretofore made manifest, and in this place we will add only one general: Whensoever the laws of princes about things ecclesiastical do bind the conscience [pg 1-318] conditionally, and because of some other law of a superior bond, which cannot be observed if they be transgressed (which is the only respect for which they bind, when they bind at all), then the things which they prescribe belong either to the conservation or purgation of religion; but the controverted ceremonies belong to neither of these, therefore the laws made thereanent bind not, because of some other law which is of a superior bond. As to the proposition, will any man say that princes have any more power than that which is expressed in the twenty-fifth article of the Confession of Faith, ratified in the first parliament of king James VI., which saith thus: “Moreover, to kings, princes, rulers, and magistrates, we affirm that chiefly and most principally, the conservation and the purgation of the religion appertains, so that not only they are appointed for civil policy, but also for maintenance of the true religion, and for suppressing of idolatry and superstition whatsoever?” Hoc nomine, saith Calvin,[986] maxime laudantur sancti reges in scriptura, quod Dei cultum corruptum vel eversum restituerint, vel curam gesserint religionis, ut sub illis pura et incolumis floreret. The twenty-first Parliament of king James, holden at Edinburgh 1612, in the ratification of the acts and conclusions of the General Assembly, kept in Glasgow 1610, did innovate and change some words of that oath of allegiance which the General Assembly, in reference to the conference kept 1751, ordained to be given to the person provided to any benefice with cure, in the time of his admission, by the ordinate. For the form of the oath, set down by the Act of the Assembly, beginneth thus: “I, A. B., now nominate and admitted to the kirk of D., utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the right excellent, right high, and mighty prince, James VI., by the grace of God king of Scots, is the only lawful supreme governor of this realm, as well in things temporal as in the conservation and purgation of religion,” &c. But the form of the oath set down by the Act of Parliament beginneth thus: “I, A. B., now nominate and admitted to the kirk of D., testify and declare in my conscience, that the right excellent, &c., is the only lawful supreme governor of this realm, as well in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical, [pg 1-319] as in things temporal,” &c. Yet I demand, whether or not do the matters spiritual and ecclesiastical, of which the Act of Parliament speaketh, or those all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, of which the English oath of supremacy speaketh, comprehend any other thing than is comprehended under the conservation and purgation of religion, whereof the Act of Assembly speaketh? If it be answered affirmatively, it will follow that princes have power to destruction, and not to edification only; for whatsoever may edify or profit the church, pertaineth either to the conservation or the purgation of religion. If negatively, then it cannot be denied that the conservation and purgation of religion do comprehend all the power which princes have in things ecclesiastical.